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ABSTRACT 
 
Ngeta Kabiri 
Global Environmental Governance and Community-Based Conservation in Kenya and 
Tanzania 
(Under the direction of Catharine Newbury) 
 
This study examines the possibilities of executing Community-Based Conservation (CBC) as 
a viable environmental governance regime.  It focuses on the contestations over access and 
control of natural resources with specific reference to wildlife.  These contestations emanate 
from competing claims over natural resources between the state and the local communities.  
The study frames these contestations within the context of a property rights paradigm.  It 
inquires as to whether the state in Africa, as presently constituted, can devolve authority over 
national natural resource control to communities so as to engender a private property right 
consciousness that the CBC model is premised on. 
The study contends that African states as they currently exist are unlikely to devolve 
property rights to local communities in a way that would induce a private property right 
consciousness.  It demonstrates that the interests of the African state in the distributional 
gains from national natural resources are perhaps too vested for it to devolve power if that 
devolution would cost it control of these resources.  Moreover, there is the factor of the social 
forces that the state is embedded in and this complicates both its willingness and capacity to 
devolve wildlife property rights to local communities.  Given such predicaments, the study 
shows that the state is capable of conceding in theory and defecting in practice, thereby 
undermining the institution of an environmental governance regime that favors CBC.  The 
 iv 
 
study thus suggests that accomplishing environmental protection through the CBC model is 
problematic given the nature of the existing African states.    
Nevertheless, in spite of the devolution predicaments, the study shows that 
communities can still accommodate a conservation regime that is not necessarily predatorial, 
thus suggesting that there may still be some hope for biodiversity conservation even in the 
absence of the desirable CBC.  The study concludes by specifying the conditions under 
which devolution of property rights in wildlife to local communities could take place in order 
to engender the private property rights consciousness anticipated by the proponents of CBC.  
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Chapter I 
General Introduction 
 
I  Introdution 
 
Though the project issues sounded very good to most of our members, there 
was (sic), perhaps, some doubts from the community as to whether such ideals 
will ever be achieved.  “Will the government agree to this revival, for 
instance, of customary institutions to manage natural resources, instead of 
government institutions?” This is what the community kept on asking.  They 
believed that the government strong presence can hardly be reversed.  (‘Final 
Report of MAA-PDO/NORAD COMMUNITY MOBILIZATION PROJECT” 
(n.d., but certainly 1997) 
 
The story of natural resource control across Africa is one of state domination.  States 
upheld their domination, oblivious of pressures to concede husbandry of these resources to 
local communities.  Since the 1990s, however, various forces have worked against the state’s 
continued domination of natural resources.  The result has been a paradigm shift in the 
management of natural resources, one from control by the central government to devolution 
to communities living with these resources.  Devolution has been, however, a contested 
process.  The competing interests that characterize the wildlife sector have largely driven this 
struggle for control.  The struggle for control over Tanzania and Kenya’s wildlife is not an 
exception to this story.  Although the government claims control over wildlife1, most of the 
wildlife lives outside of the designated protected areas, occupying land otherwise assigned to 
                                                 
NOTES  
 
1See Nshala (n.d. a) on the question of whether the government owns wildlife or holds it in Trust for 
the people of Tanzania. 
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private individuals or communities2.  Thus, communities produce a good they do not own, 
and this poses a problem to the security of wildlife.   
If communities decide that they are not benefiting from local wildlife, they will initiate 
land use practices hostile to the survival of this wildlife.  Moreover, if communities do not 
value wildlife, they will welcome poachers, instead of reporting them to the authority.3  Thus, 
the local wildlife will become endangered.  The way to modify this outcome in order to 
produce a healthy wildlife sector would be for the authorities to guarantee communities 
security of wildlife property rights.  A private property rights system would insure the future 
of both wildlife (biodiversity) and the multi-million dollar tourism industry that wildlife 
enables.  This mindset is the position of most conservationists of the Community-Based 
Conservation (CBC) persuasion and the communities themselves (KWWG, 2003e; Queiroz, 
n.d.).  The USAID, for example, has since the early 1990s supported the wildlife sector 
reform in Kenya on this premise through two of its major projects, namely COBRA and 
CORE.4  With respect to COBRA, for example, its design hypothesis was premised on the 
fact that “increasing the stream of benefits that flow from wildlife conservation to 
communities will change the attitude of rural communities towards wildlife conservation 
from negative to positive” (Queiroz, n.d.).  It is because of this reasoning that reluctant states 
                                                 
2As for wildlife, the question of land tenure is controversial.  While individuals or communities can 
have title to land, the phenomenon of eminent domain, and the privileging of conservation as a 
category defining land classification, renders the notion of private ownership precarious.   The 
President has powers to transfer a piece of land from one category to another (see URT, 1999a).  With 
specific reference to wildlife, the government can declare certain areas official wildlife habitats, 
thereby protecting such lands from certain human activities (URT, 1974). 
 
3This is not just a prediction; in western Tanzania, communities evaluated the benefit of refugees by 
ranking decimation of wildlife by the refugees (who used it for subsistence) as the top-most benefit of 
hosting refugees.  This was because communities were now harvesting crops, unlike in the past when 
their crops would be foraged by wildlife (Whitaker, 1999).  
 
4Indeed, the sector project took its abbreviation from its market orientation: CORE: Conservation of 
Resources through Enterprise. 
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have been made to recognize CBC initiatives as a model of environmental governance in 
Africa.  The pressure has been exerted by local, national, and international environmental 
actors.  The execution of this model has, however, been contentious, hence the concern of 
this study.   
 
II  Statement of the Problem 
Can the state as presently constituted devolve wildlife property rights to the 
communities so as to engender in them a private property right consciousness that is 
envisioned in the CBC model?  This study advances the thesis that while the state may 
succumb to pressures for devolution, it is unlikely to devolve such rights to local 
communities so as to engender in them a private property right consciousness in wildlife.  
The state’s interests in the wildlife largesse, and the social forces it is embedded in, 
constrains it from devolving wildlife property rights to local communities in ways that 
would give these communities a private property rights consciousness in wildlife.   
Thus, the state as presently constituted cannot devolve wildlife property rights to 
local communities as envisaged by the proponents of community-based conservation.  
The two primary factors responsible for this inability are the value the state attaches to its 
wildlife largesse, and the social forces the state is embedded in.  Consequently, a CBC 
model instituted in that context would expose the resource to predatorial exploitation by 
local stewards with insecure property rights.  The assumption driving this argument is 
that the state is constrained by vested interests that are so powerful they make devolution 
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that is acceptable to communities impossible.  This aspect of CBC is rarely addressed in 
the literature.5      
 
III  Literature Review 
 
While extant literature on CBC is not uncritical of CBC as a model of environmental 
governance in Africa, the critique concerns itself mostly with issues such as identifying the 
community in CBC, whether CBC initiatives are really involving and benefiting 
communities, and whether communities can actually execute their conservation mandate 
(Watts, 2004; Coffman, 2002; Agrawal and Gibson, 1999; Gibson, 1999; Songorwa, 1999a; 
Bill, 1995; Wells, 1994).  There is less focus on the issue raised in the paragraph above.  The 
classic statement of the capacity of a community to manage its resources made the case that 
the state is not the only way; nevertheless, the question of edging out the state was not within 
the scope of the study (Ostrom, 1990).  Subsequent studies that looked at this possibility 
(Gibson, 1999) suggested that, far from withdrawing from the arena of environmental 
governance, state functionaries would construct wildlife policies that, though they may be 
presented in the name of communities, would actually seek to entrench the interests of the 
conservation elites.  Gibson thus suggests that incorporating the state in the study of 
devolution of property rights to local communities is a fruitful way of inquiring into the 
relevance of CBC as an environmental governance model. 
The question of the role of the state in Africa’s development generally has been the focus 
of major attention.  The verdict, which is also largely responsible for inspiring claims for the 
institution of CBC, has been that the state has performed dismally as a manager of 
development, and especially capitalist development (see, for example, Nyang’oro, 1989; 
                                                 
5Gibson (1999) is perhaps the foremost exception to this observation; another one who could be read 
in the same trajectory is Schroeder (1999). 
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Mbaku, 1999; Tandon, 1982; Leys, 1975; Ake, 1996).  Among the emerging issues here is 
whether the state in Africa actually ever had an opportunity to execute its social contract with 
its inhabitants, or whether it merely remained a theater of struggle with the dominant forces 
in society, hijacking its capacity to execute its Weberian mandate (Nyang’oro, 1989; Babu, 
1981; Herbst, 1990).  This question, variously cast in terms of state autonomy6, is central to 
defining the environmental governance regime in Africa.  The conservation sector is one of 
the sectors where the state’s presence has been visibly weak, while external actors retained 
dominance even after independence.  This was largely because the emerging African 
governments were reluctant to expend resources on conservation in light of other more 
pressing demands (see, for example, Kabiri, 2006; Leakey, 2001).  Implied in this 
arrangement then is the question of whose agenda held sway in the conservation sector.7     
While the first two decades of independence in Africa were characterized by African 
governments being relatively or nominally in charge of their agenda, this situation ended 
with the rise of neo-liberal policies fronted by the Bretton Woods institutions during the 
1980s.  Donor agencies began to dictate policy in almost all the major sectors, the 
environmental sector included.  The World Bank's "Ten Principles of New 
Environmentalism", for example, explicitly claim that the local non-state actors are better 
than government officials in identifying priorities for action and in carrying environmental 
projects through to completion (Steer 1996).  It is against this background that external 
agencies sponsored CBC as a model of environmental governance (Wells 1994/5, US sub-
                                                 
6On the question of the autonomy of the state generally, see, for example, Evans, 1995, 1985; Block, 
1977; Fatton, 1988; Krasner, 1984; and Tandon, 1982. 
 
7Neumann’s study (Neumann, 1998) is a foremost statement on this question, particularly with 
respect to the colonial era, and the same can largely be reproduced for the post colonial era. 
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committee 1996, Steer 1996, Agrawal and Gibson 1999, Schroeder 1999).  Various studies 
cite the tendency of donor agencies to tie funding for projects to the incorporation of local 
communities in the environmental governance structures (Western, 1997; Songorwa, 1999a; 
Gibson, 1999; Leakey, 2001; Suzuki, 2001; Dzingirai, 2003).  This phenomenon of overt 
donor conditionality has exposed the state to the vagaries of social forces to such a degree 
that its autonomy has become compromised.8  Within this context, the role of the state in 
environmental governance has become problematic.                 
Scholars and conservation practitioners hold divergent positions on the role of the state in 
environmental governance.  While the view that the state should give way to communities is 
popular among proponents of CBC, there is also the view that a strong state is critical to the 
governance of the environment (Leakey, 2001; see also Eckersley, 2004)9.  The convoluted 
way in which global environmental discourse conceptualizes the state and biodiversity 
governance shows that the state is, nevertheless, to be edged out of the environmental arena.  
While some pronouncements at the global level have wished to privilege the position of local 
communities in environmental governance, they also shy away from explicitly calling for an 
exit of the state.  Hence, these pronouncements also end up assigning the state the role of a 
guardian of the environmental agenda.  Thus, it becomes difficult to decipher what exactly 
are the rights of the state and the rights of communities.  In Our Common Future (WCED, 
                                                 
8See, for example, Whitaker (1999:185), whereby in the Ministry of Home Affairs in Tanzania, 
nearly a half of the civil servants were on the pay-roll of NGOs or IGOs, the very organizations they 
were supposed to be overseeing. 
 
9In a public seminar on the proposed Environmental Act of Tanzania, a former state administrator 
who was now an MP differed with some members of Civil Society who had argued that the role of the 
state should be minimized in the act.  He narrated an experience he had while trying to enforce certain 
environmental regulations regarding car washing on river banks.  He observed that he only succeeded 
after a heavy confrontation between administrative forces and the members of the public involved.  
To this extent, he averred that at certain times, to secure certain environmental outcomes, a strong 
state would be imperative. 
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1987), for example, decentralization of the management of natural resources upon which the 
locals depend was called for; decentralization entailed “giving these communities an effective 
say over the use of these resources” (emphasis mine) (WCED, 1987:63).  Yet, at the same 
time, states are held responsible to their citizens and to other states in maintaining 
ecosystems and related ecological processes vital for the functioning of the biosphere.  To 
this extent, they are charged with the responsibility of reviewing programs that degrade and 
destroy species’ habitat (WCED, 1987:163, 331).  In this case, it is difficult to see how one 
can reconcile the “effective say” of local communities and the responsibility that states have.  
It is such scenarios that create the contradiction alluded to by the Matabele chief cited 
elsewhere in this study.  Indeed, under the famous CBC as represented by the CAMPFIRE 
project in Zimbabwe, communities’ proposed projects are scrutinized and dismissed by 
District Councils (Dzingirai, 2003).  Yet, given the UN instruments cited above, can the 
District Council be reprimanded? 
The confusion regarding the status of the state in environmental governance was 
reproduced again in the Earth Summit at Rio in 1992.  While the summit called for rule-
making by local authorities and communities, and emphasized the involvement of 
individuals, it simultaneously held that the successful implementation of Agenda 21 was 
“first and foremost the responsibility of government” (UNCED, 1992, Agenda 21: ch. 8; see 
also Auer, 2000).  Thus, the failure to demarcate clearly the boundary between state and local 
communities in the governance of natural resources pervades the thinking of the global 
actors, thereby leaving the terrain of environmental conservation with a situation where both 
parties can legitimately anchor their claims to the governance of these resources to global 
norms on environmental governance.  This indeterminate situation also emerges in the 
 8 
 
literature on communities, property rights and biodiversity as well (see, for example, Kameri-
Mbote, 2002). 
Kameri-Mbote (2002) argues for devolving “real power by states and local authorities to 
local communities”.  To this extent, she avers that policies “that deny  such communities 
access to resources in the name of conservation or seek to teach them how to live with 
resources in terms that they do not understand should be eliminated” (Kameri-Mbote, 2002: 
184).  The current study is interested with the proposition of whether such prescriptions as 
Kameri-Mbote advances are feasible, given the nature of the African state extant.  Kameri-
Mbote does not address this question.  Indeed, the proximate observation she makes towards 
this end only confounds the issue.  In stating the relationship that should characterize the 
state and local communities vis a vis the governance of natural resources, she presents a 
template that the state would be comfortable with, but the communities would be suspicious 
of.  Kameri-Mbote avers that, 
The role of the state as the guardian 10  of the public interest would still 
subordinate the rights of communities, local authorities and individuals to the 
general interests of the country to sustainably manage wildlife resources and 
entitle the state to intervene in situations where the property owner’s activities 
threaten the existence of the wildlife resources (Kameri-Mbote, 2002:184). 
 
There is certainly a patent problem in a language that promises “real power” yet the same 
community is “subordinate,” and alludes to some vague, if not controversial, benchmarks 
                                                 
10 The notion of state as guardian was actually invoked in Mali to justify state claims on the 
governance of natural resources.  Mali’s 1994 central planning unit for environmental activities stated 
that “the State should behave as a good father who assists, advises, and controls” (Degnobl, 1995:10, 
quoted in Ribot, 1999:53). 
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like “general interests of the country”11, and sustainable utilization.  These benchmarks are 
easy to pronounce, but not to fathom.   
With respect to sustainability, for example, the entire debate around CITES and the 
regulation of ivory trade divides international actors into those who think it is sustainable, 
while others think it is detrimental to the elephant (see, for example, Hill, 1993; Bonner, 
1993; Western, 1997; Leakey, 2001).   Hence, to unleash on communities a state armed with 
such weapons as superintending the sustainability of utilization is the same as telling the state 
it can have its way.  Thus, the state should have no problem with Kameri-Mbote’s prognosis, 
but communities would.  On the basis of Kameri-Mbote, the state may not be expected to 
devolve property rights to the locals except on its own terms, even though she would also 
prefer it to do so on the basis of communities’ terms by not involving itself “…in the affairs 
of the community” (Kameri-Mbote, 2002: 184).  The notion of the state as the guardian of 
national interest confounds the question of what ought to be with that of what is; it is inspired 
by the assumption that the state is an honest broker12.  As will emerge from the case studies 
discussed here, this is far from being the case.  Thus, Kameri-Mbote illuminates well the 
predicaments besetting a conceptualization of the state in devolution of wildlife property 
rights.  These predicaments become even more pronounced when the state is disaggregated, 
and viewed as being more than a unitary actor, as is evident from Gibson (1999), and to some 
extent Songorwa (1999a).         
In Gibson (1999), the struggle for the devolution of wildlife property rights involves not 
just the state versus local communities, but also factions of the state (bureaucrats and 
                                                 
11See, for example, Rousseau on the problem surrounding the notion of the common good (Rousseau, 
1950). 
12 Bates (1983) argues that the social welfare maximizing model of state policymaking can be 
misleading. 
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politicians).  Gibson shows that in Zambia, the wildlife bureaucrats’ perceived threat to their 
control of wildlife property rights was from the higher echelons of the political leadership, 
not from below, i.e. communities.  Therefore, they sought to insulate themselves from 
politicians.  This is unlike the cases in Tanzania and Kenya, where the threat to the 
bureaucrats is perceived from below: the consequences of successful CBC.  Wildlife 
bureaucrats thus seek to present an image of their indispensability in the wildlife sector.  
While in Zambia the bureaucrats saw success with CBC as likely to insulate their edifice 
from being dismantled by politicians because politicians would be reluctant to incur the 
wrath of communities, in Tanzania and Kenya the bureaucrats see successful CBC as a sure 
way of dismantling the wildlife bureaucracy (given the context of structural adjustment 
programs where states are under pressure to downsize the bureaucracy and disperse its duties 
to the private sector)13.  In Kenya and Tanzania, therefore, wildlife bureaucrats seek to 
establish their indispensability among politicians in order to secure their preferences against 
the communities.  Thus, while the study of Zambia directs us to look at individuals, the cases 
of Kenya and Tanzania pose the question of why bureaucrats in Kenya and Tanzania were 
unlike their counterparts in Zambia with respect to their response to local pressures for 
devolution, more so given that in all cases, the political trajectories are relatively similar.     
On the other hand, Songorwa (1999a: 40) rightly observes that the CBC “…approach 
assumes that both the government in its totality and the relevant individual officers agree to 
transfer ownership of, and management responsibilities for, wildlife to communities.”  With 
respect to Tanzania, however, a case can be made that the government at a macro level has 
                                                 
13Tanzania’s Minister in charge of wildlife at one time alluded to this point in Parliament (Meghji, 
quoted in the Daily Mail newspaper, 30/07/1998 (Songorwa, 1999a: 346)).  See also, Schroeder 
(1999) where it is suggested that African governments may be seen as conceptualizing CBC as a tool 
of managing the Bretton Woods’ imposed structural adjustment programs. 
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agreed to devolve wildlife property rights to local communities.  Hence, Songorwa’s 
contention as to why governments may be reluctant to devolve does not capture the 
Tanzanian case (otherwise, the government would, like its Kenyan counterpart, have derailed 
the devolution process at the level of policy formulation).  Yet, in spite of this acceptance of 
a CBC-friendly policy by the government, devolution of wildlife property rights to local 
communities is still problematic.  This study is interested in the Tanzanian question as one of 
failure of devolution in the context of a policy that is acclaimed by both state and 
communities as CBC friendly.  Is it possible that the state, having been vanquished into 
subordination by donor conditionalities, publicly announces one thing, but bungles 
implementation as a tactic of resistance? (see, for example, Scott, 1990, 1985.)  Or is the 
state sincere, but constrained by other forces holding it hostage? 
In light of the foregoing, it can be observed that, while extant literature is heavy on the 
limitations of a CBC model of environmental governance, this caution is largely founded on 
technical imperatives.  It is unclear on the question of whether the envisaged CBC model 
would in the first instance be initiated.  This study pursues the line that a CBC model of 
environmental governance would still be problematic even if such issues as community 
identification and capacity were attended to successfully.  The principal contradiction in the 
execution of a successful CBC model is the factor of state willingness and incapacity to 
devolve wildlife property rights to local communities.   This is the concern of this study.   
  
IV  Study Objectives and Hypotheses 
The objective of this study is, therefore, to demonstrate that there is a fundamental flaw 
in pushing CBC as the viable environmental governance regime given the nature of the 
 12 
 
African state extant.  While the proponents of the CBC model are clear on the failures of the 
state governance of natural resources and the merits of CBC, there is a lacuna on the question 
of whether that clarity implies state capacity or willingness to disperse environmental 
governance authority to the local communities.   Yet, such a quality is germane if viable 
devolution is to be obtained.  Consequently, this study, by focusing on the interests of the 
African state in the wildlife largesse and the social forces within which the state is embedded, 
seeks to demonstrate that it is difficult for it to deliver a devolution strategy that would yield 
the promise of CBC as put forward by its proponents. 
The underlying motivations for this consideration are that the conditions under which an 
ideal environmental governance regime can be constituted would entail the state 
guaranteeing security of wildlife property rights to communities.  Such rights would be 
devoid of ambush through administrative fiat.  This pre-condition would in turn generate 
conditions under which a devolved environmental governance regime (CBC) would generate 
viable (anticipated) environmental outcomes: decision-making on resource use would rest 
with the communities who would be without fear of a state that would discard institutions 
and unilaterally distort the transaction costs (North, 1990).  The constitution of such a regime 
is currently problematic because the state, a key actor, has vested interests in the resource 
(Ascher, 1999), or it is trapped by vested interest groups that are more powerful than the 
communities (Gibson, 1999). 
In light of the foregoing, this study’s evidence supports a further hypothesis that, one, 
there will be inadequate devolution of environmental governance authority to locals; and, 
two, communities will resist anything less than total devolution, but depending on the level 
(and direction) of their politicization (intervening variable), they could concede.  
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Nevertheless, the future of environmental security through community stewardship is quite 
tenuous.  The foregoing objectives and hypotheses are conceptualized against a theory of 
property rights. 
 
 
V  Theory:  Private Property Rights and the Conservation Impulse 
     
Hence, in a class-divided society, if “ownership” is to have anything to do 
with relations of production (class relations), then someone owns something 
if, and only if, he can use it for production without impediment (Nyong’o, 
1981: 23).  
  
Property rights regimes can be grouped into three broad categories: the open-access, the 
state/public, and the private property rights regimes.  The first two are discounted as viable 
approaches to environmental conservation, leaving private property rights as the preferred 
resource governance regime (see, for example, Hardin, 1968; Ostrom, 199014).  The private 
property rights regime is the one that informs the CBC model. 
The CBC environmental governance model can be situated within a property rights 
regime stipulating that secure property rights, enjoyed at a private level, are better able to 
inform a responsible utilization of resources and thus serve as an incentive for conservation 
of resources.  A regime of such secure property rights is more reliable, the more the polity is 
a stable and a democratic one.  Similarly, the enjoyment of such property rights at the 
individual level generates a sense of confidence among resource users if there is a strong rule 
of law that is also accessible.  Also, the utilization of resources would be more responsible if 
the market for the resource is a liberalized one, such that resource users can be certain that 
                                                 
14Ostrom’s CPR is hereby being treated as a private property approach in light of McKean, 1992, in 
the sense that a community of people own the resource to the exclusion of others (hence 
privatization).  
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they are getting the best value for the resource that the market can offer.  In that case, they 
would have no incentive to over-harvest, but instead they would have an incentive to re-
invest in the production of the resource.  If such a condition were obtained, then there would 
be grounds to expect that resource users are going to engage in the conservation of resources 
because they have a selfish interest in the survival of the same.  The foregoing story can be 
modeled thus: 
Secure   enjoyed at  responsible             biodiversity conservation    
Property rights private level natural resource utilization                  
 
 
  x                                      x                                               x 
stable and   strong and accessible  liberal/free market 
democratic state rule of law 
 
The property rights arrangement described above implies that the state would have to 
concede property rights to resource users, thereby generating a private property rights 
regime.  Property rights are defined as enforceable instruments of society that specify the 
ways in which particular resources may be used and assign costs and benefits (Demstz, 
1967).  When that specification is done at a private level, then a private property rights 
regime can be said to be in vogue.  Private property rights mean that the private actors’ rights 
to the resource they own is exclusive and voluntarily transferable (De Alessi, 1980, Nyong’o, 
1981; Anderson and Hill, 2004).  In light of this, it is then possible to understand what is 
happening when, for example, a Matabele chief laments that they are always told that they 
can make decisions about wildlife and decide how to use their own resources, "but when we 
want to kill problem elephants, we are told by district council that it is not possible because 
the quota does not allow it" (Bonger, 1999:279-280).  The cases studied here from Kenya and 
Tanzania are largely inspired by similar sentiments.  Simply, there is a disjuncture between 
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the theory and practice of privatization of the resource.  This can have perilous effects on 
biodiversity conservation.   
If resource ownership is not devolved to a level where private actors feel they have 
determinate control over the resource, this would produce a sense of insecurity of resource 
ownership.  This sense of insecurity informs a short shadow of the future because resource 
users live in fear of dispossession at any time.  The result is a utilization of resources that 
assigns a high premium to the present, in contrast to the future.  Such an appropriation of 
natural resources exposes them to over-consumption, thereby heralding a regime of 
unsustainable resource utilization that translates to environmental degradation.  This scenario 
can be modeled thus: 
 
Inadequate  
devolution      resource ownership  short discount rate  predatorial 
of authority  insecurity       resource  
                                                                                                                                    utilization. 
 
    x    x 
   rentier/predator   high poverty levels 
state  
 
The above formulation informs the inquiry of whether the state can devolve to the 
community such authority over natural resources so as to make the community develop an 
affinity with the resource, thereby leading to the outcomes (environmental sustainability) that 
are associated with community governance of environmental resources.  This formulation 
produces a good fit between the theory and the thesis. 
If the research question is regarding whether the state as presently constituted can 
devolve property rights to communities as to generate a sense of private property right 
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consciousness, then a theory based on (in)adequate devolution of authority on property is 
relevant.  If the answer to the question on the state is answered in the negative, then it would 
have the implication that a CBC model of environmental governance will lead to predation 
and, therefore, that it is not the most appropriate regime of environmental governance.  On 
the other hand, if the question of the state and devolution is answered in the affirmative, then 
it would mean that communities will have a sense of ownership of resources and, therefore, 
that they are bound to steward them responsibly, thereby  making CBC  an appropriate 
regime for environmental governance.  To this extent then, actors and institutions are central; 
hence, the inquiry was executed within the framework of actor-centered institutionalism. 
 
VI  Theoretical Framework:  Actor-Centered Institutionalism 
Since this study raises questions dealing with the behavior of the actors involved in 
environmental governance, Scharpf’s (1997) actor-centered institutionalism framework is a 
useful tool for organizing our inquiry.  This framework explains social phenomena as the 
outcome of interactions among intentional actors, but these interactions are structured and the 
outcomes shaped by characteristics of institutional settings within which they occur.  The 
elements of this framework (see figure 1) entail a consideration of, among others, the 
institutional settings and the actors involved, including their perceptions, preferences, and 
capabilities; the actor constellation (that describes the potential of conflict); and modes of 
interaction (through which the conflict of actor constellation is to be resolved, which could 
either be: unilateral action, negotiated agreements, voting, or hierarchical directives).  The 
framework was valuable in imposing conceptual and empirical clarity. 
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(Figure 1:  Actor-centered institutionalism framework) 
 
 
In this approach, an attempt is made to examine the role of the individual or groups of 
individuals as the causal force behind given processes.  This applies as well to the question of 
the state, such that the state is not necessarily treated as a unified actor (see, for example, 
Marks, 1997: 23).  Rather, state bureaucrats and politicians are conceived as different sets of 
actors whose interests are sometimes at variance.  The state is, however, also seen as a 
theater of struggle in the sense that it provides the institutional contexts in which actors 
pursue their goals (Marks, 1997: 34).  This conception is particularly evident in the case of 
devolution of property rights because actors struggle to either capture, or influence the 
transformation of, the regulatory mechanism governing the wildlife estate.  It is this 
regulatory mechanism that in the final analysis informs decisions on resource utilization.  
The framework was quite helpful during data collection in the field. 
 
VII  Field Methodology and Data 
The data used in this paper were collected during extensive field research done in Kenya 
and Tanzania during 2000, 2003, and 2004.  Data were gathered through oral interviews and 
Actors 
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-perceptions 
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- options 
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-- regulations 
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participation in seminars and workshops, as well as from NGO and government documents.  
Local-level oral interviews were conducted among the Maasai of both Kenya (Amboseli and 
Maasai Mara) and Tanzania (West Kilimanjaro and Loliondo, North-east of Serengeti 
National Park).  These are sites of heavy NGOs activity because of their endowment in 
wildlife resources and concentration of the wildlife protected areas network.  Respondents 
from these sites were sampled among the youth, men, and women.  Village leaders and other 
opinion leaders were also interviewed, as were government officers, particularly at the 
district level.  Views of senior government officers were also noted during seminars and 
workshops addressed by these officers.  More data were collected from documents in 
archives of NGOs, government offices, and from media archives.  Secondary literature on 
NGOs and state-donor relations in Africa was also utilized.   
The conceptual focus of the fieldwork was the phenomenon of community-based 
conservation in which communities living with wildlife would have wildlife property rights 
devolved to them.  In both cases, clear groups of actors were manifest, and the struggle was 
centered on the kind of institutions to be put in place, in light of the existing institutions.  
Aspects of data sought included who the actors were, their goals, the coalitions, and their 
interactions.   
In Tanzania, the process of executing CBC entailed the creation of Wildlife Management 
Areas (WMAs) through aggregation of several villages.  The key actors participating in the 
process included the villagers, wildlife bureaucrats, politicians, and NGOs.  NGOs got 
involved because the government appointed some of them to facilitate, in concert with the 
district wildlife officers, the implementation of WMAs.  Other NGOs stepped in on their own 
initiative to assist the communities.  In Kenya, communities hosting wildlife in their lands 
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mobilized themselves as district wildlife forums and formed an umbrella body (Kenya 
Wildlife Working Group, KWWG) to pressure for the review of the wildlife legislative 
framework so that the resultant devolution would be anchored in law.  As the lobbying for 
review got under way, NGOs participated, lobbying for or against certain preferred legal 
positions.  While communities won at the parliamentary level, anti-utilization lobbies 
nevertheless triumphed at the executive level.  Again here, the key actors were thus the 
communities (as represented by the wildlife forums), politicians, wildlife bureaucrats, and 
NGOs.  On the basis of these cases, the theme of the CBC model as problematic is examined, 
as shown in the following chapters.    
 
VIII  Organization of the Study 
In the following chapter, the obstruction to the implementation of a successful CBC 
model by the bureaucrats in Tanzania’s wildlife department is analyzed.  While there is clear 
evidence supporting the premise that it is difficult for the state to devolve property rights to 
communities, there is simultaneously evidence that the failure to execute a CBC model in 
line with what the communities would like is not deterministic.  This aspect is illustrated in 
Chapter Three, whereby it is shown that some communities can nevertheless concede to work 
with the property rights defined for them by state bureaucrats.  Chapters Four and Five 
examine the struggles for property rights in Kenya.  The former looks at the attempts to co-
opt communities by devolving property rights to local communities without changing the 
basic institutions, such that wildlife bureaucrats interacted with communities in their own 
terms.  Communities found this approach unacceptable, and therefore initiated a 
 20 
 
parliamentary legislation that would anchor in law the devolution of wildlife property rights 
to communities.  Chapter Five examines this initiative.  The conclusion then follows.    
 
  
 
 
 
Chapter  II 
Devolution of Property Rights in Wildlife:  Bureaucratic Obstacles to Policy 
Implementation in Tanzania 
 
I  Abstract 
Community-based conservation (CBC) provides the best response to the crisis of wildlife 
governance in Tanzania.  Its successful implementation would make Tanzania richer both 
economically and in terms of its biodiversity.  Overt pronouncements by various actors attest 
to this observation.  The implementation of the CBC model is, however, at an impasse.  The 
wildlife bureaucrats responsible for the implementation of the CBC model are sabotaging the 
devolution because it runs counter to their interests.  This chapter explains how and why 
wildlife bureaucrats were able to succeed in sabotaging the government policy of devolving 
wildlife property rights to local communities.  
 
II  Introduction 
In the previous chapter, it was argued that executing a successful Community-based 
conservation (CBC) model would be difficult given the character of the extant state in Africa.  
It was hypothesized that the state is unlikely to devolve wildlife property rights to local 
communities in a way that would engender a private property right consciousness among 
them.  This consciousness, specifically, would give wildlife the same communal value as 
private property.  In this chapter, it is argued that bureaucratic interests are the foremost 
obstacle to the implementation of a successful CBC initiative in Tanzania, the national policy 
in favor of CBC notwithstanding.   
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It is argued that given the land tenure regime in existence, the claim that CBC provides 
the best response to the crisis of wildlife governance in Tanzania is tenable.  Moreover, it is 
further posited that its successful implementation would make Tanzania richer both 
economically and in terms of its biodiversity.  Overt pronouncements by various actors, 
including the government of Tanzania itself in its Wildlife Policy of 1998 (MNRT, 1998b), 
acknowledge this proposition.  Nevertheless, the implementation of the CBC model is at an 
impasse.  The wildlife bureaucracy responsible for implementing the CBC model is 
sabotaging the devolution because it runs counter to their interests.  They adopted a strategy 
that, in the estimation of many commentators of the wildlife sector in Tanzania, including the 
target local communities, was inimical to the spirit of the government wildlife policy.   
The behavior of the wildlife bureaucracy suggests that it does not want to give up its 
control over wildlife.  It has been about seven years since 1998, when the wildlife policy was 
adopted, and yet its implementation is still doubtful.  This means that the wildlife 
bureaucracy can be seen as having succeeded in tactically delaying the devolution of 
property rights over wildlife to local communities.  The question then is how to account for 
the success of the wildlife bureaucracy in sabotaging the government policy of devolving 
wildlife property rights to local communities.  
This chapter argues that the wildlife bureaucracy crafted a devolution strategy that would 
either be unacceptable to the communities or, if accepted, would be such that the wildlife 
bureaucracy would still enjoy immense influence in the wildlife sector.  The bureaucrats 
were able to do this because of the nature of the political patronage in vogue in Tanzania, and 
due to lack of job performance accountability.  The former incapacitates politicians’ ability to 
confront the bureaucrats on behalf of the communities.  The latter deprives wildlife 
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bureaucrats of any incentives to contract with other actors for a conservation regime in which 
the piece of the pie could be bigger with more benefits to society, but perhaps with less 
private gains for bureaucrats.  Hence, bureaucrats can gerrymander the implementation of 
devolution, and procure outcomes favorable to them. 
The question is then raised as to why the government should bother producing 
regulations that are unacceptable to communities, instead of just rejecting devolution 
altogether.  It is demonstrated that there are two processes at the governmental level that are 
occurring.  One is political and the other is administrative.  The former is executed within the 
broader political economy of Tanzania; hence, the government is compelled to adopt a policy 
with a popular face.  The latter process is administrative, executed by bureaucrats with no 
immediate accountability to the forces fronting for devolution, hence the leeway they have in 
gerrymandering with devolution.  In the chapter’s conclusion, it is argued that this chapter 
demonstrates the need to focus on the structure of the state in Africa at a broader level, 
instead of targeting piece-meal sectoral reforms. 
In the following section, the chapter discusses the wildlife sector and Tanzania’s socio-
economic development.  It demonstrates the need for a policy change with the implication 
that bureaucrats with a public interest persuasion should look forward to devolving wildlife 
property rights to local communities.  The next section looks at the limitations of the 
proposed devolution model.  It shows how the bureaucrats obstructed devolution by either 
ignoring or exploiting contextual factors, thereby predisposing communities to reject 
devolution.  The guidelines for devolution that bureaucrats issued are discussed, showing 
why communities found them unacceptable.  The last section accounts for the success of the 
bureaucrats in obstructing devolution.  It situates bureaucrats within the transformation of 
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property rights literature and shows the basis of their success so far.   The conclusion then 
follows.  
 
III  The Wildlife Sector and Tanzania’s Socio-economic Development 
Tanzania is a non-industrialized economy that relies heavily on its natural resources.  
Among the significant natural resources is wildlife, which supports the economy through the 
tourist sector.  Both government policy and empirical evidence attest to the significance of a 
properly managed wildlife sector.   
The government has projected that the contribution of the wildlife sector to the GDP can 
be raised from 2% to 5%.  The centrality of wildlife as a resource that “can be used 
indefinitely if properly managed” (MNRT, 1998b:9) is recognized.  Wildlife can be used “to 
reduce hunger by providing food and to generate foreign exchange” (MNRT, 1998b:17).  
The government has proposed to use the wildlife sector to promote rural development by 
creating Wildlife Management Areas (WMA): 
where local people will have full mandate of managing and benefiting from 
their conservation efforts, through community based conservation programs. 
(And) The private sector will be encouraged to invest in the wildlife industry 
(MNRT, 1998b:34).   
 
The impact of wildlife investments in the economy is already being realized.  
Pronouncements by those in authority and the experiences of certain communities are a 
testimony to this impact. 
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Empirical Evidence for the Capacity of the Wildlife Sector 
Recently, the minister in charge of wildlife spoke “of the safari hunting industry as a 
major source of foreign currency to the government and individual operators” (Semberya, 
2005).  Wildlife department officers claim that the department is among the top three 
departments in providing revenue to the Treasury (O. I.).  This is consistent with the fact that 
the department’s expenditure is less than half of what it collects from hunting licenses alone 
(USAID/TZ- W/D, 2001:14).  
The same story emerges from villages that have leased land to tour operators.  The 
revenue generated from these ventures has enabled these villages to afford social services 
that have placed them ahead of other villages in the region (Ololosokwan, 2003; Nelson, 
2003; O.I; ACC, 2004).  These tourist ventures exemplify the power of wildlife to catalyze 
rural developments. 15   The Wildlife Division gives a portion of tourist hunting fees to 
districts with tourist hunting blocks.  Monduli district, for example, relies on this remittance 
for 40-60 % of its annual budget (O.I.; Nelson, 2003).  Without revenues from wildlife 
investments, such districts could suffer huge budget deficits.16  Actors in the wildlife sector 
point to similar ventures not yet exploited, partly because there is no enabling environment 
                                                 
15Unfortunately, these ventures have no support from the government, whose officers have declared 
them illegal because these ventures are in tourist hunting blocks.  Nevertheless, some of these 
ventures are sanctioned by the District Council, which also receives a percentage of the income.  
When I asked a game officer why the District Council should then claim a share, he told me that he 
has told the district council that they are receiving income from illegal activities (see, for example, 
MNRT, 2002a; TNRF minutes of monthly meetings, 2005).  Early in 2006, one of these ventures lost 
in a legal suit (but could appeal the verdict) and was supposed to close shop. 
 
16There is conflicting opinion about whether the district councils are actually supposed to use these 
remittances to service their budgets; there is a claim that they are supposed to send them immediately 
to the villages, but they do not do this.  In one seminar, a Member of Parliament expressed the latter 
position. 
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(see, e.g. Nelson, 2003).  Also, degradation of wildlife species also threatens the wildlife 
sector and these ventures. 
 
Wildlife Degradation and the Roots of CBC 
Wildlife is now under increasing threat.  The government’s wildlife policy acknowledges 
that the sector is confronting such problems as “Loss of wildlife habitats to settlement, 
agriculture, grazing, mining, and logging” and “Escalating illegal wildlife off-take and trade” 
(MNRT, 1998b:7).  Other government policy documents, for example, the Forest Policy 
(MNRT, 1998a: 35) attest to the same problems.  Similarly, fears of wildlife degradation are 
corroborated by actors in the industry, such as tour operators.  Some operators related to me 
that in the past, game was abundant as soon as clients left the vicinity of urban settlements.  
Now they go all the way to the parks before coming across wildlife.  One tour operator 
claimed that once there were areas where he could not drive after 6 pm for fear of hitting 
wildlife crossing the road, but nowadays, one does not see even a rat.  Interviews with 
villagers have yielded similar stories.   
Wildlife degradation is partly a result of loss of wildlife habitat due to human activity 
(MNRT, 1998b:7), and also due to the practices of the wildlife department.  The 
department’s management of tourist hunting is thought to accelerate wildlife degradation as 
hunting licenses are issued almost haphazardly.  In a question and answer session during a 
villagers’ seminar on natural resources, the wildlife department personnel confirmed these 
fears: 
(Villager) Question: “Is there information on the number of wildlife in the 
hunting blocks so that the Department of Wildlife knows how many can be 
hunted?” (District Game Officer)  Answer: “No, this information is not 
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available and we really don’t know how much wildlife there is left in this 
area.” (SCF, 2002).   
 
Other weaknesses in the management of the hunting industry include licensing the hunting of 
animals in areas those animals do not inhabit.   As a government commission of inquiry on 
corruption noted: 
…the Royal Frontiers Company was given a quota to hunt Topi and Gerenuck 
in the Mkomazi areas while these animals are not available at all in the area 
(Warioba Commission, as quoted in Nshala, 1999:17).   
 
The government and its critics, therefore, concur that there is a problem.   
It is against this background that the merit of involving people living with the wildlife is 
emphasized.  Communities are thought to have better knowledge of the wildlife habitat and 
would know the predicaments besetting local wildlife.  Armed with their knowledge, they 
can husband wildlife, but they would do this only if they benefit from the resources.  The 
justification for CBC is premised on this idea.  Communities and the government concur that 
devolution of property rights over wildlife to communities would fill the management void of 
governmental ineffectiveness.  The implementation of this devolution has, however, been 
controversial.   
 
IV  Limitations of the Proposed CBC Model 
Communities looked forward to the implementation of devolution of property rights to 
wildlife.  Communities had invested a lot in the clamor for devolution during the years when 
the state was the sole legal claimant to wildlife.  The issuing of a CBC-friendly wildlife 
policy met their expectations.  Community expectations were nevertheless shattered when the 
wildlife division released the guidelines on devolution.  Communities have resisted the 
implementation of devolution because they find some regulations in the proposed devolution 
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strategy undesirable. 17   Before looking at the issues in the guidelines that rendered the 
proposed CBC model contentious, I review the context in which the guidelines were issued 
in order to throw light on what may have fuelled the controversy over devolution.  This 
review of context and analysis of the WMA regulations is intended to motivate the idea that 
the wildlife bureaucrats designed regulations in such a way that these regulations would 
discourage communities from participating in the WMA project. 
 
WMA Guidelines in Context: 
Era of Changing Political Values: Rise of Civil Liberties 
One of the key issues at play in the controversy is that WMAs were being implemented 
using a mind-set that was perfected during the era of state authoritarianism.  When Tanzania 
initiated villagization (using villages as units of rural settlement) in the 1970s, the process 
was supposed to be people-driven, but later on, coercive strategies by the government 
became dominant (see, for example, Scott, 1998).  Since the advent of both political and 
economic reforms in the 1990s, citizens are now more conscious of their civil liberties, even 
though diverse structural odds make accessing those liberties difficult.  Communities are now 
sensitized to their rights, partly due to NGOs activity (see, for example, SCF, 2002; Pingos, 
2004; Kallonga, Nelson, and Stolla, 2003).  When communities are able to access these 
rights, then they may resist government proposals they consider undesirable.   
The WMA have been victims of this new dispensation.  This is not to suggest that the 
bureaucrats were ignorant of this possibility.  One could argue that bureaucrats created an 
implementation program that would ensure that WMA could be rejected so that the 
                                                 
17Some communities have, however, shown willingness to accept WMA.  But they are also divided, 
with those against being more militant (see the following chapter).   
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bureaucrats’ personal interests in wildlife would remain as they were (see sec. III c below).  
Thus, recognition of the extant political values by both actors may account for their behavior.  
The communities knew they could appropriate the widening political space to reject a 
government project that they do not like.  Consequently, as will be shown below, some of 
them rejected the WMA project after they concluded that the WMA regulations are designed 
to serve the interests of the wildlife division.  The bureaucrats, on the other hand, knew this 
character of the communities and thus sought to exploit it for the bureaucrats’ own ends.  
They designed an implementation project that communities would find difficult to accept and 
hence, the status quo would continue.    
The proposition that the bureaucrats designed the rejection of WMA looks tenable in 
light of the problems that WMA regulations ignited.  The WMA regulations touched the 
question of land.  The drafters of WMA regulations should have known that land issues are 
very sensitive given the legacy of wildlife protected areas (See, for example, Brockington, 
2002; Shivji and Kapinga, 1998; and Neumann, 1998).  WMA regulations were also being 
issued contemporaneously with devolution in forestry.  The example set by the devolution in 
the forestry sector provided communities with a powerful alternative approach of how 
devolution ought to be implemented.  The land and forestry sectors thus served as a catalyst 
for critiquing the WMA regulations.  
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Inter-sectoral (but avoidable) “Liabilities”: 
The Land Question 
WMA guidelines raised issues that suggested that villagers might lose land through the 
WMA project.  According to the legal instruments governing land,18 villagers do not own 
land; they only have occupation and user rights.  Landownership is vested in the President, 
and villagers are only beneficiaries (Gastorm, 2003).  The requirements by the WMA 
guidelines that livestock be excluded from land set aside for wildlife (see sec. III b) made 
communities suspect that WMA were another tactic to expropriate land (O.I.; Loliondo, 
2004; Pingos, 2004).  Such fears were heightened when government officials began 
reminding the villagers who were rejecting WMA that villagers actually owned no land 
(Oloipiri village minutes).  Communities fear that if government opinion was that 
communities do not own any land, and yet the government can declare any land wildlife 
habitat, then to the villagers, developing a wildlife habitat in their lands was the surest way of 
enticing the wildlife authorities to annex lands already occupied by villagers.   
Villagers would be expected to feel vulnerable to loss of land if they have a successful 
WMA.  Such feelings are not without historical precedent.  Villagers relate the current 
experiences with WMA to prior expropriation of Maasailand for wildlife, whether it was in 
Ngorongoro, Serengeti, or Mkomazi (see, for example, Brockington, 2002; Shivji and 
Kapinga 1998).  Moreover, the phenomenon of Game Controlled Areas (GCA) could have 
heightened these suspicions.  The minister responsible for wildlife can declare a GCA on any 
                                                 
18 The Land Act (URT, 1999a); Village Land Act (URT, 1999b); Land Acquisition Act, 1967 
(Gastorm, 2003).  The contradictions in governance emerge when one considers that the government 
issued the Forest Policy, in which it recognized the critical role played by security of land tenure in 
satisfying “long-term objectives of environment protection” (MNRT, 1998a:4); yet in the following 
year, it passed two land acts that fail to confer this tenure on villagers.  If anything, the acts seem to 
better serve the interests of those claiming villagers own no land. 
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land.  Even when such a declaration affects village land, the minister does not consult the 
villagers.  Within a GCA, the director of wildlife can assign a hunting block to a hunting 
outfitter, in which case villagers lose control over land use practices in their village land, 
contrary to the Village Land Act (no. 5, 1999) (URT, 1999b).   
Designing apparently hostile guidelines for a situation characterized by insecurity of land 
tenure was, therefore, the surest way of investing in their rejection.  Furthermore, community 
suspicion was intensified by the fact that the wildlife authorities were implementing 
devolution in a way different from that of their counterpart in the forestry sector.  
 
Devolution in the Forestry Sector: Any Demonstration Effect? 
Studies of the governing of common pool resources emphasize the role that trust plays in 
the success of that governance (Ostrom, 1990).  Given the history of mistrust between the 
wildlife sector and the communities, it would be expected that the bureaucrats would be 
aware of the fact that they needed to show that they are now trustworthy.  However, the 
guidelines that the bureaucrats issued made communities trust the bureaucrats less than 
before.  Devolution of property rights in the forestry sector contributed to this suspicion.  
While the wildlife division issued a policy communities identified with, but then followed it 
with a legal regime that was hostile to the promise of the policy, the forest division issued a 
policy and an act that communities accepted.       
The fit between the Forest Policy (MNRT, 1998a) and Forest Act (URT, 2002) is evident.  
The Forest Policy statement (6) provides that: “Village forest reserves will be managed by 
the village governments or other entities designated by village governments for this purpose” 
(MNRT, 1998a: 21).  This policy statement is reflected in the Forest Act.  The act seeks to 
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delegate “responsibility for management of forest resources to the lowest possible level of 
local management consistent with the furtherance of national policies” (Act, Part, II, sec. 3.d; 
see also 3.b).  The act protects devolution of property rights even when a village enters into 
joint management agreements with the director of forestry.  Although villagers are required 
to submit proposed by-laws to the director for comment, “In the exercise of its functions of 
managing a gazetted village land forest reserve, a village committee ….shall not be bound to 
comply with all and any advice of the director” (Act, sec. 36.7; sec. 37 (i) b).19 
Devolution of property rights in forestry, therefore, let communities evaluate government 
departments implementing devolution.  Consequently, in several fora, communities critiqued 
the wildlife sector compared to the forestry sector.  Communities note the contradiction, and 
sense the distributional factor in the wildlife sector.  A villager participant in a natural 
resources seminar asked:  
I’m surprised because I thought wildlife and forestry were the same, but I can 
see now that that is not the case. The Forest Policy seems to favour 
communities much more than wildlife. Why is this?  Perhaps the issue relates 
to the greater amounts of money in the wildlife sector than in forestry (quoted 
in Kallonga, et al, 2003).     
 
Another participant graded the two policies thus:   
I congratulate the forestry sector for making change and bringing real 
opportunities for benefit to the community level.  I would like to request that 
the forestry sector try to influence the wildlife sector, because due to the 
differing approaches we are headed for forests without wildlife, which are not 
real forests at all  (Kallonga, et al, 2003).   
 
Thus the wildlife bureaucracy, in designing a devolution project that was diametrically 
opposed to that issued by its counterpart, the Forest and Bee-Keeping Division, ensured that 
communities would see the contradiction.  The communities certainly did see it, as the above 
                                                 
19See also 37 (3), where villagers are expected to send by-laws to the director and district council, but 
if these two do not send the feedback within the stipulated time, the villagers can proceed and make 
the by-laws. 
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quotations demonstrate.  The result was that communities objected to the devolution.  The 
same conclusion regarding the wildlife bureaucrats investing in the possible rejection of the 
devolution project by the communities results when one looks at the way the market aspect 
of devolution was designed.      
 
WMA Regulations: Betrayal of the Market as the Basis of the Crisis 
The CBC model is an argument about the role of the market in the management of natural 
resources.  Tanzania’s wildlife policy provides a good statement of a possible role of the 
market in wildlife conservation.  The policy recognizes the significance of property rights in 
engineering a wildlife-friendly behavior among communities living with wildlife (MNRT, 
1998b:3.2.1, 3.2.2, 3.3.3 iii).  The policy seeks to ensure that wildlife competes with other 
forms of land use by, for example, allowing “rural communities and private land holders to 
manage wildlife on their land for their own benefit” (MNRT, 1998b: 3.3.4).  Towards this 
end, the policy proposed certain strategies to achieve the foregoing objective.  These 
strategies entailed, inter alia, 
conferring user rights of wildlife to the landholders to allow rural 
communities and private land holders to manage wildlife, assisting wildlife 
ranchers and farmers to become eligible for the same benefits and incentives 
that the agricultural farming and livestock industry receive from the 
Government (and) influencing policies such that land of marginal value to 
agriculture and livestock development (tsetse infested areas) is set aside for 
wildlife conservation to the best interest of rural communities as a primary 
form of land use (MNRT, 1998: 3.3.4 v-vi, viii).  
 
These policy statements are market-oriented.  It is difficult to see what else a proponent 
of a market approach to conservation could expect from this policy.  Yet, communities have 
resisted the implementation of this policy, even though they had clamored for such a policy.  
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The bone of contention is the regulations issued for the administration of WMA.  Among the 
contentious issues are those dealing with investments in the WMA, benefit-sharing, livestock 
in the WMA, the penalties for infractions in the WMA, and the balance of power politics in 
the WMA project.  If these issues are not resolved, the resultant WMA (if instituted) would 
be a CBC regime incapable of generating a private property right consciousness that is vital 
for the proper management of wildlife.  The following discussion reviews these contentious 
issues.  The review shows that the wildlife bureaucrats issued regulations that discouraged 
communities from adopting the WMA project.  An explanation that presents itself from the 
foregoing analysis as to why the bureaucrats should have acted thus is that the bureaucrats 
wanted the status quo to continue the way it is currently. 
 
Control Over Investments in the WMA: Artificial Transaction Costs? 
The communities resent the fact that any investment in the WMA has to be approved by 
the wildlife division (see, for example, WWG, 2003).  The director also retains the power to 
withdraw or revoke any investment agreement.  The regulations also deny communities the 
right to transfer their user rights to another party.  Communities get the impression that the 
director wants to micro-manage the WMA.  This impression makes communities suspicious.  
There are questions regarding what, for example, would make the director reject or approve a 
prospective investor.  In case of rejection, who would meet the costs incurred while WMA 
and the investor were preparing to enage in a contract?  One would assume that if an investor 
has been cleared by the government to conduct business in the country, then communities 
should be free to decide who to work with.   
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Similarly, the owner of user rights should be allowed to sell them to whom ever is able to 
add value to them, provided that communities understand that they will take responsibility 
for what goes on in the WMA.  The involvement of the director introduces what property 
rights literature refers to as unnecessary transaction costs (Anderson and Hill, 2004: 17-18); 
this is another deviation from the wildlife policy that promised that “The Government has set 
clear, transparent and simple procedures for participation in the wildlife based tourist 
industry, and involvement in other wildlife related activities” (MNRT, 1998b, sec. 5.0).  
Clarity and transparency are not evident in this case, nor are they reflected in benefit-sharing.     
 
Uncertain Benefit-sharing Arrangement 
The bureaucracy reserves the right to determine how benefits should be shared.  As of 
now, the regulations on benefit-sharing present a study in ambiguity.   First, benefit-sharing 
is expected to “comply with circulars issued by the Government from time to time” (MNRT, 
2002b: sec. 72).  But then the regulations also distribute the WMA revenue thus: 15% to 
resource development, 50% member villages, and 25% authorized association (leaving out 
only 10% for communities to expend as they wish).20  Communities find this regulation 
suspect since they do not know what the formula will be in the future.  Can the director issue 
a circular directing that money from WMA enterprises be sent to the wildlife division?  As of 
now, he reserves that right.  Communities thus feel that they should conduct their business 
freely and then pay the government its relevant fees just like other business ventures 
(Loliondo, 2004; WWG, 2003).  It appears that the bureaucrats designed the revenue-sharing 
regulations in a way that would discourage communities from accepting WMA.  Given the 
                                                 
20The entrepreneurial logic of this distribution is problematic; revenue-sharing should be based on 
profit, not the gross, as is the case here.  It is also not clear whether the “…from time to time…” 
circulars would vary the percent distribution, the categories, or both (MNRT, 2002b).   
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arduous conditions attached to the WMA project, the least one would expect is a revenue-
sharing regime that is not subject to administrative fiat.  This expectation is doubly justified 
given that the regulations were, at the same time, attacking the mainstay of villagers’ 
economic activity, livestock. 
 
Criminalization of Pastoralism? 
The WMA regulations prohibit keeping livestock in the WMA (MNRT, 2002b, 12th 
Schedule, sec.2).  The prohibition interacts with the question of land and that of penalties 
(see below, III b iv) to to create fear and suspicion.  Communities fear that WMA may be a 
scheme to expropriate their land, and that the government values wildlife more than people 
and livestock.  Communities do not understand why livestock should be prohibited from 
WMA, given that livestock is already allowed in the Game Controlled Areas, which will be 
transformed into WMA (Kallonga, Nelson, and Stolla , 2003; Nshala, n.d. b).  Communities 
contend that if land is set aside for wildlife, the question then will be whether the wildlife 
will be told not to go to the land set aside for livestock.  Communities aver that both their 
history and expert evidence attest to the compatibility of pastoral lifestyle and wildlife 
conservation.  One villager asserted,  
The government separated us from wildlife, by chasing us from Serengeti and 
starting a wildlife protected area, but the wildlife has continued following us 
up to the villages, and we shall continue to husband them like our livestock 
(Olemunai Lotiken, in Loliondo, 2004). 
 
The basis of the idea of separating livestock from WMA is thus suspect.  Consequently, 
communities have even had to revisit the name of the project and argued that it does not 
reflect any community at all.  So, they posit that the WMA project should be called 
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Community Wildlife Management Area (CWMA), or Community Wildlife and Pastoralism 
Management Area (CWPMA) (Loliondo, 2003).  This would, presumably, show that there is 
an equal interest in people, livestock, and wildlife.  If the issue of livestock is not resolved, 
the possibility of accepting WMA then becomes even more distant, given the penalties that 
one would incur in the event of contravening the regulations--something which communities 
are certain to do with respect to livestock grazing in the areas set for WMA. 
 
Penalties for Infraction 
With livestock being prohibited from the WMA, almost every villager is likely to violate 
this prohibition, with the consequence of either getting a fine or jail term, or both.  The jail 
terms are six months for the first offense, and one year for subsequent offenses (MNRT, 
2002b sec. 71).  At a time when the benefits are not clear, communities feel that the risk is 
not worth taking.  With the issue of livestock and trespassing into game parks already being a 
source of tension between communities and the protected areas managers, communities are 
uncomfortable reproducing similar circumstances inside their villages.  While wildlife strays 
out of the parks into village lands and damages property without compensation, communities 
are victimized and penalized whenever their cattle stray into the protected areas.  This system 
of selective justice seemed to be finding its way into village land through WMA.  In a 
workshop on WMA, villagers argued that “Blanket punishment should not be imposed on 
different offenders who break some of the dubious rules imposed on them” (WWG, 2003).  
The issue of penalties is thus frightening, and more so because of the wide ranging powers 
that the director of wildlife is perceived to enjoy in the proposed WMA dispensation.   
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Balance of Power Politics 
One of the overarching criticisms communities level against the WMA guidelines is the 
immense powers given to the director of wildlife.  Almost every action requires deference to 
the director.  We have already seen this with respect to investments.  Even such things as 
engagement of experts “in any task” would require approval of the director “previously 
sought and obtained as and when required” (MNRT, 2002b sec. 22 (l)).  There are clauses 
empowering the director to introduce new guidelines.  The management of the WMA is also 
expected to comply with “any other tools that may be recommended by the director from 
time to time” (MNRT, 2002b, sec. 34 (c)).  This requirement is repeated again elsewhere 
(MNRT, 2002b, sec. 78).  The emphasis betrays an obsession with control that held the 
drafters of these regulations captive.21   
Communities have taken note of this desire for control.  In various fora, communities 
express concern about the way “the regulations give the director of wildlife and his cronies 
lots of power, and consequently there is decreased participation of the people in the whole 
process” (WWG, 2003; see also, Kallonga, Nelson, and Stolla, 2003).  Communities fear that 
the powers of the director may end up emasculating village government authority and village 
land rights.  The imbalance becomes more visible in light of the forest sector, where 
communities feel that they are the decision-makers, unlike in the wildlife sector, where all 
decisions come from the director (Kallonga, Nelson, and Stolla, 2003).   
The powers enjoyed by the director, coupled with the other issues raised earlier, played 
out negatively in the villagers’ decision of whether to adopt WMA.  Whether the other issues 
could have been taken equally seriously had the director not been perceived as being 
                                                 
21Note that the clause on dispute settlement does not seem to conceptualize a situation where there is 
a dispute between the bureaucracy and communities.  Is this possibly because the former is 
conceptualized as holding sway and hence has the final word (MNRT, 2002b, sec. 67-69)?    
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enormously powerful is a moot point.  Nevertheless, these issues are the ones that embody 
the perceived powers of the director.  Separating them adds no value to the question of how 
WMA could have otherwise been configured.  The upshot has been a rejection, or lukewarm 
acceptance, of the WMA.  Of interest are the seemingly benign attempts by the authorities to 
coerce recalcitrant villages into adopting WMA.  One villager asked, “Can the Director of 
Wildlife force villages to start a WMA if they don’t want to do?” (Kallonga, Nelson and 
Stolla, 2003).  Do such sentiments suggest that communities are feeling pressurized; and if 
so, why should the bureaucrats now want devolution imposed when they seemed to be 
against it?22 
 
From Devolution to Imposition of Property Rights? 
The implementation of WMA, while it started as a program to liberalize governance of 
natural resources, seems to be replaying the experiences of “Ujamaa”(villagization), when 
rural communities were forced into living in communal villages (Scott 1998).  Villagers have 
expressed sentiments that suggest that WMA are being forced onto them.  When the 
government officer (referred to above) told villagers that they do not own land, this was 
perceived as a thinly veiled threat that they have no basis for rejecting a government project.  
Furthermore, as one village official told me, it came to their mind that what was confronting 
them was not WMA as they thought, but a second Serengeti.23   Another village leader 
averred that they thought they were free to choose WMA, but after a series of meetings with 
                                                 
22Even if it is assumed they were not against it, the imposition is still problematic.  It would not 
generate the outcomes envisaged in the CBC model because the model presupposes an acceptance of 
devolution by communities. 
 
23This was short-hand for saying that they are being forced to cede land for wildlife, just as they were 
forced out of Serengeti to pave way for the creation of a national park. 
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the government officials, they came to realize that implementing WMA was not a matter of 
choice; it was “rasima” (obligatory).   
Perhaps the most glaring evidence that the wildlife authorities were planning to impose 
WMA is from a meeting between the wildlife authorities, villagers, and an investor in one 
village.  This was one of the villages that had rejected the WMA, while the other villages in 
its cluster were showing readiness to accept the WMA project.  The wildlife officer told the 
investor that he should know that his investment in that village was illegal.  The assumption 
behind this warning was that this investor was the one inciting the village to reject the WMA.  
The villagers were assumed not to be interested in WMA because they were already earning 
good money from the private investor.  For his part, the tour operator would not want the 
WMA because they would be formed by nine villages, and this would mean enlarging the 
range of actors he would be dealing with, including fellow business competitors.24  Whatever 
the theory behind the village’s refusal to join the WMA, the episode discloses that the 
wildlife authorities were not prepared to respect the position of this village; they intended to 
coerce them into conceding. 
The idea that the communities sensed pressure to adopt WMA also emerged in a 
villagers’ workshop when a Maasai traditional leader gave the closing remarks. He reviewed 
how villagers had so far been okay dealing with tour operators, since communities get some 
money whenever they lease their lands to tour operators.  As for WMA, however, he 
observed that WMA have come like a stranger and this scares the villagers. He asked, “Why 
have WMAs been brought by the government as something to be pushed upon the 
                                                 
24However, later it turned out that this investor was not the one behind the village’s recalcitrance, but 
rather, it was the hunting outfitter operating in that village.  The theory now was that the outfitter did 
not want WMA because on their inception, hunting outfitters were supposed to enter into contracts 
with the management of the WMA and there was no guarantee, therefore, that he would secure this 
contract.   
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communities, instead of being chosen by the people themselves?”  He said that community 
leaders prefer “…things that come in the open, not mysteriously, and we need education first 
before we are pushed into doing something” (Kallonga, Nelson, and Stolla, 2003).  He then 
offered an analogy that suggested the agony communities had gotten into.  He said that right 
now, they are like a pregnant woman, they can neither rise high nor bend low.  The WMA 
was an idea they liked, but it had constraints they did not like. 
Thus, the situation had by the end of 2003 become tense.  This was even confirmed by 
consultants for the wildlife division who did a baseline study on WMA.  In a number of 
villages, the consultants met with a lot of hostility.  The popular response to the WMA had 
thus become hostile on both sides.   The question then is whether a CBC instituted under 
such circumstances can engender a sense of ownership of natural resources--something the 
exponents of the CBC model, and private property rights in general, would expect.  Can such 
a scenario lead to a CBC regime conscious of a long term future, or it would simply open 
avenues for resource predatorship?  The hostility leading to this impasse in devolution is 
directly related to the implementation strategy that the wildlife bureaucrats designed for the 
WMA project.  The strategy suggests that they were unwilling to cede power over resources 
to locals.  
   
V  Were WMA Designed to Fail? 
The turn of events, as we suggested earlier, could have been avoided.  However, that 
approach to the issue presupposes that the failure was unintended.  There is a growing body 
of opinion, both in the villages and among the conservation actors, that the WMA project 
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was conceived in such a way that it would fail.25  A facilitator of a villagers’ workshop on 
WMA observed with regard to the regulations that:  
These subsidiary legislations are placed mainly to pose impediments to the 
implementation of WMAs that may in turn lead to cancellation of the same at 
the end of three-year trial run term (WWG, 2003). 
 
I asked villagers why they should think this way, yet it was the government that decided to 
give the communities the opportunity and, hence, it does not make sense for the government 
to sabotage its initiative.   
The two popular opinions were that, either the government did not want, but was under 
external pressure to start WMA, or that the government did want communities to benefit, but 
there is someone in the wildlife sector who has been benefiting and is now concerned that 
devolution would reduce the fortunes hitherto accruing from the sector.26  If this proposition 
can be accepted as being consistent with the impression created by an examination of the 
limitations of the regulations, then the bureaucrats come out as the authors of the crisis 
besetting the WMA project.  Also, as the foregoing review of the regulations showed, from 
the wildlife bureaucrats’ point of view, the crisis can be said to have gone according to the 
script.  This is especially so if one considers that the crisis over the implementation of WMA 
has been going on since 2003 and yet a resolution does not seem to be within reach.  The 
                                                 
25Of course, this raises the question of why the bureaucracy should then try to force people to adopt 
WMA.   This is not, however, inconsistent with the conspiracy thesis because if people accepted 
WMA, albeit grudgingly, the entire project would mostly come to a halt and the wildlife division 
would step in allegedly to restore order.  They could now arm themselves with empirical evidence 
that communities cannot be trusted with conservation.  This outcome would even be better because it 
would remove the spotlight from them, unlike the current situation, whereby the WMA impasse is 
being attributed to the bureaucracy’s intransigence. 
 
26This is consistent with the experience in the privatization process in Africa.  A Rwandan Minister 
has observed, “In the developing world, bureaucrats run a large share of the economy.  As such, they 
are vastly influential and will frustrate moves to privatize the state firms that form the source of both 
economic and social power” (Nshuti, 2005). 
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pilot project was supposed to take three years, which have now elapsed before the WMA has 
taken off.  Yet, even the fourth year is slotted for further discussion over the same issue.  
This possibility was disclosed during the Minister of Natural Resources and Tourism’s 
budget speech in Parliament in which the minister, while addressing the question of 
community involvement in conservation, stated that “During the year 2005/2006, the 
ministry will continue to educate the public on wildlife conservation and to offer seminars on 
WMA regulations” (MNRT, 2005-translation mine).  Given the analysis set out above 
regarding the contention over these regulations, the number of seminars required to resolve 
the implementation crisis is a moot point.  The beneficiaries of the implementation logjam, 
however, are the wildlife bureaucrats.  For them, the status quo continues.  The question then 
is how to account for the bureaucrats’ behavior and why they have been able to obstruct an 
apparently government sanctioned project. 
 
IV  Bureaucracies and Transformation of Property Rights 
Models of bureaucratic behavior include bureaucrats as self-interested individuals and 
bureaucrats as agents of the public interest or as agents of politicians.  The public interest 
model presents bureaucrats as acting in the best interests of the public.  The state, in asserting 
its claim to the stewardship of natural resources, portrays itself as more competent in 
enforcing policies, unlike local communities who are prone to abuse of resources (Libecap, 
1981; Ascher, 1999:239-241).  One wildlife official in Tanzania, for example, told me that 
the devolution of property rights over wildlife to local communities cannot be executed in the 
manner that some NGOs charged with implementing WMA are doing.  To this officer, the 
implementation should ensure that communities develop a sense of ownership in the project, 
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lest they abandon it later, perhaps selling it to speculators.  To him, this would be dangerous 
because Tanzania may end up having its resources owned by foreigners.  He buttressed his 
argument by making reference to the Maasai of Kenya who demarcated their land into 
individual plots before they knew, according to him, the implications of what they were 
doing.   Some of the Maasai later sold it and are now landless.  To this officer, the wildlife 
division is, therefore, over-seeing the interests of the public during the process of devolution 
of property rights to wildlife.27    
I encountered a similar public interest logic in another wildlife officer.  During a 
villagers’ seminar on WMA, a wildlife division officer told me that the WMA project can be 
challenged in court as unconstitutional.  This is because it privatizes property that belongs to 
all Tanzanians, and this is contrary to the Tanzanian Constitution--which stipulates that 
natural resources should be utilized for the benefit of all Tanzanians.28  By extension, the 
officer was alluding to the judicial provision that holds that any legislation that is inconsistent 
with the constitution is null and void to the extent of that inconsistency.  It is in this context 
that the WMA regulations would be invalidated.  
Some bureaucrats even cast their role in the WMA in terms of safeguarding not just the 
wider public interests, but the interests of the WMA communities themselves.  A senior 
wildlife officer argued that because communities are not yet developed financially, they may 
                                                 
27I am not focusing here on the merits of his argument, but rather, the public interest claim that is 
being advanced.  For an extension of his argument on the Maasai question, however, see Rutten 
(1992).   
 
28Refer to article 9 (i) (c), (i); see also article 27 of the Constitution; I did not ask him where his 
argument leaves the mining ventures.  Nevertheless, this idea that natural resources should be used for 
the benefit of all Tanzanians is also shared by President Mkapa (of course, he being the supposed 
defender of the constitution).  Songorwa  refers to Mkapa as having been quoted as saying that natural 
resources in the country do not belong to local communities, but are God-given gifts to the nation as a 
whole (Songorwa, 1999a: 145 quoting Majira July 10, 1997).    
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not be able to pay for the services of NGOs for technical expertise.   On this basis, the officer 
contended that “wildlife authorities may be the only reliable and accessible source of service 
available to the local communities” (Zechariah and Kaihula, 2001:35).  One can argue that 
this is a benign justification of the bureaucracy to retain a stranglehold in community affairs.   
The justification is, however, tenuous.  Most of the NGOs that work with communities in 
natural resources management use donor-sourced funds for community mobilization or 
project investments.  NGOs may be accused of using communities as a fundraising card for 
their own benefits, but they may not be accused of selling technical expertise to communities 
in natural resource management.  This is a fact many observers of the African conservation 
scene can attest to.  It is no wonder, that the wildlife officers referred to above, having come 
to the realization that there are many stakeholders who may be willing to assist communities, 
now seem to redefine the role of wildlife authorities.  This role is now stated to be that of 
vetting those providers of service to communities that are able to “ensure quality delivery of 
services and compliance with the WPT (i.e. Wildlife Policy of Tanzania) and other national 
policies” (Zechariah and Kaihula, 2001:36).  Certainly, nobody else has the mandate to 
discharge this responsibility other than the wildlife bureaucracy.   
The role the bureaucracy is articulating for itself here is not something that they had just 
created with the designing of the WMA regulations in 2002.  It is a theme that had dominated 
them for almost a decade.  As far back as 1994, the director of wildlife, while conceding that 
communities would be given utilization rights in WMA, qualified this responsibility.  He 
stated the following:  
Within WMAs the villagers should be given the responsibility for deciding, 
with appropriate professional advice, upon the forms of wildlife utilization 
they wish to pursue and deriving benefits from such management. . . .   
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 Elsewhere in the same presentation, he further observed, quoting an earlier workshop that: 
 
Indeed, another recommendation of the Tourist Hunting Workshop was that 
local people should use their unequaled knowledge to help set quotas, but they 
will need the help of professionals also (W/D, 1994; emphasis mine). 
 
Thus, safeguarding the interests of communities and the wider public is presented as the 
motive for this bureaucratic involvement in community matters (see also Songorwa, 1999a: 
41, 45ff).   
The public interest model is, however, difficult to sustain given the pattern of 
bureaucrats’ failure as public agents.  This failure even raises the question of whether they 
know what is in their best interests, let alone that of the public (see, for example, Olson, 
2000). 29   In the wildlife sector, for example, the impoverishment that characterizes 
communities living with wildlife is largely attributable to policy failures on the part of the 
bureaucrats in charge of this sector.  Moreover, the decline in wildlife numbers (section II 
above) suggests that the bureaucrats have failed in protecting this public asset.  Part of this 
decline is attributable to the consumptive wildlife utilization enterprises run by the wildlife 
division; these enterprises operate under circumstances that are not always transparent and 
are considered unsustainable (see, for example, Majamba, 2001; Nshala, 1999; JET, n.d.).  
The public interest model is, therefore, a poor indicator of what propels such bureaucrats 
while in public service.  The same can be said of the other model that portrays bureaucrats as 
helpless tools in the hands of politicians. 
The relationship between bureaucrats and politicians has been viewed in terms of 
independence of bureaucrats from politicians on the one hand, and bureaucratic 
                                                 
29This is so, given that an “irrational” response by these communities can easily result in mass 
decimation of wildlife overnight.  In such an event, some echelons of the bureaucracy could be 
sacrificed by the political wing of government as it seeks to mollify community hostility.   
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subordination by politicians on the other (Weingast and Moran, 1983).  In Africa, bureaucrat-
politician relations need not be viewed in terms of either domination or subordination.  
African politics tend to be neo-patrimonial; hence, the bureaucrats and politicians are glued 
together in a patron-client relationship that is directed at serving their interests as wielders of 
power (see, for example, Kasfir, 1969).  Consequently, the self-interest model is more 
promising in analyzing state-society interactions in Africa (Bayart, 1993; Crook, 1989). 
In Africa, the opportunity for rent-seeking should be assigned prominence because it 
directly motivates the behavior of bureaucrats engaged in contracting for property rights.30  
This observation is consistent with the self-interest model’s contention that bureaucrats seek 
to expand their administrative role, which in turn confers on them higher salaries, longer 
tenure, and greater opportunities for political patronage (Libecap, 1981: 153).  Literature on 
determinants of devolution of property rights over natural resources show that the erosion of 
a natural resource triggers the need for devolution (see, for example, Libecap, 1989:66; 
Stephanie, 2001: 19-20; Hughes, 2001: 33.).  Literature further suggests that property rights 
entrepreneurs, recognizing the need for a new property rights regime to deal with the new 
situation, initiate the production of these rights (Anderson and Hill, 2003: 122; Anderson and 
Hill, 2004: 18).  With respect to natural resources, what generates the recognition of new 
property rights seems to be treated in the literature as a factor of bureaucratic benevolence 
(see, Stephanie, 2001: 19-20; Hughes, 2001: 33). 31   Commenting on the devolution of 
                                                 
30See, for example, Nshuti, 2005. 
31A Tanzanian national working as an environmental officer for a bilateral agency held the same view.  
His view was that, when he was in the forestry division in the ministry, the sector was seen as less 
progressive than the wildlife division, but when there was a change of top personnel, the forest 
department developed the modernizing spirit (defined in terms of devolution), such that it is now the 
reference point of what devolution means.  He was, therefore, of the opinion that even in the wildlife 
sector, circumstances might change towards acceptable devolution as top personnel are replaced.  (cf. 
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property rights to wildlife in South Africa by the Natal Parks Board, for instance, Hughes 
states:  
In 1963, the board realizing that successful biodiversity conservation must 
involve private landowners, started the first Extension Service designed to 
encourage the proper management and care of wildlife on private land 
(Hughes, 2001: 33).  
 
Thus, if bureaucrats do not recognize a need for transformation of property rights, we should 
expect them to be obstructive during the negotiations for devolution of property rights.  In 
Tanzania, for example, wildlife authorities prefer to claim that the conservation management 
regime is under control (see, for example, the controversy over the Loliondo Game 
Controlled Area, in East African 1 and East African 2).  Hence, their response to devolution 
borders on opposition.     
Bureaucratic opposition to the re-definition of property rights can be due to the 
bureaucrats’ anticipated share in the proposed dispensation.  Thus, in the proposed WMA in 
Tanzania, one can predict that bureaucrats will be concerned with the benefits that would 
accrue to them for ceding property rights over wildlife to communities.  The communities, 
for their part, would be concerned with the share-formula suggested by the regulations 
governing the WMA.  For them to sign onto WMA, the formula should be such that 
communities would not be worse off than they were prior to their participation in WMA.  
Distributional considerations are, however, more pronounced because the government is 
directly an interested party.  At this point, it is necessary to dichotomize government, indeed 
the executive, into politico-executive and administrative/technocratic-executive.  The former, 
epitomized by the cabinet, straddles both the executive and the legislature.  It has, together 
                                                                                                                                                       
case of Campfire, Child (n.d.).  Similarly, a former Director of Botswana Wildlife Service told me 
that individuals matter in executing successful devolution projects.) 
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with the legislature, the final word over policy.  As the political wing of the executive, 
officials in this branch of the government bear the cost of policy failure.  The bureaucrats are 
the technocratic wing of the executive; they implement policy.  It is in this sense that one can 
discuss bureaucracy as if it is apart from the government.  The wildlife bureaucrats have not 
only private selfish interests in the wildlife sector, but also official interests that would not 
necessarily be fulfilled by a situation in which the central government is satisfied with the 
wildlife sector (see tables 1 and 2 below).  The wildlife bureaucrats have their own 
departmental interests that they would wish to defend from the other departments of the 
government.  If the wildlife division is to be conceptualized as an individual, it can be said 
that it perceives what it has as a private good, while what it shares with other government 
departments is a public good.  Similarly, the central government can have selfish interests in 
one of its departments.  In this case, it would pay special attention to it.  This is the case 
between the political wing of government, and the wildlife department in particular.  
Government presence in distributional issues of the wildlife sector can be expected to 
bolster wildlife bureaucrats in their intransigence because bureaucrats can always pose as 
guardians of governmental interests.32  Both the wildlife bureaucracy and the government are 
thus likely to pose a contractual problem if they decide to pursue their interests single-
mindedly.33  When the government is a claimant, it can also be expected to behave in a self-
interested way, for as McChesney posits:  
                                                 
32The wildlife division is a critical revenue earner for the treasury.  Thus, any diversion of this 
largesse to other sectors of society can easily pass as a dissipation of rent from the treasury’s 
perspective, since the government may fear that what the treasury may get as tax from the new 
owners cannot be equated with what the government was getting as the sole entrepreneur of the 
hunting industry; see, however, USAID/TZ-W/D, 2001.   
 
33This pursuit of selfish-interest by government officials is starkly exemplified in the case of the 
collapse of the Canadian cod fisheries.  The department of fisheries vigorously opposed evidence 
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 government will predictably refuse to privatize when the costs to the  
Privatizers--government officials--fall short of the benefits to them.  
Government cannot be expected to act principally in altruistic ways any more 
than the ordinary person is primarily motivated by the welfare of others rather 
than himself (McChesney, 2003: 246). 
 
The challenge of devising a devolution strategy that embeds a compensation scheme for 
bureaucrats then becomes that of how to offer the bureaucrats a formula that does not distort 
their incentives (see, for example, Anderson and Fretwell, 2001: 154).  The bureaucrats’ 
interests are the private gains they derive from an economy dominated by rent-seeking.  
These private (actually secret) gains pose a different type of problem in designing a 
compensation scheme, unlike such problems as who is to pay or receive the side payments, 
the size of payments, and their form (Libecap, 1989: 6).  In this case then, the role of politics 
in the transformation of property rights becomes a significant factor.    
Politics drives the crafting of new property rights by way of negotiations/lobbying or war 
(Libecap, 1989: 4, 11; Anderson and Hill, 2004: 23).  When politics is involved in bargaining 
for property rights, it can assume unbalanced proportions.  In Tanzania, for example, the 
imbalance in political bargaining is reflected in the unequal weight brought to bear on the 
political landscape by the two frontline protagonists in the wildlife sector: communities and 
wildlife bureaucrats.  Diverse structural limitations render communities more susceptible to 
collective action problems than bureaucrats.  Bureaucrats operate in a hierarchical system 
where directives are easily implemented.34  It is, therefore, relatively easy for them to execute 
                                                                                                                                                       
showing the imminent collapse.  Later on, politicians were to openly admit that they were caught up 
between scientific evidence and economic reality (the fishing communities who were voters, while 
the cod weren’t) (Brubaker, 2000:193-4). 
 
34This is what happened in the collapse of the Canadian cod fisheries; scientists in the department 
were warned that they may not criticize their employer in public.  They were warned that such an act 
was equivalent to assault and fraud and was grounds for retribution (Brubaker, 2000: 187).  The 
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a project to its conclusion, even in the context of scarce resources or divergent opinions 
among them.  Moreover, bureaucrats are welded together, given that they are already 
benefiting from the property rights under threat.  Thus, they have private incentives to protect 
the interests of the collective as they would protect individual interests. 
Conversely, communities can be difficult to organize.  They are dispersed, and their way 
of getting information, not only about each other but also about the wildlife bureaucrats, is 
inadequate.  Then there are problems of resource availability.  During a villagers’ seminar, a 
participant captured the predicaments of the villagers thus:  
There are now big conflicts over land, and rights to use land are being granted 
by the government without consulting the villages.  What can we do- lawyers 
are too expensive as a source of help for communities? (Kallonga, et al, 2003).    
 
In a further discussion that touched on the rights of citizens in the constitutions, another 
participant noted that 
if we want to talk about the Constitution, we need to remember that many 
villagers have never even seen a copy of the Constitution and may not even 
know that it exists, let alone being familiar with the details of its contents.  
The result is that local people think that the law is their enemy (Kallonga, 
Nelson and Stolla, 2003). 
 
It is thus evident that the predicaments besetting communities contrast sharply with the 
situation their competitors, the bureaucrats, operate in.  In terms of resource endowments, 
communities are hamstrung, and this affects their participation in the political process.  Even 
though communities may get around their structural problems, 35  this is mostly in an 
                                                                                                                                                       
department also censured participation in professional meetings by members of its staff holding 
different views from those of the department as to why the cod was collapsing. 
 
35Sometimes, through the help of conservation NGOs; Sand County Foundation (either on its own or 
in concert with others), for example, commits its efforts to sensitizing communities about the 
potential of the resources in their lands, and on the rights they have to utilize these resources.  It does 
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ephemeral way.  Hence, their articulation of grievances and formulation of tactics is not 
always effective.   
The situation is further complicated by the fact that the state is also a direct, or even 
militant, claimant of the same property rights.    This effectively denies the communities the 
benefits of Solomonic intervention in their struggle against wildlife bureaucrats.  In cash 
starved economies, governments use rent from natural resources to finance other sectors (see, 
Ascher, 1999).36  When the contributions of a given sector to the GDP are pronounced, 
governments can defer to the bureaucrats in that sector.  The bureaucrats can then use powers 
of the state to do what industry seeks state power for: to block or slow the growth of new 
entrants (Stigler, 1971).  Bureaucrats in Tanzania’s wildlife division seem to fit this 
characterization.  They are discouraging the active participation of local communities in the 
governance of the wildlife sector. 
What then is the role of politicians in molding implementation of state wildlife policy that 
affects communities?  Electoral considerations would lead us to expect that vote-maximizing 
politicians should be able to articulate the interests of their communities in both 
governmental (executive) and legislative circles.  Literature suggests that politicians make a 
                                                                                                                                                       
this by engaging natural resources lawyers to conduct seminars for villagers on these issues.  Such 
seminars can either be for a single village, or could involve bringing participants from several villages 
together for a two to three day residential seminar (see, for example, SCF, 2002; Kallonga, Nelson, 
and Stolla, 2003). 
 
36This line of reasoning was played out recently (2005) in Kenya by conservationists and other 
interested parties in opposing the transfer of Amboseli National Park from the state wildlife 
regulatory body (Kenya Wildlife Service, KWS) to the local communities in the region in which the 
park is located.   While their opposition was inspired by the fact that the conservation lobbyists 
thought that the local peoples did not have the capacity to manage what they referred to as the fragile 
ecosystem of Amboseli National Park, they also cast their opposition in terms of the fact that 
Amboseli National Park is the lead revenue earner for KWS.  Hence, if it is transferred to the local 
communities, with the consequence that KWS will no longer control the revenue from it, that will 
paralyze the operations of KWS in all other parks and reserves that are under KWS, but which do not 
generate any significant revenue to run their operations.   
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cost-benefit analysis to determine their support for each claimant in the production of 
property rights institutions (Libecap, 1989: 16-17, 21, 27; McChesney, 2003: 240).  The 
expectation that politicians would support communities because of electoral considerations is 
based on the notion of a competitive democracy, which Tanzania is not.37   
The salience of the vote in Tanzania is diluted by the fact that loyalty to the ruling party 
determines a candidate’s sponsorship by the party to vie for political office.38  In the 2005 
political party nominations for Parliamentary elections, for example, the party’s national 
executive council exercised its powers to ditch candidates who had won nominations during 
the party primaries at the grassroots.  These candidates were replaced with their competitors 
who had either come second or third in the party primaries.  Justifying this action, a party 
spokesperson argued that the national executive council “…had reached the decision after 
taking into consideration party interests” (Ippmedia 1, 2005).  Because the ruling party has a 
stranglehold on the political landscape, politicians antagonizing the government (and by 
extension the ruling party) cannot bank on the possibilities of shifting alliances to another 
political party.  Under the current multi-party politics, voters are displaying a tendency to see 
parties rather than individual candidates.  Hence, some candidates who are otherwise 
regarded as frontrunners end up losing if they contest elections outside the sponsorship of the 
                                                 
37Thus, unlike the case of the Canadian cod fisheries, where the politicians were prepared to ignore 
even scientific evidence because of the interests of the voters, in less competitive electoral systems, 
support for voters would have to account for whether such an action stirs resentment higher up the 
electoral chain.   
 
38When I was doing fieldwork, I heard the claim that the President had warned ruling party politicians 
who were opposed to the liberalization of a bank that they should not forget that they will need the 
nomination of the party to contest parliamentary elections.  This is a direct threat to politicians that 
they should not oppose government policies.  It also underscores the confidence of the ruling party 
that more often than not, the candidates on its slate will sail through, at least in those regions where it 
is popular.  The ruling party controls over 70 percent of elected seats in Parliament.  Indeed, in both 
my research sites, I could not survey opinion across political party divisions because only the ruling 
party that had a following there.  Whenever I inquired about officials of other political parties, the 
popular response was a sigh of amusement--meaning the region is a ruling party zone. 
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dominant party of the region.  Gibson (1999) demonstrates a similar situation for Zambia 
under the first multi-party republic.  During this time, the ruling party was dominant and this 
affected the legislators’ choice of legislative strategies.  The current dominance of the ruling 
party in Tanzania was recently (2005) conceded by an opposition party politician who is 
making a third bid for the presidency.   He observed that, “….The voting pattern in both 1995 
and 2000 has shown that even if all the opposition parties were to come together, they would 
not succeed to topple over CCM,” (Ippmedia 2, 2005).  While there are exceptions in which 
the ruling party has succumbed to the opposition during parliamentary elections, on average 
politicians rejecting the ruling party for the opposition political parties risk ruining their 
political careers.39   
Consequently, politicians in Tanzania have been slow in organizing their people against 
the wildlife sector in a way that could be interpreted as fermenting rural disquiet against the 
establishment.  Politicians sympathetic to their peoples’ plight because of wildlife menace 
seem to have contented themselves with attacking the record of the wildlife division from the 
floor of Parliament.  In 1992, for example, Members of Parliament (MPs) temporarily 
blocked the passing of the budget vote of the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism.  
The minister was called to the floor about thirty times to respond to a barrage of criticisms 
                                                 
39The recognition by the politicians of the dominance of the ruling party can be gleaned from what 
transpired in a meeting that was sponsored by conservation NGOs for Members of Parliament to 
sensitize them on the drawbacks of the proposed WMA project.  The MPs admitted that there are 
issues that need to be addressed but, they argued, the seeking of such redress must be done through 
the ruling party.   The party hegemony seems, however, to be under stress from the grassroots.  
Experience from the 2005 political party nominations for the parliamentary elections indicate that 
grassroots supporters of the ruling CCM are beginning to challenge the national executive council’s 
tendency to override the wishes of the voters.  In certain areas where the choice of the voters was 
over-ruled by the national executive council, the party’s flag bearer for the Presidential vote was told 
openly by the voters while on the campaign trail that they will give him presidential votes.  
Nevertheless, they insisted that they would not vote for the party candidates for the parliamentary 
vote, since the candidate was not their choice (Nation, 1). 
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from the MPs against the performance of the wildlife officials.  The press reported that 
Members of Parliament 
raised a series of allegations against workers of the Wildlife Department, 
citing cases of cruelty, murder and rape. … The MPs also complained that 
Wildlife Department officials in their respective areas were not cooperative.  
They ignored their advices and at times used abusive language against them. 
(Daily News 5/8/1992, in Songorwa, 1999a: 351, appendix 4, articles 1-2.)  
 
Its clear from this session of Parliament that MPs are bitter about the wildlife sector, yet there 
is nothing much they have done.  Although they temporarily withheld passing the ministry’s 
vote, that was a one day victory; they passed the vote the following day after the government 
promised to take tough measures against the officials concerned.   
A decade later, we find MPs admitting, as observed earlier, that the WMA regulations are 
faulty, but that a solution has to be sought through the party machinery.  Their position can 
then be taken as evidence that the bureaucrats still weild more power than MPs, the latter’s 
presentation to the government notwithstanding.  As one of the MPs had observed in the 
parliamentary debate referred to above, “Despite frequent complaints to the Government on 
the conduct of the wardens…no serious action was taken” (Daily News 5/8/1992, in 
Songorwa, 1999a: 351, appendix 4, articles 1-2).  This state of affairs could have impressed 
on MPs the belief that in a contest between them and the bureaucrats, the latter are likely to 
be the successful contenders, much to the detriment of the MPs. 
In addition to political risks, politicians’ commitment to (re)presenting community 
interests against those of the bureaucrats could also be affected if bureaucrats endeavor to 
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compromise the politicians.40  Regarding this issue, one conservation NGO actor working in 
Northern Tanzania commented that this claim:  
unfortunately continues to hold water--as recently exemplified by the case of 
the MP for…trying to sell the hunting rights of the ...rangelands to Arab 
hunting interests in collusion with the District Commissioner and District 
Game officer. (e-mail communication.) 
 
Such bureaucratic overtures are tempting for politicians in a social setting characterized by 
rent-seeking, and who already entertain the idea that a fiery and structured defense of 
community interests is not a paying venture politically.   
A politician in the Tanzanian context can thus be caught up between two claimants 
(bureaucrats and communities) who present unequal incentives for support.  A politician’s 
cost-benefit analysis of whom to support does not, therefore, easily lead to a conclusion that 
could hurt the bureaucracy.  This means that the bureaucrats are saved from one potent 
danger that could stand in their way.  In light of the self-interest model, certain characteristics 
of the Tanzanian wildlife bureaucracy that are relevant to the transformation of property 
rights can then be identified. 
 
VII  Character of Tanzania’s Wildlife Bureaucracy 
The bureaucracy is both a lead claimant for property rights over wildlife and a regulator.  
As a lead claimant, it is satisfied with the status quo because it holds all the property rights to 
the resource, and it is, in its opinion, doing well.  As a regulator, its fate, like that of most 
Tanzania bureaucrats, is not tied to job performance and, therefore, it has no incentive 
structure to make obligatory welfare maximizing decisions (see, e.g. Ascher, 1990: 11-12; 
                                                 
40Some villagers actually shared this view.  In one village, I read village documents in which the area 
Member of Parliament was accused of colluding with the district commissioner and wildlife division 
officers to give away village land to the wildlife division.  
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Leal and Fretwell, 2001: 48; McChesney, 2003:40; Nshala, n.d. a).  Moreover, as a 
regulating agency, it is assured of political patronage given the centrality of the wildlife 
sector and the weakness of political actors that could voice community interests.  Thus, in 
terms of factors influencing a bureaucrat’s decision to defend the status quo, those in favor 
are strong, while those against are weak.  As such, one can say that wildlife bureaucrats are 
blind to the short-term horizon of a publicly managed wildlife sector, and impervious to 
change because of several factors.   
First, bureaucrats are apprehensive about a loss in revenue flow, both public (what goes 
to the Treasury) and private (rent-seeking) money, which they currently control.  The wildlife 
division is in charge of all wildlife in Tanzania that is out of the national parks (and 
Ngorongoro Conservation Area).  Wildlife is subject to both consumptive and non-
consumptive utilization.  The wildlife division controls directly the former, whose dominant 
mode of utilization is tourist sports-hunting.  The current distribution of revenue from tourist 
hunting ventures in Tanzania is heavily tilted in favor of the wildlife division (see Table 1). 
 
 Table 1:  Current revenue-sharing arrangement (from tourist hunting fees) 
%    Distribution of fees from: Beneficiary 
Trophy animal  Hunting block Conservation  others 
25 0 0 0 -Wildlife Division 
-TWP Fund* 26 25 100 100 
Treasury 49** (37) 75 0 0 
Communities***   =     (12) 0 0 0 
* (TWP) Tanzania Wildlife Protection Fund is under the wildlife division. 
** Treasury finally gets 37% because, of the 49% sent to the Treasury 25% is supposedly given to the  
            communities. 
*** Given to district councils; popular opinion is that it never reaches the target communities. 
 
As Table 1 shows, most of the revenue from tourist sports-hunting, with the exception of the 
fees from hunting blocks, is retained by the wildlife division.  Communities get only 12 %.  
Popular opinion, however, is that communities get 25 %.  This is true as far as what the 
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treasury gives the communities is concerned, but the treasury gives 25% of what it receives 
after the wildlife division has taken its share --51% of total revenue.  The wildlife division 
thus has at its disposal a large chunk from the state wildlife largesse that it can spend without 
having to apply for appropriations from the treasury.  This is unlike the case with most other 
government departments that have to submit their appropriation estimates to the treasury in 
order to be allocated funds.     
Yet, devolution of property rights over wildlife to locals through the WMA project 
implied shifting this revenue from the wildlife division to the local communities.  A 
consultancy study on revenue-sharing in WMA that was commissioned by both the wildlife 
division and USAID came out with this recommendation (see Table 2). 
 
Table 2:  Distribution of wildlife revenue proposed by some experts (USAID/TZ-W/D: 2001).  (The 
report also said that the distribution shown below received “strong support from stakeholders 
consulted”). 
%Distribution of wildlife revenue to: Fees from: 
 community District council government 
Hunting block 100 0 0 
Conservation 100 0 0 
Tourist hunting Game 60 30 10 
Resident hunter game 100 0 0 
Tourism 70 20 10 
 
The consultants’ recommendations reverse the distribution of revenue between the 
communities and the state from the way it is currently allocated (Table 1) and literally leaves 
the wildlife division empty-handed.  Indeed, the report noted that its recommendations were 
an interim arrangement and that, “Ideally all monies should accrue to the…” communities in 
the long run.  In the consultants’ scheme, the government would receive tax as they do from 
other businesses (USAID/TZ-W/D: 2001).  It is important to note that in this distribution, the 
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wildlife division is not in the picture; it is conflated with the government.41  What could be 
more alarming (from the point of view of the bureaucrats) about these recommendations is 
that they were not isolated cases from one consultant report.  In this same report, the 
consultants footnoted their recommendations by saying that they received strong support 
from many of the stakeholders.  Moreover, other prominent donor actors in wildlife 
conservation in Tanzania also held similar ideas that excluded communities sharing wildlife 
revenue with the state.  One such authority holds the following view:  
“Benefit sharing” is actually not a very appropriate term.  The communities 
must be allowed to keep all the income and all the fees from photographic 
tourism and resident hunting on their land.  Why should a farmer be allowed 
to keep all the cash from selling a cow, but if he sells a buffalo, for which he 
has been given user rights, he has to share the proceeds with the 
Government?” Instead of benefit sharing, the WMA should pay taxes so that 
the Government gets its appropriate share too (Baldus, et al 2001).42 
 
These proposals suggest that wildlife bureaucrats were presented with conditions that led 
them to adopt a siege mentality with respect to the appropriation of state largesse hitherto 
under their singular control.  While exponents of public finance would contend that the 
                                                 
41One is tempted to suspect that the consultants who designed this scheme, in which they also  
reported that  the scheme had received strong support from stakeholders, could have alarmed the 
bureaucrats—who then saw WMA as a real threat and hence chose the hard-line stance that they took 
(USAID/TZ-W/D, 2001).  The bureaucrats had no reason to doubt this possibility of “dispossession”.  
They were certainly aware that there were other areas where devolution has meant some of the entire 
fees going to the communities.  In southern Africa (Namibia, South Africa and Botswana), for 
example, communities keep the entire amount of trophy fees (USAID/TZ-W/D, 2001; Hughes, 2001; 
Traffic, 2000).   
 
42Baldus has for a long time been associated with the German government development agency, GTZ, 
which initiated and runs the Selous Conservation Programme (SCP).  SCP is based in Selous Game 
Reserve and tries to incorporate rural communities into wildlife conservation.  It was SCP that arm-
twisted the Tanzanian government into allowing it to retain some of the revenue generated from 
Selous Game Reserve.  This was at a time when even the wildlife division was not retaining any 
money from the proceeds it collected.  It was after SCP was allowed to retain some of the revenue 
that the wildlife division also managed to have the treasury allow it to retain some money as well 
(Songorwa, 1999a).  Thus, the wildlife division has evidence that opinions coming from people like 
Baldus should not be taken lightly.  They could easily be pushed through government corridors using 
the leverage of the donor support to other sectors of the economy. 
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government is ideally not losing anything, more so because it would benefit from an 
expanded tax base, government officials argued that the WMA project would imply loss of 
revenue for the government.  An officer from the wildlife division stated: 
reforms in revenue sharing need to be gradual so as to cushion the 
governmental loss of revenue, to give an opportunity to assess the progress of 
the designated WMAs and provide a window for revision of the regulations as 
deemed necessary (Zechariah and Kaihula, 2001: 36).  
 
From previous pronouncements by wildlife officials, it can even be observed that the 
concern of the wildlife bureaucrats of loss of revenue was not so much regarding its impact 
to the national treasury, but rather, to the wildlife division itself.  In 1994, for example, the 
director of wildlife, while addressing the question of issues to be considered in community 
conservation and wildlife benefits, posed the question thus: 
Therefore the question is whether, in providing benefits to local people from 
wildlife, we should be aiming to take benefits from the earnings of the already 
overstretched, unsettled protected areas, as espoused in the policy of 
distributing a percentage of fees to districts (W/D, 1994). 
 
There is then no doubt that the wildlife bureaucrats understand the financial dispossession 
inherent in implementing WMA.  If the wildlife division was deprived of control over tourist 
hunting ventures, it would have to queue with other government departments in applying for 
appropriations from the treasury.  This is a situation that a bureaucracy accustomed to 
affluence would not be enthusiastic about.  It is thus evident from a comparison of the above 
tables why the wildlife bureaucrats should be alarmed and consequently set themselves the 
task of derailing the WMA project.       
Second, a successful CBC initiative would render the bulk of services offered by the 
wildlife division redundant.  A reduced demand for the services of the wildlife division 
would inform the need to shrink the wildlife bureaucracy.  This is not something the 
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bureaucrats would look forward to because for them, the size of a bureaucracy matters.  The 
size of the bureaucracy provides rationale for a big budget, and this big budget implies there 
are many avenues for expenditure, and hence opportunities for rent-seeking, and a patronage 
system.43  If, however, communities are in charge of the wildlife in their regions, they would 
be responsible for general management of wildlife at the local level such that the role of the 
wildlife bureaucracy would be largely supervisory or advisory.   
Elsewhere in Africa, where community-friendly devolution has been attempted, the 
model that was set up (before it was arrested by vested interests) pointed to the fact that 
under community control of wildlife, wildlife bureaucrats would have a minimal role.  In 
Zimbabwe, for example, bureaucrats sponsoring the devolution of wildlife to local 
communities removed all monitoring or regulatory requirements that did not add value, such 
as government-approved quotas or permits.  Communities were also legally empowered to 
control any abuse of wildlife by their individual members (Child, n.d.).  An arrangement of 
this kind in the management of wildlife leaves very little demand for the services of the 
wildlife bureaucracy.  Hence, its downsizing is easily justifiable, especially in an economy 
reeling under the weight of IMF structural adjustment programs.  As far back as 1998, the 
Minister for Natural Resources and Tourism had referred to this downsizing of the sector 
thus:  
Honourable speaker, the government retrenched civil servants to reduce its 
burden and to make sure that workers were paid according to their 
performance.  This affected all sectors of government including game scouts 
of Kilwa (Daily Mail 30/7/1998 in Songorwa, 1999a: 347, appendix 1a). 
 
                                                 
43 The ways government bureaucrats use state agencies towards this end were recently (2005) 
exemplified in Kenya Wildlife Service, where recruitment for wildlife rangers for training overshot 
the cap by 100%.  Investigations later revealed that the additional recruits were brought in by senior 
government officers and politicians who had been given letters of offer by KWS management to fill 
in recruits of their choice. 
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It can be expected that the message such observations send to wildlife bureaucrats is that if 
there are others who can do the job, and possibly do it even better, then further downsizing of 
the sector would be a foregone conclusion.  That in itself is a disincentive for the bureaucrats 
to mid-wife devolution. 
A third factor is that inclusion of other actors in the governance of the wildlife sector 
would necessitate managerial transparency, which is bad for both the rent-seeking and 
patronage benefits bureaucrats currently enjoy.  In the way the wildlife division is currently 
structured, wildlife bureaucrats retain what Barzel (1997) refers to as both the legal and 
economic property rights, in this case, over wildlife).44  In the event wildlife bureaucrats 
abuse this mandate, the people best placed to know and help to arrest the situation are those 
communities living with these resources.  As of now, two scenarios exist.  Some 
communities ignore such abuse, and if anything, they welcome it.  This is because, given that 
they do not benefit from wildlife, but only incur damages from wildlife, any form of wildlife 
utilization that assists in the decimation of wildlife is to be appreciated, not apprehended, by 
communities.  Thus, while communities have no incentives to repulse such abuse, they have 
every incentive to facilitate it.45  On the other hand, a community may decide to check such 
abuse. In this case, its options are limited to reporting the abuse to the wildlife bureaucrats, 
yet these are the same people who are the culprits.  So such an action adds no value to 
checking the abuse in the wildlife sector.  In one of the villages I visited, certain documents 
                                                 
44Barzel defines economic property right as the ability to enjoy a piece of property, while legal 
property right is what the state assigns a person (Barzel, 1997: 3, 90-91). 
 
45See, for example, Guha, (1997:18), where in a village in India, a smuggler had eluded thousands of 
security personnel for a decade, but was aided by villagers disillusioned with conservationists and 
elephants that raided their crops.  The smuggler was seen as a better alternative because he took care 
of their material needs. 
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showed that the villagers had written to the wildlife division calling for a moratorium on 
officially sanctioned wildlife hunting ventures.  The villagers’ argument was that the hunting 
ventures extant were not sustainable.  When I asked the village executive officer whether 
there was any feedback from the wildlife division regarding the letter, he told me that they 
did not receive even an acknowledgement that the letter was received.  In such a case then, 
communities find themselves in a precarious situation.  Their options are limited. 
While communities have the economic rights over wildlife (in the sense of Barzel, 
1997),46 they lack the legal rights over the same.  Consequently, there is little they can do to 
right the situation if the wildlife bureaucrats are not supportive of their action.  If the 
communities had legal rights over wildlife, however, they could act as co-proprietors of the 
wildlife sector together with the bureaucrats.  This means that in the event of divergence of 
opinions between them and the wildlife bureaucrats over wildlife utilization, they would have 
a firmer legal basis in case they resolve to hold the wildlife bureaucrats accountable.  The 
wildlife bureaucrats, once hemmed in by communities, would no longer be able to dispose of 
the wildlife largesse with abandon as they currently do--a fact that is already in the public 
domain.   
The wildlife division was among the government departments singled out for censure by 
the Presidential Commission of Inquiry on Corruption (Warioba Commision, 1996).  The 
Commission observed that discretionary powers have been used in ways that accommodate 
favoritism and discrimination, and consequently, corruption.  This was particularly evident in 
the issuing of hunting licenses and in the allocation of hunting blocks (Warioba Commission, 
1996).  The legal inclusion of other actors such as local communities in the management of 
                                                 
46This view is recognized even by the wildlife division.  One director summed it up thus, “by law my 
department has control over the issuing of licences for all captures and killing of wildlife within 
GCAs, but in practice we have less control over what is actually killed or captured.” (W/D, 1994). 
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wildlife would complicate the ways in which bureaucrats exercise their discretion.  
Communities’ monitoring of wildlife utilization on the ground would give them access to 
information of all those utilizing wildlife in their regions.  In this way it would be easy to 
disclose when wildlife bureaucrats exercise their discretionary powers as if the wildlife sector 
is their personal fiefdom.  The inclusion of a multiplicity of actors with legal rights over 
wildlife is thus not favorable to a bureaucracy accustomed to rent-seeking and patronage.  
This unease can inform their disquiet with devolution.          
Lastly, the mandate to run the wildlife sector, just as is the case with other sectors, is not 
backed by any performance contract and hence there are no occupational hazards for 
pursuing strategies with short-term horizons.  I once had a short conversation during a 
seminar tea break with one bureaucrat who told me that in Tanzania, the wildlife division, 
unlike Kenya Wildlife Service, does not take orders from “these people” (referring to the 
foreign donors or experts).  This is because the wildlife division does not have to rely on the 
foreign donors for subvention because the wildlife division generates its own revenue.  
Implied in this was a sense of evaluation that suggested that the bureaucrats feel they are self-
paced while executing their responsibilities.  Wildlife bureaucrats are, therefore, under no 
pressure to take up innovative ideas, even if they could thereafter re-align these ideas with 
their pursuit of selfish-interests. 47   Thus, it can be expected that if the bureaucrats are 
confronted with a proposal for devolution of property rights over wildlife based on a premise 
that defines the problem as technical or managerial, they can easily hold out.  The proposal 
                                                 
47A similar lack of pursuit for innovation is noted in officers running the Yellowstone National Park 
in the United States.  Terry Anderson observes that landowners bordering the park have had problems 
with the bisons that spread brucellosis to their domestic animals.  The bureaucrats running 
Yellowstone are not liable for this damage and hence, they have no incentive to contract with other 
actors in search of a solution to this problem.  Consequently, the question of how to deal with the 
problem is just “political football” (Anderson, 1998: 279).    
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would not be addressing their concerns (selfish interests).  This is what happened in the case 
of Tanzania’s experiment with devolution of property rights in wildlife.  The bureaucrats thus 
moved to arrest their dispossession by crafting a devolution project unacceptable to the 
communities.  In designing the WMA strategy, the dictates of self-preservation seem to have 
been uppermost in the bureaucrats’ scheme of things.  This, in the findings of this chapter, is 
why the policy proposal to devolve property rights over wildlife to local communities in 
Tanzania has stalled.   
The question that emerges from the foregoing observation, however, is why the 
government should have bothered producing regulations that are unacceptable instead of 
rejecting the devolution project altogether.  To understand this apparent contradiction or 
confusion, one needs to note that there are two processes occurring in the politics of 
devolution of property rights over wildlife to local communities.  One is political, and the 
other is administrative/technocratic.  The latter is squarely in the hands of the wildlife 
bureaucrats, the arm of the executive charged with implementing policy.  The former is the 
arena of policy making, which combines both the executive (President and Minister) and the 
legislature, in which the President and Minister are also involved.   
At the political level, the government is dealing with more than local communities.  
While the government may not be enthusiastic in surrendering its hitherto dominant hold on 
the wildlife sector to local communities, it is constrained in its options by the international 
circumstances within which it is operating.  Within the wider political economy of the state, 
the government is dealing with donors who are interested in involving communities in 
conservation projects.  This is the case even elsewhere in Africa.  In Kenya, for example, the 
involvement of communities in wildlife conservation was imposed on the government by 
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donors like The World Bank, who, at the behest of conservationists, linked their funding of 
projects to community participation in wildlife management (Western, 1994, 1997).  This 
approach has continued up to the present (see Chapter 4 in this study).   
In Zambia, for example, foreign funding of conservation projects was central in the 
attempted incorporation of local communities in conservation programs.  As Gibson has 
demonstrated, the government was made to give certain concessions in order to secure 
funding for conservation projects from western donors (Gibson, 1999; see also Suzuki, 2001, 
for Zimbabwe and Swatuk, 2005, for Botswana).  Also, as noted in chapter one of this study, 
donor countries and agencies have now openly called for devolution of authority in 
environmental governance to local communities.  This bias towards local communities, 
particularly in its wildlife conservation variance, reached its peak at the 2003 World Parks 
Congress, where the Protected Areas system was almost denounced in favor of community-
centered conservation.  In one recommendation, it was stated: 
There is also a worldwide trend towards decentralizing authority and 
responsibility for the management of protected areas, including increasing 
efforts to develop partnerships among different sectors of society and to 
provide for greater engagement of civil society in decision making related to 
protected areas (WPC, 2003, rec. 5.17).   
 
Thus there is a lot of pressure brought to bear on African governments with respect to the 
governance of natural resources.  This has meant that at the policy level, the government is 
forced to speak the language of the donors, since they hold the purse strings.  In Tanzania, 
the process began with Selous Conservation Programme (SCP) when the government 
appealed to the international community for help in combating wildlife poaching.  The 
German government responded to this call, but linked its support to community participation 
in wildlife projects.  The German government even went further to peg support for other 
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projects in non-wildlife areas to the Tanzanian government’s response to the SCP.  The 
popular opinion among wildlife bureaucrats was that community participation in wildlife was 
a donor affair, whereby local institutions were “only passengers, while the donors are doing 
the steering” (Songorwa, 1999a: 118, see also p. 316, 320).  Perhaps it is because of such 
sentiments that there is a disconnect between policymakers’ pronouncements and progress in 
implementation of the declaration of interest in involving local communities in wildlife 
conservation.  The government has been professing community involvement in wildlife 
management since the late 1980s.  The pronouncement gained tempo in the 1990s.  In 1994, 
for example, the minister in charge of wildlife, while talking about projects related to 
community conservation, observed:  
A common development among these projects will be to establish Wildlife 
 Management Areas (WMAs) in line with proposals made in a draft national 
 wildlife policy that still awaits implementation (MTNRE, 1994). 
 
Yet, it was not until 2003 that the current stalled implementation programme was taken to the 
communities, following the release of the WMA regulations in 2002 (MNRT, 2002 b).  The 
long interlude can be attributed to the fact that the government was chanting a chorus it did 
not believe in.   
Thus, contrary to Songorwa’s (1999a: 167) contention that the government is not willing 
to devolve authority over wildlife to communities “both at the policy...and the 
practical….level”, we find that the government has at the policy level pronounced what 
would be expected from any zealot of CBC.  It has committed itself to devolution.  
Songorwa’s claim seems to be based on an earlier draft of the policy (see also reference to 
section 3.2.6 when sections in 3 end at 3.2.4).  Songorwa quotes section 3.3.1 of the policy 
that calls for the need for government to coordinate conservation in and outside Protected 
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Areas so as to address national priorities and minimize abuses, as evidence that the 
government does not trust communities.  However, this is not the case with respect to the 
Wildlife Policy of Tanzania (WPT).  Section 3.3.1. of the policy is about strategies of 
achieving wildlife policy objectives.  Among these strategies is “establishing a new category 
of protected area to be known as Wildlife Management Area for the purposes of effecting 
community based conservation” (MNRT, 1998b:11).  Thus, the public transcript of the 
policy is very CBC- oriented.  The problem is implementation.    
Thus, while the government may not believe in the policy, it is nevertheless forced to 
have it for the purposes of its broader political economy project, which is heavily influenced 
by the donors.  It is then left with the option of sabotaging the policy at the level of 
implementation in the style of “weapons of the weak” and “hidden transcripts” strategies (see, 
for example, Scott, 1985; 1990; see also Haugerud, 1995).  Commenting on the possibility 
that this is what could have been happening, Songorwa avers:  
Few people, if any, can willingly and knowingly put themselves into a hostile 
situation.  Many of the wildlife managers may be against the approach 
although, for a variety of reasons, they do not want to express their opposition 
openly.  No individual or organization would want to openly oppose the 
employer/funding agency on an issue/idea the employer/agency believes is 
correct (Songorwa, 1999a: 47). 
 
Additionally, he observes the following with respect to the wildlife bureaucrats’ opposition 
to the CBC approach: 
 
The Wildlife Department was opposing/reluctant to accept the approach, 
although the evidence presented below is circumstantial—its opposition could 
be implied mainly from its reluctance or sluggishness to clear the path for the 
approach (Songorwa, 1999a: 153). 
 
Whether the bureaucrats have the blessing of the political wing of the executive branch of the 
government is difficult to tell.  Nevertheless, some commentators believe that the top 
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decision makers in government are committed to the policy.  The problem is that because the 
government is not monolithic: 
There are officials at the middle level of the central government, who might 
fear to lose authority, influence and also income opportunities, if 
responsibilities are transferred to districts and communities (Siege, 2001: 22).   
 
Of course this raises the question as to why the higher level officials have not, over time, 
reined in the middle level officials if the latter are not acting as per the official policy.  Such 
questions lead one to sense that even though the bureaucrats may have vested interests in the 
status quo, at the same time, the top decision makers may not be exerting sufficient pressure 
on the bureaucrats to act as per policy.  It is in this context that a policy that is community-
friendly is produced, but fails to be implemented in a way consistent with what it promises. 
 
VIII Conclusion 
In this chapter, the question of devolution of property rights over wildlife was discussed. 
Using Tanzania as a case study, the discussion reviewed the current impasse in the formation 
of WMAs.  The discussion is significant in that actors in wildlife conservation are 
increasingly reaching the conclusion that the predicaments besetting the wildlife sector lie 
not in policy and law, but in implementation (see, for example, ACC et al, 2004).  Taking 
account of this, I have examined the question of the wildlife bureaucracy in Tanzania as a 
stumbling block to devolution.  While the behavior of the bureaucrats mirrors that of the 
counterparts in Zambia, as analysed by Gibson (1999), their targets are in the opposite 
direction.  In Zambia, bureaucrats sought to insulate themselves from politicians, and in their 
schemes, they were eager to cultivate acceptance by communities by making communities 
benefit from wildlife largess.  In Tanzania (and, as we see later, in Kenya as well), on the 
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other hand, bureaucrats sought to insulate themselves from communities, and had no fear of 
politicians’ invasion of their turf.  In the case of Zambia, bureaucrats relied on international 
donors to cushion themselves from politicians’ interference, while in Tanzania, bureaucrats 
relied on their legislative and administrative mandate to cushion themselves against possible 
adverse impacts of community participation.  In both cases, however, their strategy was 
geared towards securing their foothold in the wildlife sector.  The analysis in this chapter 
shows that the bureaucrats have no incentive to mid-wife devolution of property rights to 
local communities.    
The claim about disincentives is supported by several factors.  Firstly, there is the 
subjective claim that the bureaucrats conceded to devolution against their will (Songorwa, 
1999a).  Secondly, and more importantly, when they moved to devolve property rights, they 
issued regulations that suggest two things: one, they devised a WMA regime that will be 
rejected by the communities and, therefore, the status quo will continue.  Otherwise, two, the 
regulations will (if accepted) let the bureaucrats not only retain the same control that they 
had, but also make them better off than before because the regulations will expand wildlife 
habitat and their mandate into community land with the consent of the communities.  
Community consent would ease the tensions that characterize the bureaucrat-community 
relations, without the bureaucrats losing their clout in the sector, which is good for 
bureaucrats.  Thus, the problem of the lack of incentives is one that is constraining the 
transformation of property rights over wildlife.  Bureaucrats have no incentives to devolve 
property rights to communities, while communities have no incentives to take up WMA, 
given the way WMA are regulated. 
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In terms of our hypothesis, we would expect communities to refuse to sign up for WMA.  
Nevetheless, while some communities have acted consistently with our hypothesis, others 
have shown tendencies to concede to the WMA project as presented by the wildlife division.  
The question then is how to account for this move that would appear to be contrary to 
expectations of how actors in transformation of property rights behave.  Moreover, would the 
resultant transformation of property rights in these WMAs deliver the outcomes envisioned 
by the exponents of the CBC model?  The next chapter addresses these questions.  
 
  
 
 
Chapter III 
Nothing Better: Acceptance and Rejection of WMA in West Kilimanjaro 
I)        Introduction 
This chapter accounts for the variance in responses to the WMA project.  The preceding 
chapter led to the conclusion that communities would reject the WMA project.  Community 
response, however, has been varied.  This variance has occurred at both the national level, 
among different proposed WMA, and at the local level, within a single proposed WMA.  
Some communities rejected the WMA project.  Thus, they acted consistently with the 
argument of the preceding chapter and with the expectations of property right theory in 
general.  Other communities, however, consented to the WMA project.  This chapter uses 
one of the proposed WMA projects to examine the simultaneous verification and refutation 
of the argument in the preceding chapter: that communities would reject the proposed WMA 
project.  In this case, we examine this fractioning as it occurs within a single proposed 
WMA.  This chapter further examines the question of why communities most likely to reject 
the WMA consented to a project that is seemingly a liability to them.  The question of 
whether communities’ interaction with natural resources under the circumstances would lead 
to a predatorial approach is also examined.   
The preceding chapter suggested that communities stand to gain no explicit benefits from 
the transformation of property rights proposed in the WMA project.  Both theoretical and 
empirical evidence (communities’ pronouncements) pointed to this conclusion.  If anything, 
it seemed, communities could lose.  Some secondary literature also suggests that African 
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rural communities are not interested in wildlife conservation anyway.  If communities are not 
interested, then the rejection of a problem-ridden WMA project should be a foregone 
conclusion.  Yet, certain communities consented to the project, contrary to the foregoing 
expectation.   
Accounts of why African rural communities may behave contrary to expectations suggest  
that this could be due to such factors as the desperate conditions these communities operate 
in, ignorance of the implications of their actions, or that communities do not consent, but are 
simply involved in theatrics with the (state) system.  These accounts fail to unravel the puzzle 
of communities conceding to the WMA project when they should have rejected it, owing to it 
being a seeming liability to them.  I posit that the communities analyzed here were 
predisposed to accept the WMA project because the conditions that existed on the eve of the 
introduction of WMA made the WMA project appear expedient to them.  This predisposition 
materialized into consent for the WMA project because the region lacked a strong anti-WMA 
coalition that could have tilted the balance of decision-making against WMA.   
The body of the chapter is organized into four sections.  Section Two provides 
background information on the study area. Section Three deals with responses to the 
introduction of WMA in Enduimet Division.  Section Four explains why communities in 
Enduimet Division accepted the WMA project.  The conclusion then follows.   
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II) Background Information 
Location 
The Enduimet Wildlife Management Area (WMA) is located in the Enduimet division of 
Monduli District, Arusha Region.  The area is on the western side of Mt. Kilimanjaro, along 
the Kenya-Tanzania border.  It lies along the Amboseli ecosystem.  The Enduimet division is 
divided into two wards, with nine villages.  These wards are Tinga Tinga (with three villages: 
Sinya, Tinga Tinga and Ngereyani) and Ol Molog (with six villages: Elerai, Ol Molog, 
Lelangwa, Kitendeni, Irkaswa, and Kamwanga).  Enduimet division together with Longdio 
division forms the Longido electoral area with one Member of Parliament.48 
 
Demography 
The division has a population of about 17,000 people.  The total number of households is 
3,675 (Ol molog ward has 2,615 and Tinga Tinga ward has 1,060).  The average household 
size is 4.7 for Ol molog and 4.5 for Tinga Tinga (URT, 2003).  The dominant ethnic group is 
the Maasai, while other ethnicities include WaArusha, Chagga, Pare, and WaAmeru.  There 
are a few other ethnic groups, including some from Kenya, but their numbers are minimal.    
 
Socio-economic Characteristics 
The division has several primary schools; every village has a primary school.  There is no 
secondary school, however, though there are plans to build one.  Some villages have medical 
clinics that provide outpatient services.  There is religious diversity, exemplified in the 
                                                 
48
 Monduli district was sub-divided into Monduli and Longido districts in 2005.  Enduimet division is 
now in Longido district. 
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presence of various Christian denominations, a few Muslims, and the predominance of a 
traditional belief system.   
The predominant economic activity is livestock keeping, but some villages like those in 
Ol molog ward are involved in farming as well (see below).  Each village has a shopping 
centre with traders’ retail shops, restaurants, butchery and beer shops.  The busy days are the 
market days that occur during different times of the week in different villages.  During 
market days, itinerant traders bring wares from outside the division, especially from Sanya 
Juu, which is Enduimet’s gateway to Arusha.   
 
Major Land-uses 
Three major land-uses are discernible: wildlife, livestock, and agriculture.  The intensity 
of agriculture and wildlife depends on the individual villages.  Some villages are well 
endowed for cultivation, while others are not.  Others offer a better attraction for wildlife, 
while some (at least one) have little room left for wildlife, except perhaps a few that may 
stray from the major wildlife habitat or migratory areas and enter the village. 
 
Wildlife 
Enduimet Division has a lot of wildlife, and it functions as a corridor for wildlife 
migrating to and from three national parks: Amboseli, Arusha, and Kilimanjaro.  Wildlife 
species include the following: gerenuk, lesser kudu, striped hyena, cheetah, zebra, 
wildebeest, elephants, buffaloes, elands, giraffe, vervet monkeys, baboon, Thomson’s 
gazelle, Grant’s gazelle, patas monkey, and beisa oryx.  Due to the open range nature of this 
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region, wildlife roams freely in areas otherwise meant for residential and other domestic 
purposes. 
 
Livestock 
Most of the villagers keep livestock that includes cows, goats, sheep, and donkeys.  
Livestock keeping is the predominant mode of economic activity in this area.  It is not 
unusual to find villagers with hundreds of heads of cattle.  The density of livestock 
ownership, however, keeps fluctuating because whenever a drought strikes, hundreds of 
livestock die.  The livestock-keeping tradition is facing stiff challenge from decreasing 
pasturage that is emanating from an increase of crop cultivation in the area.    
 
Agriculture 
Agriculture is a major activity, especially among itinerant cultivators who lease land from 
the local Maasai for cultivation.  Middle class civil servants such as teachers working in the 
area also lease land for cultivation.  These outsiders, more than the local Maasai, drive the 
cultivation industry.  Cultivation is both hoe-based and mechanized.  Mechanized cultivation 
involves ploughing several hectares of land for planting maize or wheat.  Farmers harvest the 
wheat through mechanization.  Other cultivated crops include beans and Irish potatoes.  
Village authorities enforce proper farming practices, with some villages such as Lelangwa 
having by-laws that penalize failure to follow proper farming practices.  The by-law states: 
“a person who does not apply better farming practices commits a crime and is liable for a 
fine of sh. 50,000” (Lelangwa, n.d.: villabe by-laws, no. 18).  The region is considered highly 
productive for agriculture, with farmers planting and harvesting twice a year.  Farm produce 
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is sold to businessmen from Kenya and from neighboring urban areas such as Arusha, and 
these businessmen visit the region during harvesting period.  Given this scenario, wildlife 
ventures should have no fighting chance as a choice of land-use by villagers.   Apparently, 
however, they have.  A study of community governance of village land-use shows a 
determined attempt to provide a space for wildlife when allocating land for various uses.  
Thus, in a sense, there was an attempt to operate a village WMA even before the wildlife 
division instituted the formal WMA.   
 
III)         Response to the Proposed WMA in Enduimet Division 
From the discussion in the preceding chapter, communities should be expected to reject 
the WMA project.  The introduction of WMA, however, elicited various responses.  This 
divergence was evident at both the national and local levels.  At the national level, some 
communities that were supposed to implement the WMA project have rejected the proposed 
WMA.  The proposed Loliondo WMA is one such example.  On the other hand, some 
communities have accepted the proposed WMA.  Nevertheless, this acceptance has not been 
universal among all the villages that were meant to form the particular WMA.  While some 
villages accepted, other villages, or scions within a village, rejected the WMA project.  The 
proposed Enduimet WMA falls in this cluster of divergent local responses.   
The WMA project in West Kilimanjaro was instituted as part of the national WMA pilot 
project, in which sixteen pilot WMA were to be started among various communities in 
Tanzania.  Various villages were grouped together to form a single WMA.  Enduimet WMA 
in West Kilimanjaro was one of these pilot WMA.  Implementation of the WMA in 
Enduimet Division began in 2003, subsequent to the wildlife division’s release of the WMA 
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Regulations in December 2002.  The wildlife division appointed The African Wildlife 
Foundation (AWF) to be the facilitating NGO during the establishment of the Enduimet 
WMA, while the District Game Officer (DGO) Monduli district was the implementing 
agency.   
The initial response to the institution of the WMA was dramatic in two respects.  While 
Enduimet division has nine villages, only eight had initially been selected for the pilot WMA.  
One village, Kamwanga, was excluded.  This village, therefore, petitioned for inclusion, and 
the government accommodated them in the project.  On the other hand, while five of the 
other villages welcomed the project from the beginning, three villages presented some 
difficulties.  Two villages, Sinya and Ol Molog, initially rejected the project.  Ol Molog later 
conceded, but Sinya has rejected the project to date.  One other village, Irkaswa, is split into 
two camps.  One group rejects the WMA project, while the other is for it.  The latter group 
had the village council on its side, and so it signed up for WMA.  The village is thus 
participating in the WMA implementation process without obstruction from the dissenting 
group.  
In the following section, we discuss the case of Kamwanga as a unique one because 
Kamwanga is aspiring to join a project that seems problematic.  We then review the case of 
villages that acted consistently with the expectations of the preceding chapter. We then 
explain how different villages’ conceptualization of gains from contracting for property 
rights in the proposed WMA informed their behaviour. 
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Kamwanga Village Invades WMA 
When the division of wildlife initially constituted Enduimet WMA, it excluded the 
Kamwanga village.  The wildlife division did this because the village had no land to 
contribute to the formation of the WMA.  Most of the village land had been converted into 
agricultural use, leaving no significantly uncultivated land that could serve as wildlife 
habitat.  Consequently, the village contested this exclusion by claiming that they have critical 
services to offer a wildlife conservation project.  In a letter addressed to the Chair of the 
Board of WMA, Monduli district in November 25th, 2003, Kamwanga villagers outlined a 
series of grievances regarding their exclusion from the WMA project.  The letter was 
essentially the minutes of a village meeting held to deliberate over their exclusion from the 
Division’s WMA. 49   The grievances were couched in the language of property rights, 
choices, and cooperation.  The first speaker complained that it was wrong for them to be 
excluded, since, for many years, wildlife has wreaked havoc on their farms and property, but 
the villagers have not been retaliating.  Another speaker complained that elephants repeatedly 
destroy water pipes, causing water shortages in the village.  A third speaker “complained 
bitterly” of how elephants that year had destroyed about thirty-two acres of maize and beans, 
and when villagers relayed the information to the district, they received no response.  
Moreover, baboons eat crops, and villagers lose livestock, chicken, goats, and sheep to 
predators.  I later learnt that the background to this complaint is that the village used to be a 
wildlife corridor linking Amboseli and Kilimanjaro National Parks.  This corridor has since 
been converted into farms, but animals continue passing through the village, thereby 
damaging crops and property.  Thus, the villagers were arguing that, in the event that they are 
                                                 
49Notes are taken from the village file on that meeting held in November, 25th, 2003. 
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excluded, and since the villages running WMA will not be able to prevent animals from 
straying to Kamwanga village, Kamwanga villagers will resort to killing animals that damage 
crops.  In the event that they are included in WMA, however, they will tolerate the wildlife 
menace since there is anticipation of benefiting from wildlife.  Thus, we have a property right 
argument advanced by the villagers linking their choice of strategies in responding to wildlife 
to the benefits they would potentially derive from wildlife.   
Villagers also averred that the government should not discriminate against them because 
their village used to be the market for poached meat from neighbouring villages.  However, 
since they attended a seminar on the value of wildlife, villagers have been trying to fight the 
sale of game meat in the village.  However, if they are excluded from the WMA, they will 
continue allowing the trade of wildlife meat that is procured through poaching.  Again here, 
the villagers were linking their cooperation with wildlife protection to the pay-offs for 
reporting poachers.  The villagers also claimed that their village is surrounded by the 
conservation areas of Amboseli and Kilimanjaro National Parks, and because of this, tourists 
go to the village particularly to see Mount Kilimanjaro.  Tourists go to view Mount 
Kilimanjaro from Kamwanga because the village provides a better strategic position to view 
the mountain than other villages in the Enduimet WMA cluster.  This scenic view, they 
argued, makes their village ideal for eco-tourism.  Thus in this claim, they were making a 
case to mitigate the argument that they have nothing to contribute to the formation of a 
WMA that could be used as a product to market the area for tourism.   
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The DGO and AWF held a meeting in the village on March 2004, following the village 
meeting and the village petition for inclusion into the WMA.50  The second agenda for this 
meeting was the Community-Based Organization (CBO).  The formation of a CBO is the 
first stage in the establishment of a WMA.  The villagers were presented with the WMA 
constitution that had already been prepared by the eight villages, excluding Kamwanga 
village.  Thus, the wildlife division had already accepted their petition, and was incorporating 
them into the WMA system, such that by March 2004, Kamwanga was effectively a member 
of Enduimet WMA.  What was the view of other villagers regarding the inclusion of 
Kamwanga into the Enduiment WMA when it had no land to contribute to the formation of 
WMA? 
Apart from Sinya, some elements in Irkaswa, and to some extent Ol Molog, other villages 
seem to have been accommodative of Kamwanga’s inclusion in the WMA project. 51 
Members of Kitendeni’s village environmental committee and Kitendeni’s village 
representatives to WMA argued that it was fine for Kamwanga to be included.  This 
concession was in part because the village is in the same administrative division as the rest of 
the villages forming WMA.  Moreover, such inclusion, they argued, is in the spirit of their 
communalism (this is again another echo of Scott’s moral economy of the peasant thesis 
(Scott, 1976)).  The villagers were appealing to a sense of community to rationalize why they 
                                                 
50Notes were taken from copies of minutes of the village meeting in the village executive officer’s 
file. 
 
51Perhaps their view towards Kamwanga was influenced by the reaction of Sinya towards the WMA 
project.  They may not have wanted to be seen as if they were acting like Sinya.  It was the view of 
other villagers that Sinya was refusing to join the WMA because, in terms of wildlife resources, it 
was better endowed than the other villages and, therefore, it felt as if it could be disadvantaged if it 
participated with others not equally endowed.  So if these other villages had opposed the inclusion of 
Kamwanga, that would have been a tacit approval of the position of Sinya against them.    
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should accommodate Kamwanga village, so that it is not the only one singled out among the 
nine villages in Enduimet administrative division for adverse differential treatment.  They 
also argued that, because Kamwanga village borders conservation areas such as Amboseli 
and Kilimanjaro national parks, wildlife imposes damages to its inhabitants.  Hence, if their 
village is excluded from WMA, the villagers will be the greatest enemies of WMA.  
Members of the other villages echoed the foregoing sentiments of Kitendeni village.  Thus, 
Kamwanga’s inclusion into the WMA project was without incident. Nevertheless, as 
discussed below, there were discordant voices from villages such as Sinya and the renegades 
in Irkaswa.  These villages invoked the irregularity of inclusion of Kamwanga in order to 
justify, in part, their rejection of the WMA project.  The dissenting voices, however, show 
that contracting for property rights involves not just a contest among the villages and the 
state, but also a contest among villages and, as it shall emerge later, a contest among villagers 
within one village.   
The case of Kamwanga’s struggle to join a system that others are rejecting would tend to 
suggest that the expectations of the property right theory as outlined in the previous chapter 
are erroneous.  Nevertheless, this view is premature.  Kamwanga is not a good test case of 
the theory’s major premise regarding the trade-offs that a party contracting for property 
rights confronts when making choices about the gainful strategy to adopt.  Kamwanga’s case 
should be considered unique because the village had nothing to lose in joining WMA.  The 
village was not making any sacrifices as far as land and land-related issues are concerned.  
Yet, as shown in the previous chapter, these issues constituted the cause of disagreement.  
Thus, Kamwanga could only benefit, not lose, from the new regime of property rights in 
wildlife that was being promulgated.  This situation is unlike what occurred in the other 
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villages such as Sinya, Irkaswa, and Ol Molog.  The following discussion addresses these 
other villages.  
 
Ol Molog’s Initial Hold-out 
Property right theory contends that actors contracting for property rights will hold out if 
the expected gains from contracting are not attractive (Libecap, 1989).  This is exemplified in 
the response to the WMA project by the villages that held out.  The two villages that 
expressed reservation in joining the WMA project were Ol Molog and Sinya.  The former 
held out briefly, but later conceded, while the latter has held out to date (2006).   The analysis 
of the latter shall be undertaken below in some detail.  Ol Molog, like Sinya, had some eco-
tourism investments that gave it some income that was relatively higher than that other 
villages, save Sinya, were generating.  The eco-tourism investment involves leasing village 
land to a safari operator who pays the village an annual fee for the land lease and a fee for 
each tourist the operator hosts in the village.  There is an additional fee for each tourist who 
spends a night in the village.52  Villages with these tourist investments are perceived as better 
off than the rest.  Therefore, as will be shown below with respect to Sinya, the village 
leadership are thought to have felt that if they joined the WMA project, they would be losing 
out to the other villages that do not have similar investment arrangements.   
In justifying their reservations about WMA, the Ol Molog leadership argued that some of 
the villages such as Kamwanga had no land to contribute towards the WMA’s formation.  
Specifically, they were speaking to the fact that Kamwanga had no uncultivated land left that 
                                                 
52Hoopoe Safaris, an eco-tourism award winning tour company, is the one that does business with Ol 
Molog village.  It helps in rehabilitating village infrastructure such as roads.  This is outside the 
contractual obligation, but is a way of strengthening the bond with the village, while serving the 
company’s business interests because the company requires good roads for its eco-tourism activities. 
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could be set aside as a wildlife habitat.  Secondly, they further argued, other villages such as 
Tinga Tinga and Ngereyani had ruined their habitat through practices like charcoal 
production.  The contention here is that these villages cannot claim to be offering land that 
could serve any significant purpose as a wildlife habitat worth establishing as WMA.  
Consequently, they had no tourist product to offer.  This means that these other villages, just 
like Kamwanga village, would be benefiting from the other villages’ assets.  Thus, Ol Molog 
leadership was raising issues of equity and the fact that some villages would be contracting 
for property rights over a commodity they are not producing.  Ol Molog village, therefore, 
wanted to form its own WMA together with Sinya.   
The objections by Ol Molog, WMA facilitators claimed, were only arising during 
meetings with the village council, not during general meetings between the facilitators and 
the entire village assembly.  The facilitators held that the reason for this failure of the issues 
to crop up during general village meetings was that the objection to WMA was a village elite 
problem.  The facilitators mostly dealt with the village council.  The latter was then supposed 
to liaise with the village members.  This, however, was not happening; consequently, some 
villagers were rarely informed and did not know what was going on.  This agent problem, 
facilitators contend, is part of the problem they have been experiencing in the implementation 
of WMA.  Implementing WMA entailed dealing with the general village membership and 
their leaders.  WMA regulations require that for a WMA to be initiated, a village assembly 
has to accept it (MNRT, 2002b).  WMA facilitators, however, had no formal access to the 
general membership except through the village council.  The process of implementation thus 
suffered from something akin to “elite capture”.   
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The AWF facilitators aver that they suspected the opposition to WMA was confined to 
relatively few people, namely those benefiting from eco-tourism enterprises already in the 
village.  Consequently, they alerted the DGO that the non-consumptive investments are 
actually the ones motivating the village council’s objection to WMA.  The objection was 
because the village leadership thought that if they joined WMA, they would lose the local 
advantage they command as village political elites.  WMA would bring in many actors, and, 
therefore, it would not be easy to secure private advantage similar to what they have when 
the village council is the sole proprietor of village activities.  The AWF facilitators thus 
impressed on the DGO to act in his capacity as the regulator of wildlife enterprises in the 
district.  The game plan was a carrot and stick strategy:  the Ol Molog village authorities 
would be made to understand that their eco-tourism investment is illegal and that the 
government can evict the investor at any time.  Nevertheless, WMA authorities would 
counsel the village authorities that it was possible for the village to have their investor and 
WMA project at the same time, thereby reaping benefits from both sides.53  In this case, there 
would be no need to hold out.  It was against the background of this apparent threat that the 
village council allegedly caved in and accepted the WMA project.  Henceforth, Ol Molog 
joined the other villages in implementing the WMA.     
Although WMA facilitators would later present a similar threat to Sinya, the village 
failed to give in so easily.  The reasons why Ol Molog was not able to hold out for a long 
time like Sinya are varied.  One reason is that their income from tourism investments was not 
                                                 
53 This was either a ruse, or the facilitators and the DGO had not grasped the letter of the WMA 
regulations.  As was shown in the previous chapter, the question of investment in the WMA was not 
as liberal as the facilitators are hypothesizing here.  For the investment in Ol Molog to continue after 
the establishment of the WMA, the investor would have to be the same one running the tourist 
hunting ventures in the WMA.  Moreover, the investor would have to contract with the entire WMA, 
not just one village.  Different investors could vie for the lease and seek patronage from different 
villages.  There was no guarantee at this time as to who the investor  would be. 
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as big as that of Sinya.  The income was not, therefore, a strong incentive for the village 
leaders to present a spirited antagonism to the powers that be.  Moreover, the absence of 
high-stakes tourism investments meant that there were no vested interests in Ol Molog to 
derail negotiations.  This situation was unlike the case in Sinya, where the huge investments 
involved in eco-tourism led to the rise of various interest groups.  Each of these groups was 
prepared to stake its claim at whatever costs.  Another reason was that Ol Molog has a 
smaller area viable for wildlife habitat because the rest of the land is under cultivation.  
Therefore, the village cannot rely on eco-tourism as a major investment that would make it 
justify a claim to a WMA of its own.  This is unlike Sinya, where there is absolutely no 
cultivation and the entire land is, therefore, available for wildlife and livestock ventures, such 
that Sinya has a basis for laying a claim to a WMA of its own.   
 
Irkaswa’s Corridor Crisis 
The villages of Irkaswa and Kitendeni both share a wildlife corridor, commonly known 
as The Kitendeni Wildlife Corridor. 54   Wildlife use this seven kilometer-wide area for 
grazing, dispersal, and migration between Mount Kilimanjaro National Park and Amboseli 
National Park.  Wildlife authorities in Tanzania claim that during the rainy season, safari ants 
invade Kilimanjaro National Park, thereby necessitating the migration of elephants and other 
animals from the park to Amboseli.  This corridor is the only remaining one to link Mount 
Kilimanjaro National Park with the outside ecosystem.  If human settlements cause it to 
                                                 
54Pro-corridor advocates in the village of Irkaswa call it Okunonoi, but those against it prefer to call it 
Kitendeni because this gives credence to their argument that their village has nothing to do with a 
wildlife corridor; rather, that the corridor is on the side of Kitendeni village and that is why the 
corridor is called Kitendeni corridor.  This was spin because the village is the one that took its name 
from the corridor.  The village is the newest village to be established in this region.  The anti-corridor 
protagonists were using place names to disclaim responsibility and assert property rights to the 
corridor. 
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close, then the future of both Amboseli and Kilimanjaro National Parks is in jeopardy.  
Ecologists working in this area share similar views (Grimshaw, 1996).  These ecologists, 
including student/researchers, conservation organizations, and wildlife authorities, have been 
at the forefront of efforts to get the state to accord the corridor some protected area status.  
Because of these efforts, the government of Tanzania, through Monduli district council, 
designated this area a wildlife corridor.  This meant excluding the area from demarcation into 
small plots for the villagers.  The designation of a corridor, however, was largely informal.  
The government did not erect beacons to mark the boundaries until sometime after 2000, 
when human settlement of the corridor appeared imminent.  Because of these impending 
settlements, conservation NGOs such as AWF impressed upon the authorities the need to 
erect beacons to mark the corridior boundaries.  This action precipitated the desire of some 
villagers of Irkaswa to invade the corridor and demarcate plots for themselves.  The invaders 
uprooted the beacons and demarcated plots, sidetracking even the village authorities.  The 
central government responded by intervening through the Monduli district administration.  
This intervention led to the arrest and arraignment before a law court of those suspected of 
masterminding the invasion and uprooting the beacons.  By early 2005, the case was still 
pending in court.   
The crisis provoked by this corridor produced two camps in Irkaswa village.  There are 
those for and those against the retention of a formal wildlife corridor.  Those against 
retention of a corridor prefer the the subdivision of the area into plots to be given to villagers 
who are landless.  However, this camp is again subdivided into two groups.  There are those 
who would want the corridor allocated to people for cultivation, but prefer this process 
handled officially.  The other camp want the allocation done at whatever cost, even if it 
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means ignoring the village government which is responsible for allocating village land.55  
Observers feel that interests of the itinerant cultivators drive the pro-cultivation group.  These 
cultivators operate from the background because they have no legal claims in land matters in 
the village.  It is alleged by the anti-cultivators group that the itinerant cultivators hope that, 
if the corridor is opened for cultivation, they would buy out the locals and farm in the 
corridor themselves.  Critics of the anti-corridor group and other observers from 
neighbouring villages claim that this is what the itinerant cultivators have already done in 
Irkaswa village, which is comprised mostly of pastoralists.56  They have either bought or 
leased land from some villagers, leading to land hunger that has generated the clamour for 
the demarcation of the corridor. 
Those against cultivation in the corridor contend that, if the corridor is cultivated, they 
will not have a place to graze cattle during dry periods because almost every other place is 
being cultivated.  From Table 3, it is easy to discern their concerns.  For people who are 
predominantly pastoralists, one would expect them to set most of the land aside for pasturing.  
However, as Table 1 shows, this is not the case.  The land available for cattle, wildlife, and 
forest is below 50%.  Thus, diminishing pastoral opportunities represent a legitimate cause 
for their opposition to demarcation of the corridor.  Moreover, they argue, the corridor has 
                                                 
55Before this group invaded the corridor in 2003, they had unsuccessfully tried to convince the village 
council to allocate them land in the corridor.  They then decided to demobilize the village council 
prior to invading the corridor.  They invaded the village office, seized the keys of the village council’s 
office and the village council rubber stamps.  They then closed the office before proceeding to the 
corridor to demarcate for themselves plots of land.  In closing the village council’s office, they argued 
that because the council had failed to give them land, then it is of no value and has no business being 
in office. 
 
56 The pastoralists do not practice cultivation extensively; rather, they lease their lands to cultivators.  
These itinerant cultivators are mostly from the Wa Arusha and Chagga ethnic groups; some people 
from across the border in Kenya are also said to be involved in cultivation in this area. 
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been a place of livestock refuge during dry spells since the days of their ancestors, and it has 
never been open for human activity.  Moreover, they further claim that if the corridor is 
cultivated, wildlife will have no place of abode and, therefore, will increasingly stray into 
areas already settled by people, thereby exacerbating human-wildlife conflict.  Thus, to the 
pro-corridor group, the corridor should be left intact in order to minimize the stress that 
wildlife imposes on areas already settled by people.   
The anti-corridor group, however, contends that this argument is illegitimate because it 
seeks to set aside land for wildlife when the government has set no land aside for people.  
Their argument is that, in areas already settled by humans, wildlife still moves around human 
residential areas, yet these areas are not wildlife corridors.  Thus, they question whether 
wildlife will be instructed to avoid the areas inhabited by people after a corridor is set aside 
for them.  They are, therefore, making the claim that different spaces should not be set aside 
for wildlife if wildlife will continue moving into or through the non-wildlife areas.  This 
claim is significant in negotiating for implementation of WMA because WMA Regulations 
require that land be set aside for wildlife, and unauthorized human activity in those areas not 
only be excluded, but also be punishable.  While the judiciary will certainly settle the fate of 
the corridor, at the level of village politics two contending opinions will, nevertheless, 
continue to color conservation decision-making.  So far, the anti-corridor camp prefers to 
depict the conservation ideology as a phenomenon opposed to the interests of the people. 
The government implemented the WMA project against this background.  Consequently, 
the anti-corridor group now denies that the government ever told them anything about the 
WMA project.  They even deny that any meeting occured in the village to discuss, let alone 
elect, officials to represent the village in the WMA project.  The secretary of the village 
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environmental committee, for example, told me that he is hearing for the first time about 
WMA from me.  This hard-line position is understandable.  This group can be expected to 
oppose WMA because, if they buy into the idea of WMA, they would be endorsing, 
inadvertently, the idea of a wildlife corridor.  This is because the corridor will certainly be 
plotted to be part of the WMA land.  Members of the anti-corridor group, therefore, represent 
the voices in Irkaswa village that are anti-WMA.  However, they are counterbalanced by 
those who are pro-corridor; and as a result, Irkaswa village is represented alongside other 
villages in the WMA project.  For the pro-corridor group, the WMA presents a good 
opportunity to collaborate with the state in their domestic war with the anti-corridor group.57  
Thus, the only village that is completely out of the WMA for now is Sinya. 
 
Sinya’s Struggle Against WMA 
Sinya village lies along the Tanzania—Kenya border, neighbouring Amboseli and 
Kilimanjaro National Parks.  Its entire land is semi-arid, with virtually no space for 
agriculture.  This is in contrast to the other villages in the Enduiment WMA cluster.  
Livestock is the predominant economic activity.  The village also hosts abundant wildlife.  
Some wildlife conservation actors claim that half of the wildlife in West Kilimanjaro region 
is found in Sinya.  The major attraction for wildlife is a salt-licking venue that is popular 
especially with elephants.    
                                                 
57Most of the people favoring the corridor were positive that they would be witnesses of the state in 
the case before the court.  They would testify that the corridor has been reserved for wildlife and dry-
spell grazing for as long as the time of their forefathers. 
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Because of the abundance of game, the village has attracted the interests of many tour 
operators desirous of pitching tent in the village to exploit its eco-tourism potential.58  The 
village also falls within an area designated as a hunting block by the wildlife division.  These 
two wildlife ventures inform the tensions in Sinya that consequently complicate the 
implementation of WMA there.  The major tourism venture that dominates discussion of 
Sinya is the eco-tourism investment.  The village has leased three acres of land to a tour 
company for a campsite, at a cost of $30,000 per annum.  Because of this investment, plus 
whatever else the village may be getting from the hunting outfitter,59  Sinya has become one 
of the most affluent of the nine villages in the Enduimet WMA cluster, and even among other 
pastoral villages in the district and in the Arusha Region.60  The village has used money from 
wildlife investments to provide social services such as primary school education, a health 
clinic, village office block, water, etc.  The village, for example, has one of the most 
modernized primary schools that I saw in Maasailand.  It is against this background of 
successful eco-tourism wildlife utilization that the government was introducing the WMA 
project in Sinya.  Given the problematic nature of WMA as reviewed in the previous chapter, 
Sinya’s dogged opposition to WMA was a foregone conclusion.    
The government introduced the WMA project as a program that would enable 
communities to benefit from wildlife living on village lands.  This is evidently appealing to 
                                                 
58Kibo Safaris, however, is the dominant eco-tourism investor in Sinya.  
59 As observed earlier, Hunting outfitters are expected to contribute to community developments in 
the villages that fall within the company’s hunting blocks.   This understanding that outfitters have 
with the wildlife division does not bind them to specific contractual obligation with the villages 
concerned. 
60  Ololosokwan village in Loliondo division, Ngorongoro district, is another village that enjoys 
similar status with Sinya.  Ololosokwan is even more affluent because it is well watered and has 
better scenery, unlike Sinya, which is basically a semi-arid land.  It has attracted more photo-tourism 
investors than Sinya. 
 92 
 
villagers who, hitherto, were not benefiting from wildlife.  Nevertheless, when applied to 
villages like Sinya that were already enjoying wildlife benefits, albeit against official 
regulations, the objective of the WMA did not show much promise.  Even a casual glance at 
the WMA project does not reveal how the community will benefit; it merely gives the 
generic idea that an investment will yield dividends.  To communities with other possible 
ventures to accomplish, the promise of what they would perceive as imaginary benefits is not 
a good selling point.  Matters are bound to be worse if the impeding WMA project embodies 
certain undesirable characteristics that suggest villagers could lose rather than gain from the 
project (—See Chapter Two).  The WMA project seemed to fit this scenario.  Consequently, 
given Sinya’s current investment situation as outlined above, the village decided to reject the 
WMA project.  Unlike other villages, Sinya has been protracted in its hold out.  
Different people have expressed divergent opinions to explain the causes of Sinya’s 
hold out.  The range of hypotheses advanced includes:  Sinya is jealous of sharing its wildlife 
investment with other villages, there are powerful forces (read government functionaries and 
politicians) behind the eco-tourism fortunes in Sinya, and village leadership is captive to the 
wildlife investors there (both eco-tourism and hunting outfitters).  The hunting outfitter does 
not want to lose the hunting block, while the eco-tourism investor does not want competition 
from other tour companies and is averse to the transaction costs implied by having to 
negotiate with many villages.  Another hypothesis, attributed to Sinya’s village leadership, is 
that villagers are still not clear as to what WMA is all about; some WMA commentators say 
this is feigning ignorance.61  The divergence of hypotheses not withstanding, there seems to 
                                                 
61 While to a certain extent, Sinya’s claim that they do not understand what WMA is about could be as 
the facilitators averred, it is not, at the same time, a claim that can be dismissed off-hand.  Among the 
other villages in Enduimet, very few villagers could articulate what WMA is about coherently.  The 
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be a convergence of opinion on the claim that Sinya feels it would be a loser in a joint WMA 
arrangement that treats all of its shareholders similarly.    
 
Sinya’s Grievances 
One of Sinya’s grievances is that the WMA groups together villages, including those without 
any land to contribute, for the setting up of a WMA, such as in the case of Kamwanga 
village.  The question, then, was what kind of investment the WMA is if the contribution of 
the shareholders is skewed against some villages.  In addition to this skewedness in the 
contribution of land as the major resource for forming WMA, Sinya also had grievances 
related to the villages’ unequal endowments.  Sinya argued that, while other villages possess 
agricultural potential, Sinya does not.  Sinya’s comparative advantage is in the wildlife 
resource that was going to be the prime commodity on sale in the WMA.  The question then 
is whether the other villages would bring their farm produce to the WMA table for sharing if 
Sinya gave out its land that is an asset in wildlife ventures.  Sinya contends that it makes its 
living from wildlife and if it is going to share that with others, then WMA should clarify 
whether that will be the norm across all the other villages that have other land-use practices.  
                                                                                                                                                       
most informed were those elected to the leadership of the Community-Based Organization (CBO) that 
will be running the WMA.  This is in contradistinction to other areas like Loliondo, where I 
encountered a more widespread understanding of WMA among the villagers.  Studies on Selous 
Conservation Program could also support the claim that Sinya’s contention may not be just a ploy to 
keep WMA at bay.  Research by Songorwa (1999a) that was done several years after the program had 
been instituted found that there was minimal understanding by the villagers about what the program 
was about.  There was a difference of opinion regarding program goals between villagers and the 
program staff and wildlife officers.  A similar instance of communities not understanding what the 
wildlife project is about has been reported from CAMPFIRE.  While villagers thought they had been 
given control over wildlife to do as they deemed fit, they found it strange that when they wanted to 
kill problem animals, they were denied permission on the basis that the quota does not allow the 
killing (Bonger,1999).  Similarly, in Zambia, Gibson (1999: 136-7) found that a conservation 
program (LIRDP) spent time and money establishing community-based conservation institutions, yet 
many residents were unaware of the existence of the program.  Many even thought it was a private 
company, while others thought it was a government scheme to advance the interests of some people at 
the expense of others.  Thus, few understood it as a community participation project. 
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As of now, actors in Sinya argue that since villages have boundaries, there is no basis for 
taking what belongs to one village and giving it to others.  This is in reference to the fact that, 
if Sinya joined WMA, the eco-tourism investment would go to WMA such that Sinya will 
now have to share its proceeds with other villages. 
In terms of trying to resolve the WMA impasse, Sinya had proposed that the village be 
allowed to have its own WMA.  This is a view also shared by certain conservation actors 
such as Sand County Foundation (SCF)62 who work closely with Sinya.  Observers claim, 
however, that the wildlife division rejects this idea, claiming that no individual village will 
have its own WMA; and in any case, Sinya is not ecologically viable enough to sustain a 
WMA on its own.  Sinya retorts that it already has such a WMA in two respects.  For one, it 
has the eco-tourism investment whereby it has leased land to an investor to conduct non-
hunting tourism business on village land (although it is illegal).  As far as Sinya is concerned, 
this arrangement is serving the village well.  On the other hand, Sinya village houses part of a 
hunting block that the wildlife division currently allocates to an outfitter for tourist hunting.  
Thus, as far as Sinya is concerned, it is already a self-sustaining WMA, contrary to the claim 
by the wildlife division that the village is not ecologically viable on its own so as to be able 
to host a WMA.   
There was another related approach to resolving the WMA impasse at Sinya that could 
have been invoked, but was rejected.  Sinya itself could decide what portion of its land to set 
aside for the Enduimet WMA, instead of the management of the WMA drawing up a plan 
that hives off part of Sinya’s land for WMA.  There are two conflicting opinions as to who 
rejected this approach.  Sinya village officials claim this was their proposal, thus implying 
                                                 
62See footnote 35 on SCF-Tz. 
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that the wildlife division rejected it, while the AWF who are facilitating the implementation 
of WMA claimed that this is what they had advised Sinya to do, but Sinya rejected it.  To 
Sinya, however, the rejection of such a solution constitutes a grievance against the WMA, 
namely, that the government is coercing them into a program they do not understand. 
Sinya’s claim that it does not understand WMA constitutes an independent grievance.  
Whenever the wildlife officials and the AWF facilitators of the WMA held a meeting with 
Sinya regarding Sinya’s signing up for the WMA, Sinya would allege that it had not yet 
understood what the project entails, and hence they were unable to decide whether to join or 
not.  They would, therefore, always ask for more time to decide.  Some local government 
administrators and the AWF facilitators of the WMA aver that this is just a ruse that Sinya is 
employing.  To them, there is nothing about WMA that Sinya does not understand.63   
To deal with Sinya’s recalcitrance, the wildlife division and the facilitators applied a 
carrot and stick strategy.  They directed hreats and intimidation to both Sinya and to the eco-
tourism investor.  The latter was included because, according to popular opinion, the investor 
was the one who was inciting Sinya against signing up for WMA because he did not want to 
be dealing with many villages.  The inclusion of many villages would mean proliferation of 
potential investors and hence competition for lease of land from the consortium of villages.64  
As of now, he had Sinya’s confidence, and both of them were happy with the status quo.  
Moreover, the WMA regulations stipulate that only one investor will conduct both 
consumptive and non-consumptive tourism activities in a WMA.  This meant that an eco-
                                                 
63See, however, the footnote above regarding the question of villages not understanding these wildlife 
projects. 
64Assuming that each village was captured by a potential investor vying for the lease to run the 
WMA, this would trigger a cutthroat competition among investors, leading to higher transactions 
costs than would be the case when dealing with just one village.  In the case of one village, it is most 
likely that the maxim of “first come, first served” would hold sway. 
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tourism investor without a sports–hunting component could easily lose out if the WMA 
management opted to go with sports-hunting (even if the sports-hunting investor did not wish 
to conduct non-consumptive tourism).   During negotiations between the Sinya village 
council, wildlife division, AWF facilitator and eco-tourism investor, the wildlife authorities 
remarked that the photo-tourism investment in Sinya is illegal and that they hoped the 
investor was aware of that.  This was a thinly veiled threat that the authorities could easily 
crack the whip on the investor if Sinya was being difficult because of the revenue they are 
collecting from that investment.  Early in 2006, the eco-tourism investor lost in a court case 
between him and the hunting outfitter operating the hunting block in Sinya. 
The authorities also endeavored to placate Sinya by trying to accommodate some of the 
issues Sinya was raising, namely, that it does not understand the WMA.  Both the wildlife 
division and AWF arranged for the village council to go on an education trip to other areas 
that have some WMA-type arrangements so that they could see what happens and how these 
areas had benefited.  The other representatives of Enduimet WMA had already been on such 
a trip, but Sinya had been excluded because it had not signed up for WMA.     
 
b)  The Morogoro WMA-education Trip 
Both AWF and the wildlife division decided to undertake the trip while in a meeting at 
Sinya.  The entourage was to consist of the entire village council.  However, the wildlife 
division decided that the entourage should have about 10 more villagers who were not in the 
village council.  The implementers of the WMA were assuming that the rejection of WMA 
by Sinya was a creation of the village council.  Being the political elites, the council was 
thought to be benefiting disproportionately from the eco-tourism investment in the village, a 
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private advantage it wanted to safeguard by not opening the investment arena to other 
actors.65  The idea behind the inclusion of non-council members was to involve some people 
who may not have had stakes in the village’s current dispensation in wildlife investments.  
Nevertheless, things did not go as planned for the WMA implementers.  The turn of events 
worked in favor of the village council. 
While AWF was to foot the travel costs of the members of the village council, the 
wildlife division was to fund the non-council members.  On the eve of the trip, however, the 
wildlife division alerted AWF that it was not going to be able to foot the bill of the non-
council members.  The AWF was not able to pick up the additional expenses.  Therefore, 
they proposed to the village council that non-council members either be left out, or that the 
number of council members be reduced to make room for the non-council members.  The 
chairman of the village council decided to go with the latter option.  According to the AWF 
facilitators, he substituted those in the village council who were not in agreement with him 
with non-council members who shared his views.  Thus, the team that went on the trip was 
solidly behind the chairman of the village council.  The failure of the trip to achieve its 
originators’ objectives was now a foregone conclusion. 
                                                 
65 There is suspicion that village accounts from these investments are not very transparent; this claim 
is a sub-text denoting misappropriation of funds.  Participants in a Community-based Natural 
Resource Management in East Africa who made a field trip to Sinya held a formal meeting with 
Sinya community.  During the meeting, they asked how the income from eco-tourism was allocated 
and spent.  The report indicates that although the villagers described some of the uses of the funds, 
some of the questions about spending procedures were not clearly answered.  “it was clarified in later 
discussion with the resident tour operator that due to financial abuses and based on agreement with 
Ward Councillor for Sinya, payments to the village have been suspended (although fees are accruing 
in a separate account maintained by the operator) until after the forthcoming election….” (ACC, et al 
2004:12).  Similar allegations regarding use of these funds have also been reported in other villages 
with a turnover of good investments similar to those in Sinya (see, for example, the case of 
Ololosokwan village  [Ololosokwan, 2003]). 
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The objective of the trip was for the villagers to learn the potential benefits of a WMA; 
but once in Morogoro, the entourage seemed to have been learning how the WMA was not 
beneficial to them.  The facilitator claimed that he had his own contacts within the group, 
who, even though they were not for the WMA project, were, nevertheless, updating him on 
what was going on within the group.  The facilitator claimed that the chairman of the village 
council and his inner circle would organize a meeting with a clique of his trusted lieutenants 
every evening.  In these meetings, they decided that the group was still not convinced that 
there was value to be gotten from WMA.    
Although the chairman of the village council did not confirm the intrigues in 
Morogoro referred to by the facilitator, he at least was candid that the trip convinced them 
that WMA had nothing to offer them.  Their critique of WMA after the trip was based on 
several factors.  One of them was that in Morogoro, it rains daily, and this means that they 
operate in a different ecological setting.  To emphasize the ecological difference between the 
two villages, the chairman pointed out that the place they visited had grass that was so tall 
that it could conceal a very big truck.  On this basis, the chairman wondered aloud: “will the 
WMA bring rain?”   Regarding another comparison between the two regions, the chairman 
claimed that the area they visited had experience with WMA for almost 10 years, yet it was 
very backward compared to Sinya.  To them, this underdevelopment was not a good example 
of how beneficial WMA can be.  Their other discouraging observation was that the people 
they visited were neither what can be called pastoralists nor cultivators.  The village 
chairman expressed surprise at how those people were able to survive.  It was surprising 
because only about 50 people own livestock, while farmers cultivate about one acre of land.  
To illustrate his bewilderment, he recalled that at one point his group was so hungry and yet 
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he could not easily get two goats to slaughter for it.66  Thus, the lesson learned from the 
Morogoro trip was that the proposed WMA would not be more worthwhile than what they 
already had.   
On returning to Sinya, the villagers, AWF, DGO, and the government functionaries in the 
division held a meeting together.  While the village sources claim that it was in this meeting 
that they petitioned that they part ways with the WMA, the AWF facilitator told me that, 
during this meeting, Sinya asked that it be given time to make a decision.  Subsequently, 
Sinya representatives wrote a letter in which they informed him that they were not willing to 
sign up for a WMA.  I could not establish the number of villagers attending the meeting.  
While village sources claimed it was about 300, AWF puts the number at 50, and claims that 
these were the followers of the chairman.67  The pattern of decision making not withstanding, 
the point is that, even after being taken on an educational trip to learn about WMA,  Sinya 
still decided not to sign up for WMA.  Finally, both wildlife division and AWF decided to go 
ahead with the registration of the WMA without Sinya.  In the meantime, the other villages 
had formed a CBO and drafted a constitution.  They then applied for Authorised Association 
(AA) status so that the WMA could become operational.   
 
                                                 
66 This claim is confusing because the trip was being funded by AWF and it catered for all their 
expenses.  It was, therefore, not clear why the chairman needed to buy goats to feed his team.   
67In another meeting of Enduimet WMA CBO officials, the divisional officer seemed to speak along 
the same lines regarding these meetings.  He averred that they had been conversing with Sinya for a 
long time, but every time they met with the same people until they started wondering whether the 
village had any other members.  The point here then is that there was some gerrymandering that 
seemed to have been taking place regarding the composition of villagers who would attend meetings 
on WMA at Sinya.  This is a difficult issue to fathom because, ordinarily, one should not expect this 
to be an issue since village meetings are open to everyone, including the antagonists of the chairman, 
provided they are willing to attend.  Furthermore, because these are small villages such that almost 
everyone who cares to know can be aware of when a meeting is taking place, it is difficult to figure 
out how the chairman was manipulating attendance--at least at the village level. 
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IV) Explaining Acceptance of the Proposed WMA in Enduimet Division 
The response by Sinya village and a section of villagers in Irkaswa can be said to be 
consistent with what would be expected of villagers confronted by the kind of WMA project 
analyzed in chapter two.  It is consistent with the argument that parties contracting for 
property rights will sign up for transformation of property rights if the transformation leaves 
them better off than they were in the previous property rights dispensation.  The preceding 
chapter suggested that the WMA project was theoretically unacceptable to communities.  In 
various seminars that were held to discuss the WMA project, community representatives 
stated as much.  In practice, some communities lived up to this expectation.  They refused to 
adopt the project in the way it was constituted.  The response of the villages that bought into 
WMA presents a problem, however.  Their acceptance of the project would seem to be 
contrary to both theory and empirical observation, since some of their counterparts rejected 
WMA.  What then accounts for the villagers’ acceptance of a project that is apparently a 
liability to them? 
Situations in which African communities adopt a strategy that clearly seems irrational 
have been explained in various ways.  Explanations range from those that see communities 
engaging in acts of desperation, to those that see communities as acting in ignorance.  Other 
explanations portray communities as not being interested in the project, but nevertheless 
signing up to engage the state system in a circus.  In a study of devolution of property rights 
in forestry in the Gambia, for example, Schroeder (1999) suggests that communities elected 
to participate out of desperation.  The way the Gambian community forestry project was 
executed amounted to extending, rather than devolving, central control over resources and 
communities alike.  Community participation as defined in the program contracts, Schroeder 
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contends, “…involved the community committing itself to a broad set of interventions with 
project staff, and opening itself up to inspection and monitoring at the government’s 
discretion” (Schroeder, 1999:16).  From Schroeder’s account, it can be deduced that 
communities should have rejected the devolution project, yet they agreed to take part in the 
project.  In an attempt to interpret the community response, Schroeder asks, “Have 
community groups, or their leaders, willingly shouldered the burden of decentralized forest 
management plans, or are the conditions imposed by the community forestry contacts simply 
a better alternative than having no legal access to commercial exploitation of local forests at 
all?” (Schroeder, 1999:17.)  It can be observed from the foregoing that communities in 
Gambia responded to the forestry project within the context of limited alternative 
opportunities.  They were making choices under desperate conditions.  This kind of scenario 
is evident in other areas, such as the environmental justice struggles.   
While it would be expected that poor blacks and indigenous peoples in America should 
be at the forefront of struggles for better environmental regulation and quality, this is not 
necessarily the case.  These communities mostly operate in a trade off between economic 
improvement and environmental quality, in which the latter is likely to be sacrificed (Bullard 
and Wright. 1987; Neiman and Loveridge. 1981; Gover and Walker, 1992).  As Gover and 
Walker (1992) argue, tribal peoples are compelled by economic exigencies to sign up for 
commercial solid waste landfills, the environmental risks and hazards not withstanding.  
Poverty, low educational opportunities, and few job opportunities lead them to look at the 
solid waste industry as a form of economic emancipation.  Gover and Walker’s submission, 
like that of Schroeder, is an argument about lack of alternatives to what is otherwise a bad 
choice.  Nevertheless, other observers contend that such choices are made out of ignorance. 
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Actors, especially NGOs critical of the way WMA is set up, hold the view that 
communities that have bought into the WMA proposal do not understand what is at stake.  
During one villagers’ meeting on implementation of WMA, a Member of Parliament (MP) 
opposed the participants’ inclinations towards rejecting the WMA project in its current 
format.  The MP argued that communities have struggled for property rights in wildlife for a 
long time and WMA now provides that opportunity.  Consequently, he averred, to reject 
WMA is to confirm the continued domination of the sector by the wildlife division.  The 
rejection of WMA is an approach that the people of his area would not subscribe to, even as 
they admit that WMA has some limitations.  In his people’s view, he submitted, WMA 
should be accepted and then communities would struggle to improve it from within.   
Some NGO actors dispute this approach.  In a conversation this researcher had with 
one NGO actor, the actor argued that the sentiments of the MP were erroneous.  It was 
erroneous because once communities yield, it would be difficult for the wildlife bureaucrats 
to cave in to communities’ clamor for reforms of WMA regulations.  Another actor claimed 
that communities that are applying for the implementation of WMA are wasting their time 
because they cannot afford to meet the conditions that the wildlife division requires in order 
for it to approve their WMA.   The actor further claimed that villagers who understand the 
complexity of the issue have come to the conclusion that to meet the conditions set by the 
wildlife division, a village requires the services of twelve professors in different specialties.  
Given that no village is anywhere near this mark, and, further, that because no villager is 
 103 
 
prepared to pay the fines or face jail terms for infraction in WMA once it is set up, villages 
applying for WMA are misguided.68   
There is also a theory that suggests that villagers signed up for WMA not because 
they wanted it, but to fool about with the establishment.  Songorwa (1999a and 1999b) has 
argued that communities are not interested in wildlife conservation.  Premising his argument 
on the fact that rural communities in Africa are caught up in a poverty trap, Songorwa 
(1999b) posits that communities have no vision for wildlife conservation and, if they nurse 
any, it is to exterminate wildlife.  The reason for this disinterest is because wildlife is a 
liability to them, yet communities reap no benefits from wildlife.  The poor relations between 
communities and state wildlife conservation authorities also mar communities’ interest in 
wildlife conservation.  Consequently, when communities allegedly cooperate with wildlife 
authorities in the conservation project, it is to fool them.  Songorwa (1999b) cites the case of 
Selous Conservation Project (SCP), where communities were asked to elect village 
representatives to the project and villagers voted for people who were their enemies.  In the 
villagers’ imagination, those elected would be the ones to be beaten if anything happens to 
the wildlife.  Thus, instead of the villagers rejecting the project, it was being transformed into 
an opportunity to settle local scores.  Songorwa’s argument is not far-fetched; it has 
precedents.      
                                                 
68The attitude that communities can march blindly on the path of destruction is a theme that is also 
captured by one of David Western’s interlocutors among the Maasai thus: “But Amboseli will not 
survive even if the Maasai are given the park.  They don’t know what land titles mean.  When they 
get a title deed they sell it for money and think they can still keep the land” (Western, 1997:107).   
See also Esther Mwangi (2003) and Rutten (1992) with respect to the individuation of group ranches 
among the Maasai of Kajiado, when such individuation looks quite irrational from the point of view 
of land viability.  Land in Maasai Kajiado district is semi-arid and it is useful when utilized as long 
rangeland instead of as small parcels. 
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The phenomenon of Africa’s leaders getting rousing receptions from the public whom 
they have impoverished can be seen as posing a contradiction.  It would be expected that 
people in Africa’s ruralscape would either voice disapproval or exit (see, for example, 
Hirschman, 1970) upon coming into contact with their political leadership.  In most cases, 
this reaction is not the one that results.  Scenes of cheering multitudes of people appear to be 
the norm.  Why this unexpected response? If it is assumed that people are forced into loyalty 
because of various structural odds besetting them, why then don’t they just keep silent and 
ignore the leaders instead of showing their approval to the leaders by cheering them?  The 
question, however, is whether they cheer them as a signal of approval and love.   
Babu (1981:40) contends that they cheer their leaders because they fear them. Thus, they 
employ cheering as a weapon to cope with an immensely intimidating political leadership 
(see also Scott, 1985; Haugerud, 1995; and Mbembe, 1992, 2001 on the mockery of figures 
in power as a way of disarming the powerful through indication of a sense of intimacy with 
the leaders).  While Songorwa’s observation, therefore, has some merit, it does not, however, 
explain the case of communities implementing the proposed Enduimet WMA.  Among the 
communities agreeing to implement the project, there is a sense of enthusiasm that shows 
they are interested in the project.69  How then do we account for the acceptance by Enduimet 
communities to implement the WMA project? 
Several explanations account for why villages in Enduimet agreed to implement 
WMA.  The explanations suggest that, contrary to Songorwa’s contention, communities are 
                                                 
69 In every village consenting to WMA, there were expressions of frustration in the delay in 
implementing WMA (see discussion on consenting to WMA because of expedience). 
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interested in wildlife conservation.70  These explanations include expediency, proto-WMA 
imperatives, and the limitations of anti-WMA coalition. 
 
Consenting to WMA Out of Expedience 
Proponents of WMA in the consenting villages posit that communities are better off 
implementing the proposed WMA project than in rejecting it.  Both political and 
administrative leaders and the rank and file familiar with the WMA project support this 
approach.  This expediency view has become self-perpetuating, with the formation of the 
preliminary organs at the village and inter-village levels to implement the WMA project.   
Villagers presiding over these organs and their allies constantly frame their justification for 
consenting to the WMA project in terms of what makes the communities better off than they 
are without WMA.71 The stand taken by the Member of Parliament for this area in one of the 
village seminars on WMA was an argument about expedience.  The proposition that 
communities’ rejection of WMA will only serve the interests of wildlife authorities and not 
the villages suggests that communities are better off consenting to the WMA project.  This 
attitude is founded on the assumption that communities have nothing to lose in adopting the 
project.  Either the limitations in the WMA regulations (as covered in the preceding chapter) 
are wished away, or it is argued that contentious issues can be rectified as communities 
implement the project.   
                                                 
70It is instructive to note that even those villages that objected to WMA did not do so because they 
were not interested in wildlife conservation.  To the contrary, their spirited objection to WMA was 
precisely because they had strong vested interests in the wildlife conservation regime that would 
ensue.  Their objection is, therefore, paradoxical: objecting because they are interested in the project.   
71These actors also have a personal interest now.  If the project takes off, they will attain a new social 
status by virtue of being the proprietors of the WMA project. 
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To some villagers, WMA is too good for them.  This view translates to the belief that the 
delay in implementing WMA is caused by wildlife authorities envious of ceding to 
communities wildlife benefits hitherto enjoyed by the bureaucrats only.  This attitude, 
therefore, speaks of a mindset that sees communities as only benefiting but not losing in the 
WMA project.  Members of one village environmental committee argued that Enduimet 
WMA has not been approved long after it submitted its WMA paperwork to the authorities 
because wildlife bureaucrats are apprehensive of community involvement in wildlife 
entrepreneurship.  The inclusion of communities will deplete the “cornmeal” erstwhile 
appropriated by the bureaucrats only.  This apprehension, villagers averred, led the 
bureaucrats to shelve the forms in a drawer.   
In yet another village, members of the environmental committee wanted to know if I had 
any idea why their WMA has not yet been approved.  They were of the view that the 
implementation process was dragging on.  They claimed that, in delaying the approval of the 
WMA, the government was wasting their time.  Committee members expressed suspicion 
that the government was not devoted to devolution, hence the dilly-dallying with approval of 
Enduimet WMA.  The administrator of Enduimet Division expressed similar sentiments 
during a consultative meeting between officials of Enduimet WMA, district natural resources 
officers, and AWF.  The administrator said that villagers now doubt that WMA project will 
ever be implemented.  There was also a clear impression among villagers who held no 
official titles proximate to WMA (that might influence their opinions) that they are anxious 
to have WMA implemented.   
When I asked some villagers where their support for WMA leaves the grievances other 
people elsewhere have about the WMA regulations, the response was quoted again in terms 
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of expedience.  It was argued that, for a long time, the government did not entertain the idea 
of devolving property rights in wildlife to communities.  The WMA project, however, shows 
that the government is now becoming more open to the idea.  Consequently, it would be 
better for communities to seize up the opportunity and get a foothold into the wildlife 
largesse and then sort out from within the details that are currently viewed as unacceptable.  
This approach suggests that, to the consenting villages, the idea is not to get the ideal, but the 
feasible.  Their response was thus influenced by what they thought would give them greater 
mileage in an area in which they have been trying to secure a foothold.  Communities had 
already put up both legal and practical structures to enable them to conserve wildlife and 
appropriate its benefits.  Accepting the WMA project was viewed as a step towards achieving 
this pre-existing objective. 
 
Proto-WMA Framework in the Villages 
The proponents of the WMA in Enduimet villages had the option of defending the 
regulations (as the wildlife bureaucrats did, vide, preceding chapter), but they did not.  
Instead, they were willing to concede that the project has some undesirable elements, but, 
even then, its rejection was not an option because the idea of WMA is consistent with their 
pre-existing framework regarding the wildlife sector.  The WMA phenomenon did not 
confront communities with a call that was beyond their current aspirations.  WMA spoke to a 
phenomenon—community appropriations of wildlife largesse—that was well under way 
among the target villages.  Two aspects of community life attest to this.  One, over the years, 
communities have nursed grievances against wildlife damage and in the light of government 
failure to rectify the situation, they argued that they should then be co-proprietors of the 
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wildlife industry.  The WMA project would, therefore, easily fit within the framework of 
what they held to be their entitlement.   
The second aspect, is a consequence to the foregoing.  Prior to the formal introduction of 
WMA, communities had invested in structures geared towards husbandry and securing of 
benefits from wildlife, and natural resources in general.  For example, villages had 
formulated by-laws providing for the protection and extraction of benefits from wildlife.  As 
will be commented upon later, although some of these by-laws are controversy-prone, the 
controversy can only amplify, not diminish, communities’ claim to a WMA spirit.  The 
problematic aspects of the by-laws can only suggest that villagers would be willing to buy 
into a project that could regularize the application of these by-laws.  The WMA project, 
therefore, speaks to the area of wildlife conservation that communities were already 
addressing.  Although the communities’ approach was in certain ways somehow in conflict 
with the legal regime extant, it answers the question of communities’ interest in wildlife 
conservation in the affirmative (see the contrary view by Songorwa, 1999b).     
Thus, as one village executive officer told me, communities were ahead of the 
government in conceptualizing the WMA phenomenon in their area.  To this extent then, 
villagers should have no difficulty in consenting to the WMA project.  The situation extant 
on the eve of the introduction of WMA thus accounts for why certain communities may be 
expected to act contrary to the expectations of property right theory and take whatever 
package the state would be dispensing.  While observers could argue that communities are 
going to be worse off, communities themselves may hold a different view in the event that 
they evaluate the project in the long term perspective.  They may feel that they have invested 
in the wildlife sector for many years and, over time, they could hopefully surmount the 
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predicaments besetting the WMA project.  Their past pro-WMA initiatives were reflected in 
the legal and land-use strategies they had put in place.   
 
Pre-WMA Village Land-use and Wildlife Conservation Initiatives 
Pre-WMA village land-use plans included wildlife as a land-use activity.  The process of 
land distribution to village members requires that the village have a land-use plan.  Land is 
allocated for such uses as farming, residence, businesses, social services, and natural 
resources management.   Table 1 shows the village land-use allocation in relation to wildlife. 
 
Table 3:  Percentage of land allocated to wildlife in some villages. 
Village Total acreage Wildlife/livestock/forest % of total 
Ol molog 31, 370 20,029 63.8 
Lelangwa 22, 477 12, 857 57.20 
Kitendeni ?? ??; corridor ?? 
Irkaswa 10, 868 4940 45.45 
Kamwanga 2,470  2,153 ??   87.16 ?? 
Sinya ?? No farming, hence all. 100  
 
As is evident in Table 3, all the villages have dedicated a large part of their lands for 
wildlife management.  Some villages such as Ol molog even separate land for livestock and 
forest from that of wildlife/WMA (12,029 and 8,000 acres respectively).  Thus, there is a 
clear land-use regime that takes cognizance of the presence of wildlife and the need to have 
wildlife management as part of community activity.  This recognition was also given legal 
expression through village by-laws. 
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Pre-WMA Legal Initiatives. 
Village by-laws are made by each village pursuant to section 163 of the Local 
Government Act (No. 7 of 1982).  They are approved in a village assembly, attended by all 
adult members of the village.  These by-laws are then taken to the district council for 
approval, after which they become legal and enforceable under the laws of Tanzania.  In 
these village by-laws, there is ample evidence that the villagers prioritize wildlife 
management as they do other economic activities, such as pastoralism.  These village by-
laws reveal the following about wildlife: a conservation impulse, a sense of responsibility for 
wildlife protection, a desire for villagers to benefit from wildlife, and the need to be 
compensated for wildlife damage.  In the following section, we review each of these 
provisions and show that the edifice of WMA in itself was not strange to the villagers.  This 
means that any rejection of WMA should not be interpreted in terms of villagers objecting to 
the wildlife estate, as Songorwa (1999a, 1999b) suggests.  Villagers should be seen as 
objecting to the terms under which the WMA phenomenon is being executed. 
 
A Conservation Impulse 
There are a lot of prohibitions against activities that are detrimental to wildlife 
survival.  These prohibitions seek to secure a habitat for wildlife.  The by-laws prohibit 
deforestation and provide for afforestation efforts.  With respect to deforestation, penalties 
are prescribed for those cutting trees without any valid reason.  In the village of Ol molog, 
for example, the by-laws state:  
Any person who shall destroy the environment by cutting trees aimlessly is 
guilty  and his penalty is 10,000 shillings for each tree (and that) a person 
who shall graze cattle in a place where trees are planted and ruins them shall 
 111 
 
be fined 5,000 shillings for each tree and to plant the tree s/he destroyed (Ol 
molog, n.d.). 
 
In another village, Irkaswa, villagers are forbidden from cutting trees aimlessly, including 
trees they themselves have planted.  The by-laws state that  
any person who shall be apprehended having cut an immature indigenous tree 
 shall be fined 5,000 shillings for each tree and have the implements s/he used 
 confiscated together with the tree s/he had cut.   
 
The by-law further states: 
A person who will have been found to have cut a tree s/he planted shall be 
fined 5,000 shillings and to plant two trees at the place s/he shall have cut 
those trees and tend them until they mature (Irkaswa, n.d.).   
 
Other villages, such as Kitendeni and Lelangwa have instituted comparable by-laws to 
safeguard against deforestation. 
Similarly, afforestation efforts are called for and protected in the by-laws.  In certain 
cases, each household is required to plant about ten trees during the rainy season, and failure 
to do so results in a fine.  In Kitendeni village, for example, the afforestation by-laws state 
that “Every year, each person shall plant ten trees, and whoever does not plant shall be fined 
sh.10,000 or be prosecuted before the ward council or council of elders and to plant the trees” 
(Kitendeni, n.d.).  Similar by-laws on afforestation are to be found in other villages, such as 
Lelangwa and Irkaswa.  For those who plant trees, their efforts are protected in the by-laws.  
People who let their livestock into areas where trees have been planted, for example, incur a 
fine for each destroyed tree; in addition, they are required to plant another tree.  In the by-
laws for Irkaswa village, for example, it is stated:  
A person whose livestock shall destroy a tree planted by another person shall 
be fined 5,000 shillings and plant two trees for each destroyed tree at the place 
that the destroyed trees had been planted (Irkaswa, n.d.).   
 
 112 
 
In Lelangwa, the by-laws state that “A person who destroys another person’s tree is guilty 
and shall be fined 10,000 shillings” (Lelangwa, n.d.). 
The impetus to conserving the environment is also evident with respect to areas meant for 
wildlife sustenance.  Efforts are made to conserve such wildlife habitats as wildlife migration 
routes by placing them out of bounds of human encroachment.  Even legitimate human 
activities such as cultivation are prohibited in wildlife corridors.  Those violating this 
prohibition incur a fine and eviction from the wildlife corridor.  In the by-laws of Kitendeni 
village, a corridor is defined as a special area set aside by the village for purposes of grazing 
livestock and wildlife migration.  The corridor is protected from any farming or building 
activities.  Any contravention of this by-law attracts a fine of Sh. 40,000 and eviction of the 
person(s) concerned from the corridor (Kitendeni, n.d.).  The village that shares the wildlife 
corridor with Kitendeni, Irkaswa, is more elaborate in its provisions for the conservation of 
the corridor.  As will emerge later in this chapter, this concern with details over the corridor 
in Irkaswa village is perhaps a reflection of the fact that it is in Irkaswa where the challenge 
to the existence of the corridor is greatest, unlike in Kitendeni, where there is a near-
unanimity on the need for its existence.  In Irkaswa, the by-laws are stricter; they even 
address intent to commit crime.  The by-laws state: 
Any person found loitering in reserved land while possessing instruments of 
photography, axe, traps, bullets, matchet or any weapon that can destroy 
natural resources in the following areas, Olokunoni (also known as Kitendeni 
corridor) following the corridor boundary, Osinoni upto Kamwanga stream 
together with the indigenous forest, will be fined 50,000 shilling (Irkaswa, 
n.d). 
 
Thus, the idea here is that even though one has not yet harmed the conservation area, the 
mere possession of instruments capable of effecting harm on the natural resources in the 
 113 
 
corridor is itself enough to convince the village that the individual intends to do harm.72 By 
holding such ideas, the village is indicating that it is not taking chances with respect to the 
sanctity of the corridor.  This precaution is pushed further to include mere presence in the 
wildlife corridor even without tools capable of destroying natural resources.  In this respect, 
village by-laws state:  
Any person found loitering in reserved land, without instruments that can 
destroy natural resources, or instruments of photography in the area of 
Olokunoni, following the boundary of the corridor, Osinoni, upto Kamwanga 
river together or next to the indigenous forest, will be fined 10,000 shillings or 
public labor worth that amount (Irkaswa, n.d). 
 
The provision in this by-law can be seen as an attempt to dissuade people from entering the 
corridor, reinstating the sanctity of the corridor and thereby minimizing the risk of subverting 
the purposes of the corridor.   
This sense of discipline in the protection of natural resources is evident in other ways, 
too. One of these ways can be deduced in the requirement for the villagers to protect the 
natural resources of the villages.  This requirement for protection of natural resources entails 
even reporting crimes against natural resources, whether actual or potential.  Failure to report 
such crimes on conservation constitutes committing a crime of concealment of destruction of 
natural resources, which results in a fine.  In one village with such a by-law, the following is 
required:  
Any resident of the village who may suspect, see or witness destruction of 
natural resources is bound to report to village leaders nearby such as sub-
village, village office or police.  Any person who does not relay such a report 
to the foregoing places will be deemed to have participated in the crime and 
shall be fined 25,000 shilling or subjected to public work worth that amount 
(Irkaswa, n.d).  
 
                                                 
72 This conceptualization also mirrors what is contained in the Wildlife and Conservation Act 
(URT,1974 (sec 8)).  The section of the act restricts the carriage of weapons in game reserves. 
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The conceptualization of the people’s responsibility towards the natural resource assets of the 
village in this regulation seems it is borrowed from the language of treason laws in the penal 
code of Tanzania.  More specifically, however, the conceptualization of people’s 
responsibility echoes the constitutional requirement of all Tanzanians to protect the resources 
of the state.  The Constitution states:  
Every person has a responsibility to defend natural resources of the Republic 
of Tanzania, national property and all property collectively owned by the 
people (of Tanzania)…(and further, that) all people are by law required to 
safeguard properly the property of the republic and property that is 
collectively owned, to fight all sorts of wastage and ubadhilifu,…(URT, 1977 
(2000) sec. 27 (1), (2)).   
 
As will emerge from the discussion on WMA at the village level, the provision of such 
legislation in Irkaswa is remarkable.  This is because, of all the nine villages of Enduimet 
division, it is in this village where there are protracted internal wrangles over natural 
resources, especially over access to the corridor reserved for livestock grazing and wildlife 
migration.  It can thus be suspected that the pro-corridor forces within the village, and their 
external supporters such as conservation agencies like AWF, were using the opportunity 
provided by the legal requirement for a village to institute by-laws to leverage the struggle 
over the corridor towards their preferred options.  Once the village institutes laws protecting 
natural resources, it would be easy for the pro-corridor faction to secure their preferred 
option for the corridor, namely, having a corridor that is also legally protected from invasion.  
A similar sensitivity to conservation emerges with respect to the villagers’ approach to 
problem-animal control.  Perhaps, aware that the phenomenon of problem-animal control can 
be used as an excuse for poaching, destructive animals are treated in a way that suggests that, 
contrary to popular opinion, villagers are not out to eliminate such wildlife.  The by-laws 
provide that such animals should first be restrained, chased away, and only killed as a last 
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resort.  These Lelangwa village by-laws, which also echo those of other villages such as Ol 
molog, Kitendeni and Irkaswa state:  
Regarding wildlife that destroys crops, livestock and people, villagers should 
first protect the farms and livestock and if that does not work, the animal is 
killed at the very place they are causing the destruction (Lelangwa, n.d.). 
 
This by-law would seem to be even more restrictive than what is contained in the national 
wildlife act, which states:  
Nothing in this Act shall make it an offence to kill any animal in defence of 
human life or property or for the owner or occupier of such property …to 
drive out or kill by any means what-so-ever any animal found causing damage 
to such property (URT, 1974, sec 50). 
 
Thus, the wildlife act does not require the villagers to handle problem-animals with gloves.  
One would expect that the villagers would have been quick to take advantage of such a 
provision to publicize their grievances against the wildlife conservation regime in vogue.  
Hence, to the extent that the wildlife act allows the killing of problem-animals, and at a time 
when communities are not deriving any concrete benefits from wildlife, the self-imposition 
of such a regime of by-laws by the villagers is quite telling.   
Although the village by-laws regime is imposed on the villagers from the top through the 
Local Government Act (URT, 1982, sec. 163), the content of these by-laws is generated 
locally and has to be approved by a village general assembly before they are given a seal of 
approval by the district authorities.  Thus, they can be said to enjoy the courtesy of the 
villagers’ imagination as to how the villagers ought to be governed.73 The content as shown 
above can then be understood as revealing a conviction among the villagers that wildlife will 
                                                 
73When I asked in some villages whether people actually discussed and conceded to these by-laws, 
they answered in the affirmative.  On probing further whether there were some issues that provoked 
objections, the respondents referred to a by-law that had required that a husband who beats his wife at 
night be fined 15,000 shillings.  This by-law was rejected on the premise that it was too harsh.  This 
citation suggests that the by-laws were, at least, subjected to village-level discussion and that there 
was an opportunity to purge objectionable provisions in the by-laws.    
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somehow be of use to them, even if it is in the distant future.  Perhaps, it is also on this 
premise that the conservation impulse disclosed by the foregoing legal provisions is given 
expression through actual by-laws that seek to protect the products of that conservation.  
Wildlife is one such product.   
 
Wildlife Protection 
Village by-laws protect wildlife in various ways.  The by-laws prohibit poaching of 
wildlife and state that poachers should be arrested and prosecuted.  As indicated above, the 
by-laws conceptualize threats against wildlife in terms of crimes that have already been 
committed, and those likely to be committed.  The by-laws criminalize possession of 
weapons in reserved wildlife areas if one has no legitimate cause for possessing such 
weapons.  The implication here is that the villages do not have to wait for one to kill wildlife 
for that person to be arrested.  This attitude is again remarkable given that benefits from 
wildlife can only be expected in the future, not in the present, and even that future was not 
promising.  Perhaps, the only benefits that can be said to accrue from these efforts are the 
fines imposed on the poachers.  In the by-laws of Lelangwa village, for example, it is stated 
that “anybody who shoots a bird without a permit from the village government commits a 
crime and its fine is 15,000 shillings” while “a hunter who uses dogs or wire snaring if 
apprehended will be fined 30,000 shilling” (Lelangwa, n.d.).74 
                                                 
74Yet, this is a tricky issue because poaching is a crime whose penalties are prescribed in the Wildlife 
Conservation Act (1974).  It is not, therefore, clear whether the villagers can arrest a poacher and 
discharge the same on extracting a fee without referring the poacher to the relevant authorities for the 
provisions of the wildlife act to take effect.  It is only in one village, Irkaswa, where the by-law does 
not institute fines, but rather provides that poachers or those who kill wildlife be arrested and taken to 
court (Irkaswa, n.d.).   
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To institutionalize the protection of wildlife, villagers have established the institution of 
village game scouts.  Some villages have trained some of their inhabitants as game scouts to 
spearhead the professional husbandry of wildlife in village lands.  These game scouts are 
occasionally paid from village coffers whenever the village receives some revenue from tour 
operators conducting photo-tourism activities in village lands.  Otherwise, the services of 
game scouts are generally offered for no pay.  When I was conducting fieldwork in 2004, 
there were two incidences in which village game scouts arrested poachers after having 
stalked them for a whole night.  I had talked to some of these game scouts and it was clear to 
me that they had no job description from the wildlife division, and that the wildlife division 
rarely bothers about them.  When I asked them why they should then be bothered to protect 
wildlife, they intimated that they are inspired by the hope that something beneficial might 
materialize in the future.   
Villages use these game scouts to monitor licensed hunting.  Village by-laws require that 
those licensed by the wildlife division report to village authorities before undertaking their 
hunting ventures on village land.  The by-laws empower village authorities to authenticate 
that hunters are legally allowed to hunt, and also that they are complying with the terms of 
their hunting permits.  In turn, such hunters would be given village game scouts to 
accompany them into the bush.  Hunters who would not report to the village authorities are 
liable for a fine or prosecution.  In Ol molog village, for example, the by-law states:  
any hunter with a hunting permit must pass through the village (office) to 
show the permit and to be given a game scout from the village to work with.  
Failure to do so will incur a fine of 50,000 shillings (Ol Molog, n.d.). 
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The by-laws for the other villages such as Kitendeni and Lelangwa provide for similar 
scenarios, as well as the further provision of arraignment before a court of law for those 
culprits who would fail to pay the fine (Kitendeni, n.d.; Lelangwa, n.d.).75   
These protective measures, though legally controversial and perhaps without active 
support from the relevant wildlife authorities, sometimes achieve their ends for conservation.  
In one interview with village game scouts, they claimed that the village government in 
Lelangwa at one time wrote to the DGO that it suspected that some hunters’ licenses were 
illegitimate.  The villagers claimed that, while they did not get any feedback from the DGO, 
they noted some decline in such licenses during their subsequent inspections.    
The villagers’ commitment to protect wildlife is a clear testimony that they consider 
wildlife a beneficial resource.  Even when there are no legal structures to enable villagers to 
benefit from wildlife, and even though some of the laws in force actually prohibit villagers 
                                                 
75It is not clear whether this is within the village ambit because the mandate the villages are assuming 
is not explicitly provided for in the Wildlife and Conservation Act (URT, 1974).  Indeed, according to 
the act, it could be illegal for the village to interfere with a hunter who is legally permitted to 
undertake hunting activities in their village.  The obligation of the licensed hunter to the private 
landowner ends immediately the latter is furnished with the permit authorizing the hunter to conduct 
tourist hunting on that land.  It is not explicit whether serving a copy of that authority should be done 
prior to commencing hunting activities or on demand.  The private landowner, however, need not 
consent to these hunting activities.  The private landowner would thus be the one in breach of the law 
in the event of obstructing the hunting activities after the landowner has been served with a copy 
authorizing the same.  The mandate to regulate hunting is conferred on an authorized officer, who is 
normally a game officer employed by the division of wildlife.  Village game scouts only become 
involved if the hunting activities occur in an area where the village has been mandated to preside over 
the hunting activities as an authorized association (URT, 1974, sec. 40 (2-3); MNRT, 2002a: sec. 13 
(3), 14 (1)).  Thus, the furthest these by-laws could go is to have effect on resident hunters, certainly 
not tourist hunting.  The former is regulated by district councils, while the latter is regulated by the 
wildlife division.  Thus, although the act requires a hunter to get the consent of a private landowner 
prior to hunting on private land (sec 40 (1) (b), by declaring a hunting block on a private land, the 
director of wildlife effectively neutralizes this provision in the act.  This is so because the director can 
authorize hunting to take place without the consent of the landowner (see sec. 40 (2) and (3) (c)). 
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from initiating wildlife enterprises without the permission of the director of wildlife,76 the 
villagers have not been dissuaded from thinking that they can benefit from wildlife.  
Consequently, they have made provisions in the by-laws to ensure that villagers benefit from 
wildlife. 
 
Wildlife Benefits 
Villagers conceptualize their involvement in wildlife conservation as an activity that 
should yield benefits to them.  They have instituted regulations to ensure that they reap 
benefits from wildlife.  Some of these regulations are, nevertheless, controversial in light of 
the laws that govern the wildlife sector.  Extant national wildlife laws are of higher legal 
authority than village by-laws.  Among the less controversial village by-laws are those that 
require operators of wildlife enterprises to contribute to village development.  Two types of 
tourism enterprises are dominant: tourist hunting activities and photo-tourism.  The former 
are authorized by the wildlife division, while the latter is controlled by the villagers, except 
in cases where the wildlife director has declared village land to be a hunting block.  If a 
village is declared a tourist hunting block, photo-tourism enterprises are prohibited, unless 
with permission from the director of wildlife (MNRT, 2000a).  The villages under discussion 
here are in such areas.   
Thus, the villagers’ requirement for wildlife entrepreneurs to contribute to development 
presupposes that investments by photo-tourism operators will have been authorized by the 
                                                 
76These are the wildlife enterprises that are illegal under the Tourist Hunting Regulations (MNRT,  
2002a). 
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director of wildlife.77 Although villagers have the right under the Village Land Act, 1999 
(URT, 1999b) to control land-use activities on village land, the wildlife division has 
promulgated the Tourist Hunting Regulations (MNRT, 2002a) that usurp the villagers’ right 
to control certain land uses in villages in which the director has established a hunting block.  
This has led to a collusion of jurisdiction that has not yet been resolved; nevertheless, it is 
acting against the interests of villagers.78 
For villages without tourist hunting activities, the requirement for wildlife entrepreneurs 
to contribute to village development is within the villagers’ mandate (URT, 1999b).  To this 
extent, villagers have proposed by-laws to facilitate extraction of revenue from wildlife 
enterprises.  Tour operators are expected to report to the village authorities before embarking 
on their operations.  Those not doing so are liable for a fine.  In Kitendeni village, for 
example, the by-laws legislate that “Every company entering the village for wildlife-related 
businesses should pass through the village office and pay 25%” (Kitendeni, n.d.).79 Tour 
operators are to be charged fees for entry into the village, camping on village land, and for 
every tourist they host on village land.  They are also required to employ tour guides from 
among the villagers.  Village authorities can extract revenue from tour operators through 
penalties if the latter leave their campsites dirty.   
                                                 
77 To a certain extent, this requirement is consistent with the wildlife division’s tourist hunting 
regulations.  The regulations for re-allocation of a hunting block require hunting outfitters to have 
contributed to community development projects in their areas of operation (MNRT, 2002a).  There 
are, however, no benchmarks on what this contribution entails, and a low rating in this aspect can 
always be compensated for in high ratings in other aspects that are considered jointly with the 
development component.     
78Legal commentators are of the view that the villagers’ right to determine land use activities should 
take precedence over the director’s regulations because the land act, as a legislation of Parliament, is 
superior to the wildlife regulations that are made by the minister pursuant to an Act of Parliament. 
79It is not specified in the by-laws what this percentage represents. 
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Villagers also seek to generate revenue from wildlife enterprises in ways that are rather 
controversial.  These ways include charging hunters for every animal hunted, charging tourist 
vehicles entering village land, charging for game scout services, and claiming a stake in 
trophy proceeds.  With respect to tourists paying a fee for every game hunted, by-laws for 
Lelangwa village state:  
every hunter with a permit shall pay to the village government 20,000 
shillings for a wildbeest (pofu), zebra, buffalo, nyumbu, and antelope 10,000 
shillings.  In the event of not paying, shall be prosecuted in a court of law.  
Also, the village government reserves the right to alter these amounts 
depending on circumstances (Lelangwa, n.d.). 
 
Charging hunters for every game hunted is problematic because hunters are licensed by the 
division of wildlife and are expected to pay game fees to the wildlife authorities.  Thus, it is 
difficult to see how the villagers could extract this fee from the hunters, let alone succeed in 
prosecuting those who do not pay as the by-laws require.   
Similarly, villagers’ expectation to generate revenue from trophies accruing from 
problem animal control is problematic.  Ol Molog village legislation provides that trophies 
from problem animal control should “be taken to the relevant authorities.  10% of proceeds 
from those trophies be given back to the village” (Ol Molog, n.d.).  The Wildlife and 
Conservation Act holds that these trophies belong to the state.  The Act (sec. 50 (2) (c)) 
states:  
Any person killing an animal in defence of life or property shall forthwith 
hand over to such Game Officer any trophy removed from such animal, which 
trophy shall be the property of the Governement (URT, 1974). 
 
There is no provision for villagers to retain part of these trophies.  The only opportunity open 
for villagers to access proceeds from these trophies is to apply to the minister of finance, who 
is the only one who can instruct the director of wildlife on the disposal of all trophies (URT, 
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1974, sec. 69).  Some villages such as Lelangwa seem to understand this procedure.  In their 
by-laws regarding trophies from problem-animal control, they are content with handing them 
over to the relevant authorities.  Interviews with villagers on wildlife largesse, however, 
suggest that if villagers had their way, the view on these trophies held by Ol Molog village 
would hold sway. 
Nevertheless, in both the controversial and non-controversial benefit extraction strategies, 
what communities seem to be asserting is that they need to be involved in wildlife benefit 
sharing.  The villagers’ rationale for this involvement, as stated in the by-laws of one village, 
is because they “are the protectors” of wildlife (Kitendeni n.d.).  Thus, communities perceive 
the justification for benefiting from wildlife not simply because the wildlife is available in 
their lands, but also because they contribute to its production.  This contribution to the 
production of wildlife is not just in the way communities protect wildlife, but also in terms of 
how wildlife impose costs on communities.  It is in recognition of this latter fact that 
communities legislate in the by-laws that some of the proceeds they receive from wildlife go 
into mitigating the costs imposed by wildlife. 
 
Compensation for Wildlife Damage 
Village by-laws prioritize utilization of village revenue for use in compensating those 
who have suffered losses due to wildlife damage.  It is significant to note that the revenue 
referred to is not just that accruing from wildlife enterprises, but it is whatever revenue the 
village may have generated.  The by-laws state that village income and expenditure shall 
follow the normal procedures of the village government.  Nevertheless, some expenditure is 
given priority over others.  The prioritized expenditure is that required for compensating 
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people who have suffered damages from wildlife.  Such losses include human death, crop 
damage, or livestock killed by wildlife (Lelangwa, n.d.).     
It is instructive that communities can use revenue generated by even non-wildlife related 
enterprises to meet costs imposed by wildlife.  Why should communities do this when they 
do not have any responsibility over wildlife damage?  Perhaps this can be explained in terms 
of the moral economy of the peasantry, whereby village regulations are tailored to guarantee 
less fortunate members with opportunities for basic subsistence (Scott, 1976: 41-3, 184; but 
see also Popkin, 1979).  However, the reason why deprivations caused by wildlife damages 
should be singled out for special attention is not clear.  One reason might be that the revenue 
from wildlife related enterprises, no matter how minimal and elastic it may be, dwarfs the 
other sources contributing to the village coffers.  In the villagers’ financial imagination, 
wildlife-generated revenue may be the only revenue worth talking about in the village kitty.   
In terms of devolving property rights in wildlife to communities then, this situation 
suggests that these groups would be willing to adopt a devolution project if it can contribute 
to the village kitty.  Communities who are spending their revenue generated from non-
wildlife to mitigate costs imposed by wildlife would be willing to appropriate opportunities 
geared towards making communities benefit from wildlife.  This is because any legal access 
to the utilization of wildlife that would make communities better off would be preferable to a 
situation where communities do not have a regularized program for deriving benefits from 
wildlife.  A variant to this preference would be a situation whereby the proposed program 
would be less attractive than the existing arrangements, even if the government does not 
officially sanction such arrangements.   Acceptance or rejection of the WMA project in West 
Kilimanjaro villages may be understood against this background.  Villages hitherto not 
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receiving any meaningful wildlife benefits were more responsive than villages already doing 
very well.  The latter, exemplified by Sinya village, represents a case of absolute rejection of 
WMA project. 
Having said that, we may pose a question as to whether the by-laws are a proper indicator 
of community enthusiasm for wildlife conservation and by extension, WMA.  This question 
may arise because, one, the by-laws result from a requirement by the local government act 
for communities to enact them; and, two, other communities with such by-laws still rejected 
the WMA project.  It can be argued, however, that although the by-laws are a requirement 
from the national government, which may thus diminish the potency of communities’ claim 
to a pre-WMA consciousness, the kind of laws that ensue are contingent upon the local 
conditions.  Otherwise, if the villagers did not mean what they enacted, one would wonder 
why they should seek to impose on themselves fines that suggest that enacting the by-laws 
was inspired by a ruthless desire to achieve certain environmental objectives.  Villagers 
would likely be circumspect about penalties if they did not believe in the environment and 
natural resources that they sought to protect through legislation.  The by-laws, for example, 
propose penalties for certain environmental crimes that are much higher than the income of 
most members of the village.  Certain environmental crimes, for example, carry a penalty of 
about 50,000 shillings.  This is the monthly salary of some cadres of salaried employees such 
as teachers in a village.  Given that most villagers are not in salaried employment, they do 
not make as much money.  Hence, they should have objected to such high fines, just as they 
rejected certain proposed fines for wife battering.  It is most likely, therefore, that if 
communities had their way, the world suggested by the by-laws is the one they would 
sustain, hence their predisposition for WMA.  However, why did communities elsewhere 
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with a similar background reject WMA?  This was partly because of the nature of the anti-
WMA coalition in vogue.   
 
The Density of anti-WMA Coalition 
One of the regions that have presented a dogged objection to the introduction of WMA is 
Loliondo Division, in Ngorongoro District.  In Loliondo, six villages were supposed to form 
the Loliondo WMA, but all of them have rejected the project.  Loliondo shares certain 
characteristics with Enduimet Division.  Maasai pastoralists are predominant inhabitants in 
both regions.  Both border protected areas and have wildlife roaming about in their village 
lands.  In both communities, their counterparts across the border in Kenya are fellow Maasai 
pastoralists.  The Maasai communities in Tanzania hold the view that their Kenyan 
counterparts are, unlike them, benefiting from wildlife-based enterprises.  On the eve of the 
introduction of WMA, both Loliondo and Enduiment communities had instituted village by-
laws geared towards securing the wildlife sector, and individual villages had contracted with 
investors to establish wildlife enterprises.  Some villages, however, were doing better than 
others in deriving benefits from wildlife.  This disparity led to similar responses towards 
WMA in both areas.  Villages doing very well in their wildlife enterprises such as 
Ololosokwan have been consistently alert in their suspicion towards WMA right from the 
beginning.  This suspicion parallels the behavior of Sinya among the Enduimet villages.  
Sinya has also been doing very well in terms of wildlife enterprises, and has consistently 
opposed WMA in its current formulation.  On the other hand, some villages in Loliondo, 
such as Oloipiri and Olirien, that are not well endowed in wildlife investments had allegedly 
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warmed up to the WMA initially, before they later on took a hard-line stand.  The response 
of this group, therefore, mirrors that of the villages in Enduimet with similar characteristics.   
While the Loliondo villages that may have initially warmed up to the WMA were, 
however, able to change course and oppose it, those in Enduimet signed up for the project.  
By the end of 2005, the proposed Loliondo WMA had not taken root, while that in Enduimet 
was being implemented.  Loliondo’s success in blocking the WMA can be explained in terms 
of an interaction of Loliondo’s history and a strong anti-WMA coalition.  In spite of their 
similarities, Loliondo and Enduimet differ in their history of interventions by external 
wildlife actors and action resources.  Loliondo had an ugly experience of wildlife 
interventions that, coupled with a strong anti-WMA lobby, informed Loliondo villagers’ 
rejection and sustained objection to WMA.  The legacy of wildlife interventions in Loliondo 
can be characterized as one of dispossession.   
Historically, communities in Loliondo used to occupy areas now designated as Serengeti 
National Park.  A German wildlife NGO, Frankfurt Zoological Society (FZS), negotiated 
with communities for FZS to reserve some limited space to conserve wildlife, specifically the 
lion.  Communities accepted, but in the final analysis, they were expelled from Serengeti to 
accommodate wildlife.  In folk memory, communities remember the history of Serengeti 
National Park as one in which space sought for lion conservation turned out to be a national 
park for all wildlife, and from which communities were excluded.  Communities hold FZS 
responsible for their expulsion from Serengeti National Park.  Thus, communities now use 
this experience as a guide whenever contracting with environmental/wildlife enterprises.  The 
case of the WMA was more telling because FZS, their nemesis responsible for their 
expulsion from Serengeti National Park, was designated by the wildlife division to be the 
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lead facilitating agency for the implementation of WMA in Loliondo.   Hence, when certain 
issues in the WMA project seemed suspect, communities became more alarmed about 
wildlife-based interventions.  They viewed the WMA project as a suspicious message carried 
by a suspicious messenger.  Matters worsened when communities began questioning the 
project and proposing their own implementation strategies, only to have state operatives 
become hostile and resort to threats.  The similarity of these events with their expulsion from 
Serengeti National Park could not have been more damaging to the WMA process.   
This kind of suspicion was not very entrenched in the psyche of communities in West 
Kilimanjaro.  Although they were aware that communities living next to wildlife areas are 
prone to losing their land to conservation interventions, Enduimet communities did not have 
such first hand experiences to make them nervous about a suspicious WMA project.  This 
does not mean they were not cautious.  In the past, they had had an altercation with a wildlife 
conservation project, Kilimanjaro Elephant Project, which indicates that they were also alert 
to the dynamics of dispossession.  In 1990, Kilimanjaro Elephant Project initiated a process 
of protecting the only uncultivated piece of land as migratory corridor.  Project officials 
intended to provide watering points for the villagers away from this area.  Donors provided 
water pipes for this purpose, but villagers interpreted this to be a ploy to alienate land.    
Therefore, when the demarcating process commenced, “… local dissent arose, and after 
some ugly incidents it was necessary to postpone the work” (Grimshaw, 1996: iii).  Oral 
sources claim that villagers rejected the pipes and the project sponsors had to retrieve them.  
Enduimet region was not, therefore, without its share of incidents.  Moreover, they must have 
been aware of the expulsion of fellow Maasai from Mkomazi Game Reserve (see, for 
example, Brockington, 2002).  Nevertheless, its experiences were not as memorable as those 
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of Loliondo because they had not been institutionalized through actual loss of land.  In 
Enduimet, therefore, a new project could have a fighting chance. 
Loliondo also had a different experience than Enduimet in terms of its interaction with 
inverstors in wildlife enterprises.  Unlike Enduimet, Loliondo had both positive and negative 
interactions with these investors, the latter being the most relevant for our purposes here.  
Among the most publicized of these negative interventions was that of Ortello Business 
Company (OBC).  A Brigadier from the Middle East had secured a lease for exclusive 
hunting rights in Loliondo.  The company promised villagers in Loliondo that many 
development projects would ensue from its investments there.  However, the situation turned 
out to be a national scandal.  There were complaints of OBC not meeting its part of the 
bargain with the villagers.  Villagers complained of being harassed by OBC agents whenever 
they got into the way of the company.  The popular press soon baptized OBC’s activities as 
Loliondogate.  The grand finale was a parliamentary commission of inquiry to investigate 
how OBC got its lease and its activities.  Nevertheless, this intervention did not terminate 
OBC’s activities, as communities would have wished.  OBC continued and was still mired in 
controversy with the villagers by the time of the introduction of WMA.80 
The impact of OBC on Loliondo villagers was to instill in them some sensitivity when 
contracting for property rights.  Thus, by the advent of WMA project, Loliondo villagers, 
unlike their counterpart in Enduimet, were conscious that there are two types of investors: 
OBC-type investors and others who keep to the bargain.  The latter had served some of 
                                                 
80The controversy stirred up by OBC was not actually confined to the villagers of Loliondo or 
Tanzania in general.  It spilled over into Kenya where conservation NGOs complained that its 
activities in wildlife consumptive utilization were leading to game carnage in Loliondo and having an 
impact on Kenya’s Maasai Mara Game Reserve that borders Loliondo (see, for example, East 
African, 2002 and 2003; JET.n.d.; MERC, 2002). 
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Loliondo’s villages well (see, for example, Ololosokwan, 2003).  The latter, too, is mostly 
what Enduimet villagers were familiar with.  While not all of Enduimet’s villages had 
wildlife investors, villages such as Sinya that had investors were doing very well.  Villages 
without big investments yet who were aware of them in other villages longed for the day that 
they could also host such investors and gain revenue from wildlife.  Certainly, all villages in 
Enduimet knew about Sinya’s fortunes from wildlife enterprises.  Similarly, in villages like 
Ol molog, there were some profits from the lean investment by Hoopoe Safaris.  Other 
villages such as Lelangwa and Kitendeni received meagre income from a tour operator, 
Tanganyika Film and Safaris.  However, the operater had stopped visiting their villages.   
Thus, the image of wildlife enterprises in Enduimet was that of potential wonders yet to 
be realized and was, unlike in Loliondo, not tempered with vivid experiences of betrayal.  
Without personal knowledge that seemingly wonderful wildlife enterprises could turn out to 
be liabilities, Enduimet villagers were more prone to experimenting with opportunities.  
Their chances of doing so were increased by the absence of a strong anti-WMA lobby in 
Enduimet division.  This situation was unlike the case in Loliondo, where a strong anti-
WMA lobby, organized around locally based NGOs such as Community Resources Trust 
(CRT) and Laramatak Development Organization (LADO), spelt doom for WMA. 
In Loliondo, the objective conditions for the rejection of WMA were catalysed into action 
by the activism of indigenous NGOs.  Both LADO and CRT are powered by local inhabitants 
of Loliondo, some of who were not only members of their village’s councils (and, therefore, 
government), but were also members of governing organizations at the district level.  These 
organizations had established their credibility among villagers by organizing village seminars 
on land rights.  They had also played a significant role in the demarcations of village 
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boundaries, a critical step in the village’s acquisition of land titles.  The organizations were 
also principal actors in the development of the village land-use plans and by-laws, including 
those on natural resources (see, for example, Ololosokwan, 2000; Oloipiri, 2000; Soit 
Sambu, 2000).  Thus, by the advent of WMA, these organizations had effectively positioned 
themselves as opinion setters; they were to play a critical role in guiding their compatriots to 
reject WMA.  Thus, a strong activist group confronting a discredited proponent of WMA 
(FZS) handed the WMA project easy defeat in Loliondo.  West Kilimanjaro’s experience was 
different.   
In Enduimet, there was no organized grassroots pressure group spearheading opposition 
to WMA.  Other villages could not emulate Sinya’s case because it was seen as pursuing 
selfish interests.  The opposing camp in Irkaswa could not crystallize into an anti-WMA front 
for the entire Enduimet division, mainly because those involved were discredited by their 
association with itinerant cultivators.  They were not perceived as pursuing a cause that was 
for the welfare of society in the way NGOs in Loliondo were viewed.  Moreover, in 
Enduimet, AWF had spearheaded the WMA project, and had no adverse legacy comparable 
to that of its counterpart in Loliondo.  The NGO that came closest to checking AWF’s 
activities in its uncritical implementation of WMA was SCF-TZ.  SCF-TZ played a leading 
role in organizing seminars to sensitize communities of their rights under Tanzanian law in 
relation to land and natural resources.  While these seminars disclosed to the communities the 
limitation of the WMA as constituted, it was not strategic for the organizers of these seminars 
to tell communities in explicit terms that they should reject WMA.  In this respect, the 
organizers of these seminars were constrained, unlike AWF, which could tell communities to 
sign up for WMA without taking any risks because it was reciting the official script.  For 
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NGOs like SCF-TZ to tell communities not to accept WMA, that could be interpreted as 
sabotaging a government program and it was not, therefore, practical for SCF-TZ to assume 
that approach.  Thus, while in Loliondo, the anti-WMA vanguard could explicitly oppose 
WMA by virtue of their being direct and immediate stakeholders.  In Enduimet the lone 
organization sensitizing communities against WMA was constrained because it was foreign, 
and, therefore, had to operate within acceptable official limits.  Hence, while CRT and 
LADO could engage FZS in an altercation, SCF-TZ could not do this against AWF.  
Consequently, Enduimet’s opposition to WMA was not as spirited as to effect a rejection in 
the style of Loliondo.   
In Enduimet, therefore, factors favoring the acceptance of WMA were the opposite of 
those of Loliondo.  There was no significant adverse legacy and neither was the proponent of 
the WMA project demonized.  In addition to the failure to reject WMA being because of this 
weak background in objective conditions (for rejection), there was also the factor of an 
equally weak agency.  The forces characterized as anti-WMA were not local, and hence this 
foreignness deprived them of the opportunity to mount the type of activism witnessed in 
Loliondo.  Moreover, even if local activism had occurred, there would still have been a 
problem in that the objective conditions did not militate against WMA.  To the contrary, they 
favored its adoption.  The principal contradiction in Loliondo that was lacking in Enduimet 
was the legacy of adverse interventions by both wildlife conservation actors (NGOs) and 
investors.    
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V  Conclusion 
This chapter addressed the question of the simultaneous verification and rejection of the 
argument that local communities would resist the WMA project.   It emerged that certain 
communities accepted the project, while others resisted it.  Others sought to be included 
rather than being excluded.  The different communities’ perceptions of what particular 
property rights regime was beneficial to them were at the center of these varied responses to 
the WMA project.  Communities such as Sinya rejected WMA because it was inferior to 
what they had.  Other communities accepted it because they thought that, in the absence of a 
better alternative, they could make good use of a bad situation.  The WMA project, with all 
its limitations, appealed as a better alternative to the status quo, even though these 
communities realized that they were worth more than what the WMA project was giving 
them.   
This view of the WMA was encouraged by the fact that the limitations of the WMA 
project were potential, rather than actual; the cost, if any, was not upfront.  While 
communities could lose in the event of infractions on the WMA regulations, there was almost 
no cost to communities for accepting and implementing the idea of WMA.  Thus, the notion 
that communities could say yes to WMA without losing anything initially was something that 
could attract “reckless” acceptance.  Communities could imagine themselves operating in a 
situation of “let’s try and withdraw if it does not work.”   This attitude was easy to espouse 
given that consenting communities conceptualized conditions for contracting with the WMA 
project as reversible at minimal cost.  Approaching devolution in this way has implications to 
the quality of resource stewardship that would result when communities become the patrons 
of the natural resources at the local level. 
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It would be tempting to view such contractual circumstances as offering possibilities of 
resource predation by communities whose resource tenure rights are insecure.  This is 
particularly so in light of Gibson’s (1999) observation that communities in Zambia that were 
incorporated in a wildlife conservation program accepted the benefits that accompanied the 
partnership, but still continued to pilfer on resources.  These communities merely changed 
their target of prey, but continued poaching nevertheless.  Thus, the temptation to read 
potential for predation of resources in Enduimet communities is real.  This potential towards 
predation, however, need not materialize with respect to the communities under study.  The 
phenomenon of pre-WMA wildlife initiatives among these communities mitigates against the 
possibilities of an easy shift to predation.  When communities pursue such initiatives and 
activate themselves to nurture natural resources on a hopeful basis that they will secure them 
for their own future use, such a pursuit is bound to solidify when access to natural resource is 
granted, even if this access is just minimal.  Thus, a strategic, not mechanistic, 
conceptualization of their entitlement is likely to play against the possibilities of 
predatorship, contrary to what was hypothesized in chapter one.     
While the case of the Enduiment response to WMA verifies observations by property 
right theorists, it also introduces scenarios that are contrary to what was expected.  In this 
chapter, it has emerged that, although the state may not devolve wildlife property rights to 
communities in a way that generates a private property rights consciousness, communities 
may nevertheless accept a project that is seemingly incapable of advancing their interests.  
However, this eventuality need not necessarily lead to a predatorial resource regime as 
suggested in the property right theory that was advanced in chapter one.   
 
  
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 
CONTESTATIONS OVER WILDLIFE PROPERTY RIGHTS IN KENYA: 
The Economic Dimension 
 
I  Abstract 
This is a study of contestations over wildlife property rights between the state and local 
communities that host wildlife.  Over the years, the state has laid claims over wildlife to the 
exclusion of local communities living with the wildlife.  Communities, however, contend that 
they bear the brunt of hosting wildlife in their lands, and, consequently, deserve to benefit 
from wildlife as an economic resource.  External actors have also argued for the devolution 
of wildlife property rights to local communities in a bid to arrest the deterioration of the 
wildlife biomass that is attributed to the communities’ lack of interest in conservation.  The 
state presents the impression that it can cede wildlife property rights to local communities.  
This study, however, argues that the state is unwilling to devolve wildlife property rights to 
local communities in a way that would engender in these communities a private property 
right consciousness as argued for by the proponents of community-based conservation.  This 
argument is analyzed and situated within the various attempts by the state to placate the 
communities’ clamor for a stake in wildlife as an economic resource.    
 
II Introduction 
Contestations over wildlife property rights in Kenya have grown proportionately with the 
establishment of formal state control over natural resources.  Wildlife ownership moves from 
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an age of open access property rights regime in the precolonial era to one of highly contested 
ownership rights in the postcolonial period.  During the precolonial phase, there were limited, 
if any, state structures that could exact control over wildlife.  With the onset of colonialism, 
however, Africans began to experience constraints in appropriating wildlife.  Hitherto freely 
accessible natural resources, including wildlife, were alienated from the public domain 
during the colonial period when the colonial state declared wildlife state property.  
Henceforth, it would be illegal for Africans to harvest wildlife or even kill problem animals.  
Africans opposed these colonial appropriations of wildlife, but the struggle was not very 
protracted because the colonial state was not well enough entrenched to be able to maintain 
surveillance that could often net the culprits.  Thus, to a certain extent, while the legal 
infrastructure for excluding Africans from accessing wildlife benefits were put in place, the 
adverse impact was mitigated by a weak enforcement mechanism.  Nevertheless, retribution 
was severe for the culprits who were apprehended, and this became the basis of African 
discontent with colonial wildlife property rights arrangement.   
    This discontent became more vicious during the post-independence period, particularly as 
the cost of wildlife damage became astronomical with minimal accompanying benefits.  
Population increase led to expanded demand on land.  This in turn led to heightened contact 
with wildlife, and hence local communities experienced more damage by wildlife.  This 
happened at a time when the state’s capacity for surveillance was being staffed more and 
more with locals, thereby denying local communities the advantage of the monopoly of 
familiarity with the local dynamics.  Thus, the problem of collective action within the 
African society was aggravated, with the consequence that the losses to the wildlife became 
even more pronounced because the hitherto appropriated wildlife benefits, even though 
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illegal, were now becoming scarce.  This in turn heightened the clamor for the re-evaluation 
of community-wildlife relations, with communities advancing claims for compensation for 
damages imposed on them by wildlife, or for the government to concede that communities 
are also legitimate claimants to wildlife resources.  The government and the conservation 
coalition responded by initiating devolution strategies geared towards giving communities 
some opportunities to extract benefits from wildlife.  This was meant to include local 
communities as co-partners in the conservation project.  These initiatives in devolving 
wildlife property rights failed to secure community allegiance to wildlife.  These initiatives in 
devolution of wildlife property rights to local communities demonstrate that the state is 
determined to cling to the ownership of wildlife and can only devolve property rights to other 
claimants on its own terms.  Communities tried to put up with this state patronized 
devolution but found the relationship objectionable.  They, therefore, moved to secure legal 
recognition of their proprietary rights in wildlife (as discussed in the next chapter).   
 
III Age of Open-Access Property Rights Regime: the Precolonial Era 
Communities’ experience with wildlife during the precolonial period can be said to inform 
the contemporary state-local communities’ divide over wildlife ownership.  During the 
precolonial era, wildlife ownership has to be understood in terms of the nature of political 
leadership extant in each society.  In centralized societies, the central authority owned 
wildlife, just as it owned land (and even the subject population), while in non-centralized 
societies, wildlife was an open-access resource.81  In neither type of society did wildlife 
enjoy the status of a commodity.  It was not until the rise of long-distance trade, towards the 
                                                 
81Nevertheless, certain animals, as we shall see shortly, enjoyed protected status.  These were those 
that had totemic significance to certain clans or communities.   
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second-half of the nineteenth century, that wildlife became a dominant commodity.  Even 
then, it was only in centralized societies that state power was used to monopolize wildlife.  In 
non-centralized societies, wildlife continued to be an open access resource until the rise of 
state builders whose career was, nevertheless, cut short by the intervention of formal colonial 
occupation.  Thus, a number of African societies came under colonial rule without a clear 
experience of formal separation between society and wildlife ownership.  For the Maasai of 
Kenya and Tanzania, for example, the experience that ownership of wildlife is a monopoly of 
the state was to be a legacy of European colonialism.   
 Prior to the European colonization of Africa in the late nineteenth century, wildlife 
was an integral part of the African society, without any formal separation between nature and 
society.  Wildlife was viewed as a bounty of nature to be used in ways that suited the best 
interests of each society.  Some societies are presented as having utilized wildlife 
consumptively, while others largely used it in non-consumptive ways.  Whatever forms of 
utilization a particular group of people assumed, access to wildlife was a factor of the formal 
state structures in each society.  In centralized societies where the chief or king was the 
depository of state authority, natural resources such as land and wildlife were under the 
control of such authority.   
In Zambia, for instance, chiefs had control over land and by virtue of this power, they 
were able to influence other sectors such as wildlife (Shikabeta, Chief. 1993; Chiyaba, 
Honorable Chieftainess, 1993; Gibson, 1999: 128).  In Zimbabwe, Lobengula’s control of 
wildlife was exercised even over the early Europeans prior to the imposition of colonialism.  
Lobengula is said to have fined Europeans who shot game against his wishes (MacKenzie, 
1987: 48).  This would suggest that Lobengula’s people then had a concept of wildlife as the 
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Chief’s game.  A similar inference can be made with respect to the Kabaka of Buganda.  The 
Kabaka monopolized the nineteenth century ivory trade in Buganda (Mamdani, 1976: 30).  
Given the centralization of the Buganda Kingdom, and particularly the centralization of the 
Kabaka’s power consequent to the transformation of military technology, it is not difficult to 
conceptualize how the King could bring ownership of natural resources under his sway.   
Similarly, among the Toro, a centralized society headed by a king, the title of the king 
was “Omukama”, meaning “owner of all” (Naughton-Treves, 1999:314).  The King owned 
all the land and demarcated it for his subjects.  But while there was a concept of individual 
ownership of land, individuals did not obstruct hunters from hunting on their grounds 
provided that the hunters shared game meat with the landowners.82  The King also owned 
wildlife and even had royal hunting grounds.  These hunting grounds were nevertheless open 
for hunting by ordinary hunters provided they did not hunt animals such as elephants and 
buffalo.  Animals such as elephants were referred to as “King’s animals”, and ivory tusks had 
to be taken to the King (Naughton-Treves, 1999: 317-318).  Thus, in spite of the social 
differentiation in the access to wildlife in centralized societies, such a differentiation did not 
amount to a deprivation of people’s ownership of wildlife property rights.  The situation was 
even more fluid in less centralized societies. 
Precolonial societies in Kenya lacked centralization of authority as witnessed in other 
areas such as Zimbabwe and Uganda.  Even in areas such as among the Digo and Duruma83 
                                                 
82Harms (1987: 36, 87) related a similar situation with respect to the Nunu of equatorial Africa. 
Landowners had rights over land, but not the game in it; thus a landlord received a portion of an 
animal killed in his land (a landlord could not obstruct hunting and only waited for a catch and 
claimed property right over a portion of the kill). 
 
83This is highly unlikely because the societies were largely lineage segmented formations run by a 
system of gerontocracy (cf. Spear, 1978).   
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where there were personages that the literature refers to as chiefs, they do not seem to have 
extended their authority to the control of wildlife as their property.  Steinhart (2006: 32) 
observes that  
All informants seemed agreed that there was no special portion of a kill set 
aside for chiefs or headmen, and ownership rights to portions belonged only to 
the men in the hunting party and their dependents.  
 
The significance of this observation is that it shows the political leadership laid no claim to 
proprietary rights over wildlife.84   It appears that ownership of wildlife was based on the 
right of capture, thereby suggesting that the property rights regime was an open-access one.  
This is the dominant image that emerges from Kenyan communities such as the Kamba who 
are generally known for consumptive utilization of wildlife.  The major institution associated 
with hunting was the hunting society--which had more to do with rituals of increasing 
chances of bagging game than with controlling access to game.  This institution assigned 
bagged game to the hunters based on those whose arrows were verified as having been the 
fatal shot.  Other hunters in the party would not get any trophy (Steinhart, 2006).  Wildlife 
property rights, therefore, were based on access other than on the logic of prior appropriation, 
at least, among those communities who pursued consumptive utilization.     
There were other communities such as the Maasai that are said to have had little use 
for wildlife.85  Some sources contend that the Maasai did not hunt wildlife for meat and that 
they despised those who did (Kipury, 1983).  The popular opinion among both the Maasai 
and others is that Maasai did not eat game, save during crisis periods (Collett, 1987: 136, 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
84This observation covers the precolonial era; during the colonial period, hunting was proscribed and 
even if people hunted, chiefs would arrest them.  But if they connived, then he would stake 
proprietary rights on the game in lieu of arrest. 
 
85The survival of wildlife among the Maasai has fueled popular opinion more than is the case in other 
areas of Kenya and Tanzania. 
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138).  The view that the Maasai largely ignored wildlife living among them is, however, not 
correct.  Indeed, contrary to popular opinion, the Maasai are said to have considered wildlife 
as their second cattle, and for several reasons.  During drought, when their herds had been 
depleted by the vagaries of nature, they would resort to wildlife for sustenance (Western 
1994: 20).  On the other hand, Maasai social life was said to be interwoven with the wildlife 
environment, and they derived a measure of spirituality from the environment. Myths, 
legends and tales about land and the environment were narrated in a sanctified manner 
(Kipury, 1983).  Certain wildlife species were associated with ceremonies and medicine, 
thereby imparting to them some cultural significance (Berger, 1993: 105; Kipury, 1983; 
Matampash, 1993: 35-36).  This appropriation of wildlife for social significance took various 
forms: buffalo hide for making shields; rhinoceros horns used as containers for tobacco; 
giraffe tails made into fly whisks for elders; ostrich feathers served as head-gear for warriors; 
and hide and skin from famous animals such as the lion and colobus monkey were made into 
robes of honor for the elders.   
Among the Herero of Namibia, wildlife was also highly valued not just for its 
consumptive value, but also because of its metaphysical significance; it was associated with 
rainfall.  The Herero utilized wildlife sparingly and were against wanton destruction of 
wildlife because they believed that in so far as there was wildlife around, God would send 
rain to the world.  This was because wildlife was God’s creation and whenever God would 
look down to the earth and find them without subsistence, He would send rain (Bonner, 
1993:23).  In this sense, one can say that Herero had an instrumental view of wildlife, and in 
this regard, they would rate it as property that they could lay claim on to the extent that it was 
associated with the procurement of rain.   
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Thus, for most part in the precolonial era, claims to wildlife could be based on either 
immediate consumptive or non-consumptive uses.  These were the days prior to the 
commoditization86 of wildlife and, therefore, there was minimal tension in the appropriation 
of wildlife.  In centralized societies where there was differentiation in access to wildlife, 
tensions were mitigated by the fact that such differentiations were premised on societal 
beliefs that supported hierarchy in society on more ways than just the access to wildlife.  
Thus, the chiefs could easily get away with privatization of access to some wildlife species or 
parts of wildlife.  As Harms (1987) has observed, however, this is not to say that there were 
no struggles over resources in precolonial Africa.  Struggles obtained, but these struggles 
were over access to resources, not the resource per se.   In the case of fishing property rights 
among the Nunu of equatorial Africa, for example, Harms shows that while there were 
restrictions over access to fishing ponds and dams constructed by individuals, outsiders who 
only employed fishing by traps (as opposed to other common methods that would catch a lot 
of fish) were allowed in all waters, including private waters, without restriction (Harms, 
1987: 25-26). 
The crises over both access to the resource and the resource itself was to start 
fermenting with the rise of long distance trade in East Africa, a phenomenon that took place 
largely in the 19th Century.  It was the long distance trade that began to elevate the value of 
wildlife, and especially elephants and rhinoceros into a commodity that could be privatized to 
the total exclusion of others in society.87  While centralized societies were in the forefront in 
                                                 
86On the commodification of wildlife, see the following footnote. 
 
87Commodification of wildlife certainly dates to earlier than this period, but we lack reliable data on 
that period.  It is not clear how the earliest trade in East Africa’s wildlife products played itself out, 
though it is certain that the products were part of the articles of commerce between the coast and the 
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commoditizing wildlife for the purposes of participating in the long distance trade (Mamdani, 
1976: 26-28, 30), soon actors in decentralized societies would begin to position themselves to 
make claims on the wildlife trade.  In Tanzania, for example, there is the rise of new empire 
builders such as Tippu Tip of the Nyamwezi who sought to control the long distance trade in 
central Tanzania.  It is said that Tippu Tip imposed property rights on wildlife for himself 
(specifically elephants) and that no hunting was allowed unless the hunter had his permission 
and agreed to giving him one tusk of every two (Kelly, 1978: 145).  In Kenya, there is the 
rise of entrepreneurs like Kivoi among the Kamba whose exploits signal the possibility that 
they could easily have managed to carve out a commercial empire that could see them 
impose private property rights in wildlife where there was none previously.88  As Steinhart 
(2006) has observed, a trading system involving the exchange of cattle, small stock, cloth, 
and other imported goods for ivory between the Kamba and their neighbors to the north and 
west remained an important and growing part of the overall supply throughout the 
precolonial period.89 Thus the centrality of wildlife products, specifically ivory, had stamped 
                                                                                                                                                       
outside world.  East African ivory is said to have been found in Egyptian vessels fourteen centuries 
before Periplus (see, for example, Steinhart, 2006:18). 
 
88We are able to hypothesize the scenario on the basis of Anderson and Hill (2004:24).  They argue 
that decisions to invest in defining and enforcing property rights depend on the value and the cost of 
securing ownership —the latter depends on technology.  In the East African region, this can be 
anticipated because long distance trade conferred additional value on wildlife, which hitherto had 
been used for subsistence or ceremonial purposes. But with the trade, wildlife products could be 
exchanged for goods imported from the East African coast.  As long distance trade expanded into the 
interior, warfare technology was revolutionized.  Gun and gunpowder, hitherto unknown in the 
region, were introduced.  Thus, individuals and societies that were able to accumulate and 
monopolize the new weapons of violence had an advantage in imposing their view of the world on 
others.  They could easily have imposed proprietary rights on wildlife.  
 
89Of interest to the study of the Maasai and wildlife property rights is why they, as the immediate 
neighbors of the Kamba, and the ones controlling the areas that were the largest reservoir of wildlife, 
and hence ivory, did not declare proprietary rights over wildlife if by the mid-nineteenth century a 
new entrepreneurial elite and ivory trade were emerging among the Kamba. Moreover, the Maasai 
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its mark on the economic worldview of the precolonial African commercial actors prior to 
the formal imposition of colonialism. 
Nevertheless, new wildlife property rights regimes did not materialize because at the 
time the coastal impetus to such materialization was taking place, colonization, a more 
dominant force, emerged to impose its own version of wildlife property rights over the 
region.  Thus, the precolonial era closes with a mitigated open –access regime that had 
characterized it for most of the time prior to the advent of 19th Century European 
colonialism.  This was a regime whereby wildlife was accessible to all (even in instances 
where forms of private property rights in wildlife could be said to have existed, such as 
centralized societies like the Toro and Nunu), but at the same time it was not abandoned to 
the vagaries of nature (as was shown in the case of decentralized societies where wildlife 
enjoyed some kind of cultural significance such that it would be expected that society would 
have stepped in to contain wildlife’s wanton destruction).  Under this precolonial wildlife 
property rights regime, there may have been struggles for property rights over wildlife, but 
these struggles were not protracted.   
Various reasons can account for the absence of a protracted war over wildlife 
property rights during the precolonial era.  For one, wildlife was used mostly for its use-value 
rather than as a commodity for the exchange market.  Any transactions involving wildlife 
were largely for a subsistence economy that was based on economic complementarity rather 
than competition.90  Moreover, contestations over ownership of wildlife could have been 
moderated by the fact that there was abundance of game, at a time when human population 
                                                                                                                                                       
capacity to do this should not be an issue because popular opinion then was that they were the pre-
eminent military powerhouse (Thompson, 1885). 
 
90See, for example, Mamdani, 1976: 26-30.  
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was low, or if population density manifested itself, its redistribution could easily occur given 
the availability of large unoccupied tracts of land.  In whatever form it assumed, this 
demographic behavior can then be said to have translated into low demand for wildlife at a 
time when wildlife was in abundance.  There was also the factor of the relatively limited 
reach of the precolonial state which meant that it had a compromised capacity for resource 
alienation.  In some societies, the structures of governance were decentralized such that there 
was no monopoly of violence that could be brought to bear on the practice of alienating 
wildlife resources.  In centralized societies that had a monopoly of violence, the control over 
wildlife resources did not amount to deprivation of the subject populations, partly because, as 
Harms (1987) has observed, there were structures in society that ensured that such controls 
over property rights did not amount to individualism.  Moreover, the tendency during this era 
was for the chiefs or lords to provide sustenance to subject population as a way of attracting a 
following (see, for example, Harms, 1987).  Thus a protracted war over wildlife property 
rights was to obtain only with the claiming of these rights by the European colonial 
authorities and the consequent separation of society from nature within the colonial 
dispensation.  
 
IV Resource Alienation and the Origins of the State-Communities Struggle over 
Wildlife: the Colonial Phase 
 
The colonial project was founded on the subjugation of the colonized and the subsequent 
appropriation of the natural resources (among them wildlife) of the conquered peoples by the 
colonial state.  With specific reference to wildlife, the colonial state focused on wildlife’s 
dual importance as a commodity and as an object of leisure (its aesthetic value).  The 
appropriation of game animals was viewed as a critical ingredient to service the fiscal needs 
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of the colonial state.  During the early days of European expansion, both the explorers, 
missionaries and early colonial adventurers in most of Africa viewed game as an open access 
resource that could be utilized in lieu of buying and ferrying foodstuffs from the coast to the 
interior (Mackenzie, 1987:44ff; Steinhart, 2006:55).  Thus, wildlife was shot indiscriminately 
to feed the retinue of followers that constituted the bulk of the pioneer European column into 
the interior of Africa.  Other members of this pioneer column were interested in shooting 
game for the trophies that they could take with them back to Europe (Mackenzie, 1987).  
From their initial encounter with wildlife, therefore, the Europeans, unlike the Maasai who 
were portrayed in popular opinion that we encountered above as ignoring wildlife, took note 
of the economic significance of wildlife and acted on it.  Consequently, the colonial 
authorities, right from the days of the company rule (i.e. the Imperial British East African 
Company, IBEA Co. that initially had authority over the Protectorate), sought to exert their 
authority over wildlife as an economic resource.     
The early colonial authorities viewed game as a source of revenue.  As early as 1902, 
Sir Harry Johnstone was asserting the necessity of creating game reserves as sources of 
revenue (Collett, 1987: 140).  Subsequent colonial authorities were to reiterate the same 
theme of wildlife as a source of revenue (see, for example, Cranworth, 1991: 396-370 quoted 
in Collett, 1987-141).  The reason for this quick recognition of wildlife as a source of 
revenue is self evident.  In the initial days of British rule, there were few, if any, ways of 
making the Protectorate fund itself.  The future economic mainstay of the colony, agriculture, 
had not taken off because the settlers had barely grappled with the question of land alienation 
from the Africans and the provision of agricultural labor (see, for example, Okoth-Ogendo, 
1992; van Zwanenberg, 1975).   
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So, the colonial authorities could certainly use their comparative advantage as the 
new wielders of “legitimate” force in Kenya to make capital out of wildlife.  The economic 
exploitation of wildlife was as a readily viable option at this time because of a combination 
of two factors.  First, there was freely available and abundant wildlife, and second, there was 
a substantial number of fortune and pleasure-seekers who had already flocked into the 
Protectorate in search of wildlife products.   Using its military might, the colonial state 
imposed its control over wildlife property rights and went ahead to exploit wildlife 
economically.  By the 1920s, revenue from wildlife products, particularly ivory transactions, 
contributed between 50-75% of the tax base of the Kenya Protectorate.  Such ivory 
transactions included sale of confiscated and “found” ivory, hunting and special elephant 
licenses, gun permits and fines (Steinhart, 2006: 150-151).  In regional terms, the impact of 
ivory revenue on the tax base was even more prominent.  In the Coast province, for example, 
ivory and ivory-related fees far exceeded other sources of revenue.  In 1922, ivory revenue 
from Tana District was three times that of the other customs returns combined; while in the 
then Kipini District, rewards to the Africans for delivering to the authorities ivory that they 
had collected was more than the tax revenue in 1923 (Maforo, 1979:157-158).91     
Wildlife was also appropriated as part of a project of nature preservation.  Within the 
overall framework of Victorian colonial expansion, there were those who pushed the need to 
protect wildlife as a heritage for posterity (see, for example, Cranworth, 1919: 396-370; 
Anderson and Grove, 1987: 1-12; Neumann, 1996).  The appropriation of wildlife property 
                                                 
91Maforo (1979: 157-158) makes a compelling observation indicating that what the Coast Province 
experience discloses about the significance of ivory in the colonial economy is important. The 
contribution of ivory at the Coast should be understood against the backdrop that the elephant 
population was not as dense as in the interior.  (Of course, this need not necessarily imply that the 
interior did far better; one has to account for the ability of different colonial administrators to execute 
their mandate in administration and particularly in dealing with the local population.  This would 
determine the willingness of the Africans to participate in the ivory business.) 
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rights for aesthetic reasons, however, did not exclude the economic motive for appropriating 
wildlife property rights referred to above.  The Protected Areas system was allegedly used to 
check the decimation of game.  The system defined those areas in which no hunting was to 
take place; and in those areas where it did, a pattern of closed and open hunting seasons was 
put in place (as is still the practice today in countries where sports-hunting is in vogue).  This 
was a form of game management that ensured that wildlife was allowed to recover from the 
impact of hunting.  The protected area system could at the same time be read as a clear 
indication that the colonial authorities planned on securing wildlife as an economic resource 
that was to be used for a long time both in consumptive (game hunting) and non-consumptive 
ways (photo-tourism).  In due course, the wildlife Protected Area system would also generate 
revenue for the colonial and postcolonial establishments through photo-tourism.  The 
colonial system thus had compelling grounds to alienate wildlife property rights from both 
the African population and European immigrants for its exclusive disposal.  To accomplish 
this, it invoked several instruments such as conventions and ordinances.   
Through a series of international agreements/conventions and legislative Game 
Ordinances, the colonial state brought the ownership of wildlife under its sway.  This 
colonial appropriation of wildlife took the form of separating society from wildlife (the 
creation of National Parks and Reserves), in addition to specifically prohibiting anyone from 
appropriating game animals (save with authority from the state). 92   Among the early 
international Agreements legitimizing this colonial move were the 1900 and 1933 London 
                                                 
92In the early days of the Protectorate rule (around 1894), however, the Imperial British East African 
Company that governed Kenya exempted Africans from the hunting restrictions that it issued against 
European hunters (Maforo, 1979:6).  The aim of the restrictions was not to further the conservation 
agenda.  It was to control the influx of armed Europeans into the interior where they would interact 
with the African population and possibly provoke the latter into a confrontation at a time when the 
IBEA Company did not have the muscle to handle unrest (Kelly, 1978; Maforo, 1979). 
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Conventions.  The 1933 London Convention, for example, provided for the establishment of 
national parks in which human settlement would be generally prohibited.  In article 4 (1), for 
example, it stated that there should be administrative arrangements for “The control of all 
white or native settlements in national parks with a view to ensuring that as little disturbance 
as possible is occasioned to the natural fauna and flora” (London Convention, 1933).  While 
these kinds of arrangements did not have an immediate impact on the pastoral Maasai, they 
were to distort access to badly needed grazing and watering points for the Maasai living in 
the Amboseli basin once it became a park in later years (see, for example, Collett, 1987; 
Western, 1994).   
The 1933 London Convention, moreover, re-stated and expanded restrictions on the 
types of hunting methods that were initially prohibited by the 1900 London Convention.  
Among them were those that generally covered hunting methods used by Africans.  Article, 
10 (2) stated, for example, that 
Wherever possible, the under-mentioned methods of capturing or destroying 
animals shall be generally prohibited: …(b) The use of….poison or poisoned 
weapons for hunting animals; (c) The use of nets, pits or enclosure, gins, traps 
or snares, or of set of guns and missiles containing explosives for hunting 
animals (London Convention, 1933). 
 
The most likely recourse that now remained open was the use of certain types of guns.  This 
was a dim opportunity because guns were out of reach for Africans (partly because as a 
commodity guns were still rare in Africa, and because of restrictions on possession of guns 
by Africans by the colonial state).93  This effectively meant that by 1933, the erstwhile 
                                                 
93 Europeans had learnt the hard way not to reward Africans with hunting guns after such an 
experiment backfired in Central Africa when the Shona-Ndebele turned the guns against the white 
invaders in the 1896-7 uprisings (MacKenzie, 1987: 47). 
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exclusion of Africans from the wildlife hunting regimes had been given an international 
approval.                                                                                                            
Starting from early 1900, and following the 1900 London Convention, the colonial 
government issued Ordinances that were meant to bring the wildlife largesse under its 
control.  In this case then, force was being used as a tool for contracting for wildlife property 
rights between the colonial authorities and the rest of society, both the whites and African 
populations.94  This was to be followed by a struggle for wildlife property rights between the 
colonial state versus these other segments of society.  The struggle for these property rights, 
however, was not presented as a common front by society against the state because society 
was laced with the racial divide symptomatic of the political economy of the colonial state.95  
                                                 
94This was not always the case throughout Africa.  In certain places where there were centralized 
authorities, such as among the Toro, treaties were used in contracting wildlife property rights.  The 
1891 Treaty between King Kasagama of Toro and Captain Lugard of the Imperial British East 
African Company, for example, stated in clause 4 that: “I engage to preserve the elephants on my 
country and to prevent their destruction by hunters of any tribe whatsoever.  I recognize the (British) 
Company’s exclusive right to kill and hold all elephants in my country as Company property” (quoted 
in Naughton-Treves, 1999: 315).  In subsequent Toro agreements (1900 and 1906), slight variations 
were made in which the King was to be given fifty per cent of ivory from Problem Animal Control 
(ibid). 
 
95Kameri-Mbote contends that though the settlers and the Africans were confronted by the same 
problem they were not united in their opposition to the state’s property rights, because the 
government gave superior consideration to the settlers’ rights (Kameri-Mbote, 2002: 98).  By 
contrast, I argue that the settlers would not have formed an alliance with the African population 
because, while they wanted the state to devolve property rights to them, the benefit of doing so would 
not have been enhanced if the rights were devolved simultaneously to them and the Africans.  To 
include the African population in the ranks of those with rights to wildlife would have meant 
multiplication of competitors, a factor certainly not in the interests of the settlers.  Thus, a strategy of 
struggling on their own served the settlers better, in the hope that the state would give in to the 
settlers’ demands for devolution of wildlife property rights but deny the Africans.  From this 
perspective, the failure of the settlers and the Africans to unite against the state strategy had nothing 
to do with the superior treatment settlers received.  If they were treated as superior (whether superior 
to animals or Africans is not clear, given that the problem is one of giving game more attention than 
humans, p. 98), then the settlers and the Africans did not have a similar problem.  This is actually 
Maforo’s argument (Maforo, 1979).  The settlers’ choice of strategy was not based on their being 
treated better than the Africans.  It was premised on the consideration of what property rights in 
wildlife should be in effect.  Their answer to the question was in terms of a property rights regime 
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The settlers could not have struggled for a transformation of wildlife property rights that 
would have brought on board the Africans as equal participants in the appropriation of 
wildlife largesse.  There would be no value added in settlers’ vouching for a transformation 
of the property rights regime that would bring in competitors whose numerical 
preponderance was superior to their own.  Consequently, they engaged the wildlife 
legislations with a view to fashioning them to accommodate settler interests.   
Because the Ordinances defined the property rights regime in effect at the time, we 
review them briefly here and then examine their impact and how the society responded to 
them.  Some of the Ordinances included the 1900 East African Game Regulations (published 
and allowed by the Secretary of State in February 22, 1901); subsequent Ordinances passed 
prior to 195096 largely dealt with the ground covered in the East African Game Regulations 
(1900).  These Ordinances were passed in 1906, 1921, 1928, 1932 and 1937 (Kelly, 1978; 
Maforo, 1979; Ofcansky, 2002).  These Ordinances first took control of game animals and 
later on both the game and their habitat (through the declaration of national parks).   
The 1900 East African Game Regulations imposed the first effective control over 
wildlife by the colonial state.  The regulations introduced a system of licensed hunting that 
forbade hunting, killing or capture of certain animals save with the authority of the state, 
issued through a license.  These licenses were to be issued to sports hunters, public officers 
and settlers for a fee.  Thus, while hunting, killing or capture of certain animals was 
proscribed, there were exemptions (made through licensing) that meant that some inhabitants 
                                                                                                                                                       
that discriminated against the indigenous population.  This was the reason why there was no 
convergence of interests and opposition against the state.  
 
96After 1950, the colonial authorities began to lessen their monopoly of control over wildlife property 
rights.  The first step was the enactment of the 1951 Wild Animals Protection Ordinance that started 
devolving certain rights to Africans. 
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could secure wildlife property rights while others would not.  Moreover, the proscription 
applied only to some scheduled animals, while property rights in other animals were fair 
game for people (not Africans) interested in hunting.  Article 10, for example, stated that, 
“Save as provided by these Regulations, any person may hunt, kill or capture any animal not 
mentioned in any of the schedules, or any fish” (Game Regulations, 1900).         
It is then evident that right from the onset, the colonial state took possession of 
wildlife, and imposed its preferred property rights regime on the populations of the state.  
This imposition, while having its share of admirers, produced several casualties, as a result of 
which the wildlife sector was henceforth a terrain of struggle (this continues today, as will be 
shown in the next chapter).  The colonial imposition of monopoly on wildlife property rights 
was welcomed by sports hunters (because they were interested in preventing game from 
being an open access resource with the possible threat of extinction; disappearance of the 
game would have ruined the opportunity to have it for their sport next time round).97  It was 
also welcomed by animal welfare groups (who were opposed to the wanton suffering visited 
on game in what can be called the age of mass game slaughter in Kenya).  The two groups 
then, in their response to the colonial wildlife laws would pursue the same cause, though with 
contradictory motives.  On the other hand, other actors in the wildlife sector, such as settlers, 
traders in wildlife products and Africans, felt aggrieved.   
The settlers did welcome the game laws but with the proviso that they were not 
constrained from protecting their property from wildlife damage.  Settlers were concerned 
                                                 
97In Central Africa, hunters even opposed the establishment of white settlements, which they blamed 
for the extermination of game.  One observer is said to have urged “...in 1891 that the BSAC 
territories should be preserved as a happy hunting ground for commercial killer and gentleman 
sportsman and not as a field for settlement” (MacKenzie, 1987: 56 ref. to Lord Randolph Churchill).  
Others blamed hunting parties for the decline in game numbers.  Thus, the struggle for wildlife 
property rights was multi-faceted, and not just a state versus society affair. 
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that the state enacted laws prohibiting killing of wildlife even when it was a vermin.  
Although settlers were allowed to shoot marauding wildlife that was wreaking havoc on 
property, certain Royal Game was protected and the settlers could not just shoot it 
(Legislative Council debates as cited by Maforo, 1979: 138, 143).  Consequently, in the 
Legislative Council, advocates of settler interests contended that when it came to the 
preservation of game and settlement, the latter should prevail.  By 1926, an advocate of white 
settler interests in the Legislative Council argued that game preservation was costly to the 
settlers and existed at the expense of the settlers.  Arguing that game was a luxury, he further 
contended that if it came to the choice between game and settlement, he would vote for 
settlement (Maforo, 1979: 136-137).   
The settlers may have considered game a luxury because they obtained no benefit 
from it.  The failure to extract benefits from wildlife occurred because wildlife property 
rights were monopolized by the state.  The state, for example, while allowing setters to kill 
animals to protect property also legislated that settlers surrender trophies from such animals 
to the state (1906 Ordinance, quoted in Maforo, 1979: 104-05).  Thus the settlers were being 
denied access even to dead game that had visited damage to their property at a time when the 
government had no compensation regime for such wildlife damage to private property.  
Indeed, by 1937, the government required the settlers to report to the District Commissioner 
cases of wildlife shot as vermin; and such wildlife remained the property of the government.  
This step was taken in an attempt to seal loopholes that settlers were thought likely to exploit 
in order to access game illegally.  The government expressed apprehension that shooting 
parties could be organized that would disguise themselves as an effort to protect against 
damage from animals (Maforo, 197:151).   
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Thus, although the settlers could appear to have been a more privileged class in the 
colonial state than their African counterparts (as Kameri-Mbote, 2002 suggests), they were 
constantly on a collision course with the state over wildlife property rights.  While the settlers 
did not necessarily contest the legitimacy of the state’s claim to wildlife ownership, the 
central question was, who was to pay for the preservation of wildlife (within the context of 
its destructive activity).  This question would not have been necessary if the settlers had 
property rights over wildlife in their lands, thereby relieving wildlife of the epithet of a 
nuisance in the estimation of the settlers.  The failure to resolve this question can be 
hypothesized in terms of the state not seeing the need to contract for a different regime of 
wildlife property rights.  To the state, such contracting would mean sharing with the settlers 
the badly-needed revenue from wildlife, a free bounty of nature, thereby dissipating rent at a 
time when the settlers did not pose a credible threat to either the existence of the wildlife as a 
resource or the life of the state.98  The state also seems to have considered the settlers as not 
credible because even after the state gave settlers some concessions, it would ring them with 
safeguards for fear that settlers were prone to defection.  This may partly explain why settlers 
were supposed, for example, to report game they shot as vermin to the District 
Commissioner.  Hence, the state’s strategy was to impose its preferred property rights regime 
and then negotiate with the settlers within that context.  Consequently, in subsequent Game 
Ordinances (1906-45), settlers did battle with the state over issues such as the number of 
problem animals they could kill, their variety, and the circumstances of shooting such 
animals.   
                                                 
98In any case, there were equally pressing issues related to land acquisition from the Africans and 
provision of African labor that the settlers relied on the state to deliver.  Settlers, occupying hostile 
territory, possibly needed the state as much as it needed them to develop agriculture as the mainstay 
of the economy.  Thus the state may have known that the settlers could be a nuisance, but that they 
could not go beyond that.  
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Nevertheless, the opportunity that the settlers had to wring concessions from the state 
was not available for the other aggrieved actors such as the traders and the Africans, the latter 
for a while.  Traders, who were simply interested in game products--a taste they developed 
before both the IBEA Company and, later, the colonial state consolidated sway over the 
territory--felt alienated from harvesting wildlife that they had come to consider as an open 
access resource.  The pioneer column of European ivory harvesters, plus their Arab and 
African counterparts, took any game they wanted (Steinhart, 2006).  The alienation of these 
resources by the colonial state led these erstwhile users or their successors to turn to 
poaching (Steinhart, 2006; Maforo, 1979), a clear indication that they resented state control 
of wildlife property rights that would now require them to pay license fees before accessing 
game.  This group could be expected to have either fizzled out or adapted to the new wildlife 
property rights regime imposed by the state, because there was no way the state was going to 
negotiate a continuation of the dispensation that obtained on the eve of colonial rule, and to 
some extent into the colonial era before the colonial state developed its grip on the colony. 
The Africans were in a more precarious situation than either the traders (of whom 
they were a part) or the white settlers.  In the first instance, Africans were even excluded 
from the 1900 East African Game Regulations exemption that allowed “any person” to hunt 
wildlife not mentioned in the schedules to those regulations.  Africans could only be allowed 
to hunt, kill or capture wildlife through a different exemption procedure but which did not 
make reference to the right to hunt, kill or capture other animals not included in the schedules 
of the 1900 East African Game Regulations.  Thus, while the prohibitions placed on non-
Africans were conditional, for the Africans, the hunting prohibition was total unless they 
were given special exemption from the Chief Native Commissioner.   
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Africans could only access wildlife if they were seen to “…appear to be dependent on 
the flesh of wild animals for their subsistence…” (Game Regulations, 1900, article 26).  In 
that case, such people could be authorized by the Chief Native Commissioner to access 
certain game and under certain conditions that the Commissioner may set.  Similarly, under 
article 27, Africans could get a sports hunter’s or settler’s license upon such terms and 
conditions as the Chief Native Commission may prescribe.  Thus, it is clear that without 
these two exemptions, Africans were cut off from wildlife largesse, unlike other inhabitants 
of the colonial state. 
Of course a case can be made that for Africans, the proscription against hunting of 
wildlife was only nominal because the state’s capacity for enforcement of game laws in 
African areas was minimal.  To this extent, Africans could continue harvesting wildlife with 
just a little imagination and effort to evade whatever traces of authority could be there.99 The 
scenario, however, was more complicated than the question of the state’s capacity to enforce 
game laws.  As MacKenzie has observed,  
Game regulations were largely irrelevant to Africans: their access to game was 
denied through the operation of gun laws, together with the fact that game 
became extremely scarce in areas of dense human settlement like the reserves 
(MacKenzie, 1987:57). 
 
The scarcity of game would imply that Africans would have to move far and wide from their 
place of abode in search of game, and this could then increase their odds of having a brush 
with the law.  It is possibly in this context that Sir Frederick Jackson found the Kamba 
suffering from the famine of 1899 and yet they were not hunting; he wondered why the 
colonial administration had not endeavored to alleviate the famine by permitting hunting 
                                                 
99This is so given that there are problems of collective action and those breaking the law could be 
reported to the authorities. 
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(MacKenzie, 1987: 57-8).  As Steinhart (2006) has shown, by the time of the imposition of 
colonial rule, the Kamba were already hunting far from their areas.  But if they were to 
continue hunting in such outlying areas, they would have been vulnerable to apprehension 
even when the legal enforcement mechanisms were not sophisticated.  Thus, the scarcity of 
game conspired with the game laws and undermined the economic right (Barzel, 1997) to 
game that would have been otherwise helpful for the Kamba even after they had been denied 
the legal right to hunt game.100 
An even more ominous denial of wildlife property rights was visited on the African 
population with the establishment of game reserves under Article 11 of the Game 
Regulations.  Once such reserves were established, presence in them was largely 
criminalized.  The Article states  
Save as provided in these Regulations or by any such Proclamations, any person 
who, unless he is authorized by a special license, hunts, kills, or captures any 
animal whatever in a game reserve, or is found within a game reserve under 
circumstances showing that he was unlawfully in pursuit of any animal, shall be 
guilty of a breach of these regulations (East African Game Regulations, 1900). 
This was tricky for Africans living next to areas declared game reserves because the 
demarcations of such areas was not marked on the ground, and therefore they could not know 
when they were beyond the boundary of the reserve.  And, of course, the decision of whether 
they were inside the game reserve in pursuit of game was discretionary to the racially-tinged 
authorities. 
In certain respects, the colonial administration provided opportunities for Africans to 
access wildlife property rights, even if only by default.  Perhaps knowing that there was a lot 
                                                 
100Though Steinhart (2006: 55) avers that in the colonial period the Kamba continued to hunt, 
disguising their poaching as defense of life or property, this contention is problematic.  There is a 
view, which Steinhart (2006: 164-65) shares, that Africans were denied the right (enjoyed by the 
European settlers) of shooting destructive wildlife, but were allowed to chase animals using sticks, 
fire and stones and relay information to the Game Department. The colonial authorities would then 
shoot game.   
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of ivory lying around with Africans (which they may have gotten in various ways, including 
from elephants dying of natural causes), and also because they knew they were ineffectual in 
enforcing their game laws, the colonial authorities sought to play some cooperation game 
with the Africans with respect to the ivory trade.  This entailed paying rewards to Africans 
who delivered found ivory, provided it was thought not to have been poached and then 
presented as found ivory.  Rewards were also to be paid for informants if their tips led to the 
recovery of poached ivory. 101   Though there were opposing voices, this program was 
implemented and as we observed above, in certain areas like the Coast province, Africans 
were paid money that even exceeded the tax revenue.  This program was one way in which 
colonial authorities saw a net gain in contracting for a wildlife property rights regime that 
would also benefit Africans.  The state sold ivory delivered by Africans at thrice the rate they 
paid for the reward (Kelly, 1978; Maforo, 1979).  Thus, they were not contracting with the 
Africans either for the benefit of conservation or the Africans.102  Such contracting was to 
take shape in the post-Second World War period. 
After the Second World War, colonial wildlife policies began to reflect some concern 
for African interests in wildlife property rights.  At the legislative level, two Ordinances that 
recognized Africans’ stake in wildlife largesse were passed.  These were the Wild Animals 
Protection Ordinance 1951, and National Parks Ordinance, 1945.  The latter provided for 
                                                 
101There was a lot of controversy over the plan, with some critics saying it would encourage Africans 
to poach ivory and then claim they found it in the bush, or had it prior to the ban on possession of 
trophies.  This opposition was in spite of buying regulations that stipulated that if ivory was raw, and 
therefore possibly poached, it would be confiscated and those presenting it penalized (see, for 
example, Maforo, 1979: 103, 152-53). 
 
102Colonial authorities had consistently stonewalled against entreaties to compensate Africans for the 
heavy toll they suffered from wildlife.  Even when colonial officers in African reserves relayed 
information on the extent of wildlife damage to African property, such petitions were ignored 
(Maforo, 1979:177).  Thus, there were pro-African voices in the struggle for wildlife property rights 
even among colonial administrators. 
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consultation with Africans, through the Native Lands Trust Board, whenever their lands were 
to be alienated for wildlife purposes (Maforo, 1979:193).  However, this did not indicate 
whether Africans had veto powers or if the consultation was just a legitimating one, where 
the declaration of a national park would nevertheless go ahead, their protestations 
notwithstanding.  Pursuant to this Ordinance, the Royal National Parks of Kenya, led by 
trustees, was set up to be in charge of National Parks.  In 1952, the Southern Game Reserve 
was replaced by three National Reserves (among them Amboseli) and Maasai Mara.  These 
reserves were placed under the administration of trustees (Lindsay, 1987:154).  The 
declaration of these areas as National Reserves did not transform the wildlife property rights 
relations in any fundamental way.  Although hunting was prohibited in the reserves, this was 
of no consequence to Africans because they were not allowed to hunt, anyway.  In Amboseli, 
a fundamental problem would have obtained if they had been forbidden from herding their 
livestock in the reserve, but this did not happen even though naturalists continued to raise 
eyebrows about the presence of Maasai cattle in the reserve (Lindsay, 1987:154). 
The fundamental transformation in wildlife property rights relations was to come with 
the Wild Animals Protection Ordinance, 1951.  This allowed District Councils to levy fees on 
hunting enterprises and use the same for local needs.  In the first wave of linkage between 
benefits from wildlife and conservation, it was claimed during Legislative Council debates 
that if Africans benefited from game proceeds, they would appreciate wildlife preservation 
(Maforo, 1979:203).103  In a further push of this policy, an amendment to the 1951 Ordinance 
was effected in 1957 which brought game fees in African District land units at par with 
government charges.  Moreover, controlled areas were created in African land units in which 
                                                 
103The white constituency was, however, not receptive to the idea of sharing wildlife revenue with 
Africans.  The official proponents claimed that the proceeds were to help put up infrastructure that 
would boost tourism, travel, and sport (Maforo, 1979: 203). 
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African District Councils had powers to pass by-laws (Maforo, 1979:219-220).  While these 
steps could be seen as the first real shift towards having Africans access wildlife property 
rights, it is still difficult to take them as conclusive evidence that the colonial authorities were 
prepared to devolve property rights in wildlife to local communities.  The colonial 
authorities, even at the tail end of colonial rule still seemed determined to retain state control 
over wildlife largesse, the concessions to communities notwithstanding.   
The report of a Game Policy Committee, issued in 1957/58 and adopted as a 
government Game Policy in 1959/60, attests to this observation.  While the report conceded 
that the future of game in Kenya depended on the attitude of the people of Kenya (Colony, 
1959 sec. (5)(1)), and hence, one would expect that the state would use this as an impetus to 
devolution, it was still not able to countenance devolving property rights to them.  To the 
contrary, a regime of strong central control still pervades the position taken in the policy.  
The government insisted that  
The determination of policy in regard to proper land usage, in which game 
preservation is a factor, is a matter of national importance.  Ultimate 
responsibility both for formulating policy and for ensuring that the policy is 
effectively carried out must therefore rest with the Government (Colony, 1959 
(2). 
 
Although this in itself does not preclude the government from making policies that devolve 
wildlife property rights to communities, it at least emerges that that is not what they intended 
to do.   
In elaborating its view as to what constitutes the bedrock of game preservation, 
contrary to the proponents of community-based conservation that this bedrock is to be found 
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among communities, the state was of the view that game preservation was a fortress 
exercise.104  The policy emphasized that  
In the last resort the complete preservation of game can only be assured fully in 
national parks.  The Government must look to the Trustees of the Royal 
National Parks to provide the main bastion in its long-term game preservation 
policy.  The Government will maintain existing parks.  The Government will 
consider what control measures will be possible in areas adjoining National 
Parks (Colony, 1959 (3)(2).105 
 
Moreover, the government rejected the Game Policy committee’s proposal to set up local 
game reserve committees with statutory recognition in respect of every game reserve.  
Rather, it held that should such a committee be desirable, the “Government would consider 
each case on its merits” (Colony, 1959, part I, 2 ii).  Thus in spite of the concessions it had 
made in revenue sharing and provisions for consultation in alienating land for preservation of 
game, colonial authorities were sending an equally strong signal that game control was the 
preserve of the state.   
Nevertheless, the government was soon to undermine this position in a step that 
marked a further transformation of wildlife property rights.  In 1961, both Amboseli and 
Maasai Mara national reserves were converted into game reserves and placed, respectively, 
under the Kajiado and Narok District African Councils.  This conversion took place against a 
background of lobbying by hunters, naturalists and Royal National Park trustees who wanted 
the national reserves (especially Amboseli) declared national parks.  Their desire had been to 
eject the Maasai from Amboseli basin because they feared that Maasai cattle were displacing 
                                                 
104Brockington (2002) has used the phrase “Fortress conservation” in respect to the eviction of the 
Maasai from Mkomazi Game Reserve to preserve it as a pristine habitat for wildlife even though the 
Maasai had lived with the wildlife for a long time. 
 
105This alleged commitment to trustees would shortly be subverted, as is shown below, when the 
government transferred Amboseli to Kajiado African District Council without consulting the trustees 
(Lindsay, 1987: 155; Ofcansky, 2002). 
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wildlife; yet the proponents of the parks system wished to see Amboseli preserved as a 
pristine area (Lindsay, 1987:154).  However, this pressure for a park status was being 
contained by the Game Department that wished to have these areas remain as game reserves, 
and hence, under their sway. 106   At the same time, the African District Councils were 
bargaining with the colonial authority for a stake in the reserves if they were to retain them as 
wildlife preservation areas in the post-independence era.  The colonial authorities bought into 
the promise by the African District Councils that Africans would preserve the reserves if they 
were benefiting from them.  Thus, in 1961 both Amboseli and Maasai Mara were moved to 
Kajiado and Narok African District Councils, respectively, to be district game reserves. 
This can be called the first major step in devolution of wildlife property rights to local 
(and especially African) communities.  Maasai Mara was to enjoy this status to the present 
day, while Amboseli was to experience a reversal from district game reserves to National 
Parks status in 1974.107  The 1961 devolution to district game reserves status meant that 
wildlife would receive some protection, but communities would benefit from wildlife.  The 
transformation of wildlife property rights that went with this devolution largely favored the 
Maasai as a community.  In Amboseli, the Kajiado African District Council was to collect 
revenue from Amboseli.  In return, the Council negotiated with the Maasai in Amboseli for a 
livestock free zone that was to be used only by wildlife (Talbot and Olindo, 1990).  On its 
                                                 
106While national parks trustees were in charge of animals in the parks, the Game Department was in 
charge of those outside; thus carving out a park in an area meant reducing the bureaucratic necessity 
for the Game Department, something they seemed to wish to avoid. 
 
107The status was again reversed to a reserve in 2005.  But a coalition of conservationists has moved 
to court to challenge the decision.  The reversal has thus not been effected. 
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part, the Council was to provide the Maasai with social services in lieu of utilization of the 
exclusive wildlife zone.   
In Maasai Mara, the colonial authorities contracted with the Maasai for a wildlife 
property rights regime that provided for land alienation from everyday Maasai use; a certain 
area in the Mara reserve was to be free of human activity (save tourist facilities).  This was a 
cost to the Maasai.  On the other hand, however, there were benefits.  The reserve was to be 
administered wholly by Narok African District council.  The Council would collect rents and 
develop infrastructure in the reserve.  Part of the fees was to be used for social services for 
communities adjacent to reserve, with signs indicating that the funds were generated from the 
reserves.108  Moreover, the council was to run hunting blocks outside the Mara reserve and 
collect fees from the same.  The tourist hunting fees were supposed to go to villagers on 
whose land hunting blocks were located.  The government was also to collect game license 
fees from the hunting enterprises (Talbot and Olindo, 1990: 69). 
Thus, by the time of independence the ownership of both Amboseli and Maasai Mara 
wildlife reserves had been transferred from the colonial government to local communities.  
What then had been the legacy of wildlife property rights in Maasailand during the colonial 
period?  As mentioned earlier, colonial declaration of a Queen’s dominion in Kenya implied 
loss of, inter alia, wildlife property rights by Africans, and to a lesser extent, the whites, both 
settlers and others.  In Maasailand, this loss was experienced by the Maasai in terms of loss 
of legal access to game, given the restrictions on licensing, hunting methods and trade in 
                                                 
108The need to link provision of social services with wildlife is certainly an attempt to buy space for 
wildlife in people’s imagination.  This is the logic of community-based conservation today.  What is 
not yet clear is the extent to which the proponents of the devolution project sought to negotiate the 
divide between public and private goods as they tried to lure the Maasai into conservation.  It would 
appear it was assumed that the communal spirit of the Maasai would suffice: if the community 
benefits, it will vote with wildlife. 
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wildlife productions imposed by the state.  There was also loss of compensation for diseases 
and predations on livestock and people caused by wildlife.   
 While in the precolonial period no one actually paid compensation as such, the fact 
that Maasai made use of wildlife in whatever ways they may have wished could itself be 
conceptualized as a proxy to compensation, just as the evening out, through hunting and 
killing wildlife in retaliation for predation, could be seen as a form of compensation.  The 
fact that all of these practices were now proscribed meant that there should have been 
instituted a form of compensation for victims of wildlife damage.  Under colonial control of 
wildlife, neither the precolonial type of compensation, nor a new compensation regime was 
in place.  This absence implied that wildlife property rights were tilted against the Maasai.  
The oppressive character of this wildlife property rights relations situation becomes more 
pronounced when one considers, for example, that colonial authorities provided for ways to 
insulate wildlife against sick cattle, and not vice versa.   The London Convention, in its 
efforts to preserve the wildlife of Africa, called for “Applications of measures, such as the 
supervision of sick cattle...for preventing the transmission of contagious diseases from 
domestic animals to wild animals” (London Convention, 1900: article II, 12).  No provisions 
about cattle’s vulnerability to such diseases as malignant catarrh are provided for in the 
Convention.    
Apart from loss of legal access to game and compensation, the land question has also 
been identified as another way in which the Africans lost out in the process of colonial 
imposition of wildlife property rights.  Land was alienated for wildlife and, in the case of 
land declared national park, it was out of bounds for unauthorized persons and human 
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activity, including hunting,109 grazing, foraging or farming.  Grazing was particularly critical 
for communities living in areas where the dry season grazing and watering spaces were 
proclaimed wildlife protected areas.  As Kameri-Mbote has observed,  
The confinement of these resources within parks where they were not available 
for use represented a social cost to the communities, which cost was not paid 
for.  Parks were promoted as single land-use areas and people denied access to 
the resources contained therein (Kameri-Mbote, 2002: 97-98; and see also p.91).  
 
While this observation may explain the situation in other places, it fails to capture the nature 
of wildlife property rights struggles in Maasailand.  During the colonial era, wildlife 
protected areas in Maasailand were not promoted as a single land-use regime.  The Maasai 
did not have any contest with colonial authorities over access to areas designated wildlife 
reserves, even though the first wildlife reserves were declared in their areas (contrary to the 
impression given in Kameri-Mbote, 2002: 91).  The Maasai retained access to grazing and 
watering places in the reserves until after the colonial authorities handed over the reserves to 
the respective African District Councils.  Indeed, the question of property rights over wildlife 
reserves was a contest between the colonial government, nature preservationists and hunters 
who wanted the Maasai kept out of Amboseli reserve, but the government never acceded to 
these pressures.  In Maasai Mara, the issue of keeping Maasai out of the reserve did not flare 
up because they themselves kept off the core of the reserve; it was tsetse-fly infested up to 
late 1950s, when they began to invade these areas through burning (Talbot and Olindo, 
1990).  Thus, Maasai contestation with the colonial state over land was in spite of the 
declaration of wildlife protected areas, unlike in other areas, such as Serengeti, where 
                                                 
109I do not consider this to be of much relevance to Africans because prohibition on hunting was more 
generic and not restricted to the protected areas.  The latter could affect whites who were allowed to 
hunt in open areas, but Africans were under a permanent ban, game reserves or no game reserves. 
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national parks were established and the Maasai evicted from them (Maasai Agreement, 
1958). 
From the foregoing, it can then be submitted that colonial authorities had a clear view 
of what they wanted from wildlife.  This is contrary to Kameri-Mbote’s (2002: 89) 
contention that objectives of game conservation in colonial period were haphazard and not 
well thought out.  This state of affairs she attributes to the dominance of interests in 
agriculture that blinded the colonial authorities from seeing the importance of wildlif--which 
was, therefore, perceived as a menace or vermin and thus shot indiscriminately.  To the 
contrary, wildlife property rights were a signal pillar of the colonial scheme of things.  It 
would appear that Kameri-Mbote (2002: 89) and Maforo (1979) conflate the colonial state 
with settlers and see the game question as that of colonists versus Africans, thereby blurring 
the distinction otherwise discernible even in their works between the colonial state and the 
rest of society, including the white setters.   
The issue at stake is that of contestation over devolution of wildlife property rights to 
the rest of society, whether white or black.  Both of these are contesting with the state, albeit 
for a different status of property rights:  The colonial state had an elaborate clarity on wildlife 
as state property and consequently appropriated the same to itself.  Beginning with the advent 
of the colonial state (see, for example, Lord Cranworth 1919), through the twilight of 
colonialism (Colony, 1959), colonial state actors were clear on the centrality of wildlife to 
the economy of the colony.  In 1951, Cooke argued that, 
Game is a great asset to this country and it is an asset which we are fortunately  
able to cash in on, if I may use the expression.  In a country where there are 
very few minerals or other assets, it is, as the Honorable Mover indicated, a 
revenue-earning department and, indeed it is also, fortunately, a dollar earning 
one (Leg co debate, 1951, quoted by Maforo, 1979: 213) 
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Similarly, in the Game Policy of 1959, the government conceded that  
game is the most important tourist attraction in the country and that the tourist 
industry is of considerable economic importance.  Proper land usage, …must 
take into consideration the asset of wild life, as forming a part of the natural 
wealth of the country, so as to preserve the conditions under which the tourist 
industry can expand (Colony, 1959: 1 (i)).  
 
These observations, considered in line with the returns from ivory referred to earlier, show 
that the colonial state could not have been party to the indiscriminate shooting of wildlife as 
vermin.   
Indeed, the settlers’ right to shoot destructive wildlife was won incrementally and 
only through a bitter struggle with the state (Kelly, 1978; Maforo, 1979).  The indiscriminate 
shooting was done outside state connivance (and even when done by state officials, it was a 
case of a principal-agent problem).  This shooting does not even represent an evaluation of 
game as less sturdy than agriculture in the economic estimation of the settlers; rather, the 
settlers could be seen as using the vermin card as a camouflage for accessing wildlife goods 
which they considered as public goods anyway, and hence a welcome supplement to the yet 
to flourish agricultural sector.  From the days of adventure hunters, it was clear that there 
were enough side payments that could be secured from selling trophies to subsidize an 
individual’s trip to Africa or whatever other enterprise one was engaged in within the 
continent (Steinhart, 2006; MacKenzie, 1987).  Colonial records are also replete with reports 
of settlers indulging in poaching.  In Legislative council debates, a Member for Agriculture, 
while addressing a question on poaching, stated: 
We have had quite a number of cases, and I may say this has not specifically 
referred to the Africans--on the contrary, it is more common to other races—in 
which it is alleged that the defense of property has necessitated the slaughtering 
of certain animals…. (Leg co, debate, 1951, reel 16 p. 326 quoted in Maforo, 
1979: 207).  
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This association of whites with indiscriminate shooting of game can also be understood in the 
light of the previous Ordinances that required settlers to report the game they shot as vermin 
to the District Commissioner and to have the trophies as state property.  The objective of this 
requirement was to curb hunting parties disguised as vermin control. 
There is also a tendency to see the wildlife question as one of race relations, rather 
than as property relations being contested between the state and society (Kameri-Mbote 
(2002; Maforo, 1979).  Kameri-Mbote (2002: 91), for example, argues that within the general 
schema of colonial expropriation of African lands and resources for preservation of game, 
“the rights of the settler farmers to their land and other resources found in them were 
rigorously protected.”  This is misreading the wildlife property rights relations that existed 
between the state and the settlers.  While the settlers had the legal right to deal with problem 
animals, such right did not give them control over wildlife resources in their lands.  Wildlife 
within settler farms was state property and was subject to prevailing Game Ordinances, 
among them those that stipulated that game shot during problem animal control remained the 
property of the state.  In certain cases, settlers were not even allowed to shoot certain game, 
considered royal game, even under the concession of problem animal control.  Consequently, 
there were running battles between the settlers and the state over whether some of these 
animals, especially those which were quite destructive, deserved to be protected.  Thus in 
matters of wildlife property rights, the white settlers did not own wildlife in their lands any 
more than the Africans did.  The white settlers, just like the Africans, often found themselves 
reduced to poaching in order to fulfill their desire for game, even though they had more 
opportunities for access to wildlife than the Africans.  
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The colonial transformation of wildlife property rights can be summed up thus: at the 
time of the imposition of the colonial state in Africa, decentralized societies like those mostly 
found in Kenya enjoyed a fluid wildlife property rights regime.  The property rights relations 
between the nascent colonial state, the Africans and the whites could rightly be characterized 
as that of the right of capture; wildlife was largely an open-access resource.  The initial claim 
to the ownership of wildlife by the bulging colonial state remained just that—a claim.  
Nevertheless, as the colonial state brought the inhabitants under its effective sway, it was 
able to impose through force a transformation of property rights in, among other domains, 
wildlife.  This imposition by force was in contradistinction to what obtained elsewhere, as in 
centralized societies where negotiating treaties with the rulers of the various polities could be 
employed as an alternative to force.  The former was the case in Toro, while the latter 
obtained among, for example, the Shona and the Ndebele (Naughton-Treves, 1999; 
MacKenzie, 1987).  Thus, superior weaponry, not market relations, transformed wildlife 
property rights relations in Kenya.110 
 The ensuing struggle for wildlife property rights entailed a contest between two state 
institutions: the Game Department and the Royal National Parks, and between the state and 
society (both various segments of white community and Africans).  Within the latter struggle, 
the dominant theme was that the state was unwilling to devolve wildlife property rights in 
toto to locals (both white and Africans) living with the wildlife.  Thus the scenario that 
unfolded shows the take-over of wildlife by the colonial state by force.  Some rights were 
then allowed for both the settlers and the hunting-gathering societies.  Devolution was 
effected incrementally as a bundle of rights to society, amidst contested claims by the various 
                                                 
110See, for example, Anderson and Hill (2004) on the role of weaponry in the transformation of 
property rights in the American West. 
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wildlife institutions of the state, settlers and Africans.  After 1945, decisive steps were taken 
to give Africans a greater stake in wildlife, in spite of opposition from other actors in the 
wildlife sector--such as the preservationists and the hunters.  These steps culminated in the 
transfer of both Amboseli and Maasai Mara to the local African District Councils in 1961.   
Thus, with respect to Maasailand, the colonial state bequeathed to the postcolonial 
state and the Maasai a wildlife property rights regime that the Maasai could generally be 
comfortable with.  The struggle for wildlife property rights was, however, far from over.  
Those who had opposed the transfer of, for example, Amboseli to the Maasai were to 
continue with their campaign to wrestle these rights from the Maasai.  In so doing, they 
would have the ear of a state whose appetite for the revenue from the wildlife sector made it 
amenable to joining a coalition of those ready to raid the Maasai of their wildlife property 
rights.  This context was to define the struggle for wildlife property rights in Kenya (and for 
our specific reference, Maasailand as well) during the postcolonial era.  Thus, while the 
colonial state showed tendencies towards devolving wildlife property rights to local 
communities, these tendencies were largely to be clogged by the appetite of the postcolonial 
state to lay absolute claims over wildlife property rights. 
 
V  The State-Communities’ Struggle Becomes More Protracted 
the Postcolonial Phase 
   
Although the postcolonial state rode to power against a harsh criticism of the colonial 
wildlife policies, it was to maintain the same, and even intensify the colonial wildlife 
policies, on coming to power.  The postcolonial government’s position on wildlife 
recognized the latter as an important economic asset.  Under such circumstances, its desire to 
dominate the wildlife sector is not surprising.  In a resource-strapped economy, free-ranging 
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resources like wildlife would be jealously guarded as state property.  Nevertheless, due to the 
structural limitations confronting the state ownership of wildlife, the state was forced into the 
rhetoric of devolution of wildlife property rights to local communities.  While the state 
claimed absolute ownership of wildlife, wildlife continued to intermingle with local 
communities in ways that the state was unable to prevent.  The result was strained 
community-wildlife relations that spelt doom for the future of wildlife.  This forced the state 
to be amenable to initiatives geared towards addressing local communities’ grievances 
against wildlife.  These initiatives assumed the dimension of devolving wildlife property 
rights to local communities.  An analysis of these devolution initiatives demonstrates that the 
state can only concede control of wildlife to local communities on the state’s own terms. 
 
VI Wildlife-People Position in the Imagination of the Postcolonial State 
The postcolonial state emerged against a background of a populist wildlife policy.  During 
the anti-colonial struggle, nationalist leaders promised people that they would abolish the 
hostile colonial wildlife policies (see, for example, Gibson, 1999).111  As indicated in the 
preceding pages, the wildlife landscape in the colonial era had been racialized to the extent 
that the Africans considered the whites as enjoying privileged access to wildlife.  The 
Maasai, for example, even when they may not have felt offended by exclusion from access to 
hunting, had grievances against wildlife because of the damage it imposed on them while 
they got nothing from it in return.  Hence, by 1958, their “attitude toward wildlife had 
                                                 
111However, Kaunda was later to claim that the nationalist rhetoric against colonial wildlife policy 
was a ploy to marshal support against colonialism.  The nationalist leaders never intended to abolish 
the colonial wildlife conservation structures because they had recognized the significance of wildlife 
(Gibson, 1999: 180, n. 138). 
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deteriorated to such an extent that most of them favored destruction of all wildlife animals in 
Amboseli” (Ofcansky, 2002:71, see also pp.104-105).  This situation was thus good fodder 
for nationalist agitation.   
Nevertheless, once colonial domination ceased, the postcolonial state not only 
retained the colonial wildlife ideology and practice (for example, of privileging a protected 
area system governed through a fines and fence approach), but also extended it (Gibson, 
1999).  In most countries, for example, while many more wildlife protected areas were 
added, none were opened up (to be a protected area system that included human activity) let 
alone being abolished altogether.  The leaders of the postcolonial state publicly advocated for 
the merit of wildlife conservation and hence, the need for the public to see wildlife 
conservation as not only a national duty, but as a human responsibility as well (Bonner, 
1993; Ofcansky, 2002; Steinhart, 2006).  Although these leaders posited the question of 
wildlife conservation in terms of the responsibility bestowed on society by the rest of the 
world and posterity, the role of wildlife in the economic health of the emerging state was also 
uppermost in their choice to conserve a wildlife estate.112  Given the political economy of 
underdevelopment of the emerging postcolonial state, the need to harness natural resources 
that could be exploited fairly easily (such as wildlife) was easily recognized.  
                                                 
112While this argument applies in Kenya, it has a practical problem in Tanzania.  Nyerere’s Ujamaa 
government seems to have had problems supporting a wildlife estate that was perceived to cater 
solely to a foreign clientele and out of reach for most Tanzanians.  Under Ujamaa, tourism was hotly 
debated, with some leftists arguing it was a bourgeois lifestyle inconsistent with socialist ideals.  
Other issues had to do with the possible exploitative nature of tourism (Myers, 1972; Shivji, 1973; 
Ofcansky, 2002; Waters, 2006).  Nevertheless, the argument could still hold because the limitation 
became relevant only towards the end of the first decade of independence.  Initially, Tanzania had 
taken the road to capitalist development; it only abandoned this after it failed to secure financial 
assistance it had factored into its first Five-Year Development Plan of 1964 (Ake, 1996:20).  
Consequently, it shifted to a socialist strategy in 1967.  In any case, in the Arusha Declaration section 
on the need to protect wildlife, Nyerere had underscored the role wildlife would play in people’s 
livelihoods (Ofcansky, 2002). 
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The Kenya government underscored in various statements the centrality of wildlife in 
the economic development of the state.  In these pronouncements, the state makes it crystal 
clear that the wildlife estate should be under its sway.  In an economic blueprint issued two 
years into independence, the state’s ownership of natural resources was clearly spelt out 
(RoK, 1965).  This laying of stake to state ownership of wildlife was motivated by the role 
the state saw wildlife playing in the economic development of the country.  The state 
observed that the “importance of wildlife to Kenya’s future prosperity must be appreciated 
by everyone and national parks and reserves must be protected and preserved” (RoK, 1965: 
para. 110).  In order to harness wildlife for this prosperity, the state in addition to promising 
to protect and preserve existing wildlife areas, also proposed, again for economic rationale, to 
create new wildlife protected areas.  The 1975 policy statement on wildlife provided that, 
The Government shall seek the creation of new National Parks and Reserves 
and County Council Reserves, in accordance with its over-riding objective to 
optimize returns from wildlife…. (RoK, 1975: par. 51)  
To operationalize this policy statement, the government had planned in its 1974-1978 
Development Plan to initiate a major development programme of new parks and reserves 
“…designed to fill an important gap in the development of the tourism industry” (RoK, 1974: 
180).  The state further observed that natural resources such as wildlife can be subject to 
thoughtless destruction which must thus be brought under control because it threatens the 
future of the nation (RoK, 1965: para. 110).  The linking of natural resources, among them 
wildlife, to prosperity, the future, and posterity can be seen as the laying of the foundation for 
the mentality of state expropriation of wildlife property rights.   
Having asserted the significance of these resources to the nation, the state then moved 
to claim the legitimacy of intruding in the production process, thereby reining in on, among 
others, wildlife property rights.  Proceeding from the way the state tackled the question of 
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land ownership, where the state was ready to concede individual title but yet not willing to be 
excluded from having a say in land management (RoK, 1965), it becomes apparent that the 
expropriation of wildlife by the state, and the denial of private wildlife property rights, would 
be a foregone conclusion.  With respect to the question of land ownership, the state argued 
that the African practice was different from the European tradition that recognized absolute 
ownership of land.   
Nevertheless, it also recognized that even in Europe, the tradition of absolute 
proprietorship has been discredited and that “today the right of the state to guide, plan, and 
even order the uses to which property will be put is universally recognized and 
unquestioned” (RoK, 1965: para. 29).  Grafting this latest development in Europe to Africa, 
the state argued that even though the ownership of land must be made more definite and 
explicit, it does not follow that society would give up its stake in how resources are used.  To 
buttress this desire for control, it observed that “Indeed, it is a fundamental characteristic of 
African Socialism that society has a duty to plan, guide and control the uses of all productive 
resources” (RoK, 1965: para. 30).  Thus, the state was justifying its intent to control natural 
resources.   
In a reference that reads like an a priori reply to the principal claims of the 
contemporary CBC argument, the state objected to the contention that private ownership 
would guarantee proper use of resources.  It averred that  
To imagine…that the appropriate ownership will guarantee the proper 
use of productive assets are errors of great magnitude.  Ownership can 
be abused whether private or public and ways must be found to control 
resource use in either case.  African Socialism must rely on planning 
to determine the appropriate uses of productive resources on a range of 
controls to ensure that plans are carried out (RoK, 1965: para. 31).   
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How did the state plan to determine the appropriate uses of productive resources such as 
wildlife?   
The state situated wildlife within the tourism sector.  The state viewed tourism with 
special interest “because it requires little or no subsidy, is an important source of foreign 
exchange, …and has a vast potential for growth” (RoK, 1965: para. 124).  Noting that 
Kenya’s tourism is basically premised on game viewing, the state, therefore, observed that 
“The long-term future of tourism in Kenya depends very much on conservation and 
management of wild life according to scientific principles” (RoK, 1965: para. 124).  The 
question that remained, then, was to decide who was to shoulder this responsibility.  In 
conceptualizing this responsibility, the state seems to have had no difficulties.  It concluded 
in a terse statement that “Parks, tourist roads and wild life management are Government 
functions” (RoK, 1965: para.125).  Thus, the state was clear that the wildlife sector was 
under its sway.   
In this scheme of things, the question of devolution of property rights to locals was, 
therefore, something that the state would only entertain on its own terms. With respect to the 
question of formulating policies to conserve natural resources, including wildlife, the state 
was to formulate the same while the people were merely to “….be fully informed of their 
role in conservation” (RoK, 1965: para.142, sec. 32).  It is then evident that the state did not 
intend to cede wildlife property rights to local communities.  This becomes apparent when 
the state issued a policy paper on wildlife conservation in which the spirit of the foregoing 
claim that the people were to be informed is put in practice.  With respect to the devolution 
of wildlife property rights to local communities, the 1975 statement on wildlife policy is, at 
best, a study in contradiction.  
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In the 1975 statement on wildlife conservation and management, the state reiterated 
its intent to control the wildlife sector.  As shown above, this intent was again situated within 
the context of the significance of wildlife to the national economy.  Thus, wildlife was 
conceptualized as property.  In the opening sentence of the government policy on wildlife 
management in Kenya, the government stated that its “…fundamental goal with respect to 
Wildlife is to optimize the returns from this resource,…” (RoK, 1975: par. 1).  This time, 
however, the local communities were included as part of those to benefit from the wildlife 
resources (RoK, 1975: par.8).  The 1975 Statement on wildlife policy was quite sensitive to 
the incorporation of landowners into the wildlife sector, but this incorporation was largely 
subordinated to the department of Wildlife Service.  Thus, even when the state wanted local 
communities to benefit from wildlife, this was to happen under the tutelage of the former.   
However, there is a sense in which the state seems to portray a split personality in the 
way it conceptualized relationship with local communities.  At one time it suggests that local 
communities should be free to conceive how they utilize wildlife, which suggests something 
akin to the state conceding devolution.  With respect to the relationship between the Wildlife 
Service and local communities, for example, it states that while the direct game management 
and regulation of commercial activities remained to be discussed,  
The main point, however, is that Wildlife Service Officers must cease 
to be mainly policemen, telling landowners what they cannot do, and 
increasingly become their advisers, in carrying out activities designed 
for their benefit (RoK, 1975: par. 37).   
 
This is precisely the language that local communities would like to hear.  It resonates well 
with their version of devolution.   
The problem, however, is that when the regulatory activities are introduced, the 
wildlife service agency is given such a discretion that its advisory role as conceived in the 
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foregoing citation is compromised.  The Minister and the Service are given powers to set up 
regulations to govern the wildlife sector.  The control given to them is such that even the 
statement concedes that that control is overarching.  It states,  
These blanket powers are sufficient to control every aspect of wildlife 
utilization.  It is important that many of these issues be handled by way 
of regulations rather than legislative provisions, in order that 
regulations may be flexible in the light of changing circumstances 
(RoK, 1975: par.39). 
 
Thus, even the policy statement admits that the powers of the state over wildlife are 
enormous.  The question of flexibility opens up room for administrative fiat.  This is 
discomforting to the landholder interested in entrepreneurship in the wildlife sector, because 
it hinders a regime of predictability that they would like to see in place within the sector.  
Such a situation then is not consistent with devolution of property rights to local 
communities.   
To the contrary, it entrenches state control of wildlife even under circumstances 
where the state would wish to involve local communities (as entrepreneurs in the wildlife 
industry).  The idea then is that involvement of local communities has to take place within 
the constraints of the state.  The state justified this situation thus:  
A large measure of administrative discretion regarding issue and 
withdrawal of licenses and permits is necessary, since it is difficult to 
secure evidence sufficiently conclusive, to lead to conviction in the 
Courts for infringement of some necessary game laws and regulations 
(RoK, 1975: par. 40). 
 
What emerges from this justification is the extent to which the state was averse to entrusting 
wildlife to other entities.  Consequently, it betrays the desire to cling to wildlife as a resource, 
while only allowing others to participate on its own terms (as opposed to the terms that the 
proponents of CBC put forward).   
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The desire of the state to bring the wildlife estate under its sway becomes even more 
evident with the state’s policy to take over even the wildlife protected areas hitherto under 
agencies other than the central government.  Some wildlife Reserves were under the 
respective local authorities (such as Amboseli and Maasai Mara) under arrangements set up 
by the departing colonial authorities.  The independent state pursued a policy that would see 
the Wildlife Service take over the management of these wildlife Reserves.  In its statement of 
policy towards parks, it held that 
The Wildlife Service shall eventually be responsible for management 
of all National Parks, National Reserves and County Council Game 
Reserves.  The dates at which the Wildlife Service takes over 
management of particular Reserves will depend upon financial and 
personnel availabilities, the ability of particular County Councils to 
manage their Reserves competently in the meantime, and the time 
required to negotiate acceptable agreements with each County Council 
(RoK, 1975: par.50; see also RoK, 1974: 181). 
 
Thus, what is revealed here is a desire towards centralization rather than devolution.  The 
state is pursuing its conviction as upheld in the 1965 policy cited earlier that the domain of 
productive resources, especially natural resources, falls under its sway.   
This conviction was given legal effect in the 1977 Wildlife Act.  The Act provided 
that areas administered by local authorities as game reserves could remain so but the 
Minister, after consultation with the local authorities, could direct otherwise (RoK, 1977a: 
sec. 18(6)).  This provision gives the state a window through which they could take even 
those wildlife property rights already enjoyed by certain local communities.  Thus the local 
authorities in charge of such reserves could never claim to have absolute powers over the 
reserves, in so far as the Minister reserved the right to intervene and possibly upset the status 
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quo.113  It is then evident that the state, having formed an opinion on the value of wildlife, 
moved to insulate itself against possibilities of losing control over wildlife to other actors on 
the scene.  Thus, it can then be observed that given the state’s conceptualization of wildlife as 
a state largesse, the state would be unwilling to devolve.  Nevertheless, the state faced certain 
constraints that forced it to concede the existence of other actors in the wildlife sector.  It was 
these constraints and the pressure from these other actors that were to force the state into the 
rhetoric of devolution.   
 
VII Compelling the State to Concede Wildlife Property Rights to Communities 
As shown above, the state was unequivocal in laying claim to the ownership of wildlife. 
Under ordinary circumstances it would have nothing to do with challenges to that ownership 
from other segments of society.  Certain structural limitations, however, forced it to focus on 
communities’ right to the wildlife largesse.  Wildlife, unlike other natural resources, poses a 
unique problem in its ownership.  This is because it is a fugitive resource, and secondly, it is 
pretty destructive to land-use activities other than its own proliferation.  This presents a dual 
challenge to its presumed owner--namely, that it can be easily appropriated, albeit illegally, 
by others, and it is also difficult to control it from inflicting damage on private property, 
thereby making the wildlife owner incur liability.  However, using its comparative advantage 
as the wielder of legitimate force, the state can impose its preferences on society with regard 
to the latter challenge.  It can, and does, decide not to recognize liability to damages imposed 
                                                 
113This had already happened with respect to Amboseli, while it is the locals’ militancy that has saved 
Narok’s Maasai Mara so that the state has so far not been able to do what it did with Amboseli.   
In 2004, for example, the Minister for Environment and Natural Resources had initiated moves to 
intervene in the Maasai Mara.  At a KWS wildlife conference, community members warned the 
minister against implementing the ideas he had on the Mara.  The issue seems to have died. 
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on other legal persons by wildlife.114   But while the state can get away with the latter 
challenge, it is constrained in terms of how it can deal with the former challenge.   
Illegal appropriation of wildlife can be legislated against, but enforcement 
mechanisms are, more often than not, beyond the capacity of the state.  The state law 
enforcement agencies cannot monitor wildlife wherever it goes.  Hence, with minimal effort, 
communities can appropriate wildlife as an open-access resource.  This illegal appropriation 
of game, known in local parlance as the bush meat trade, is said to be responsible for the 
massive decline in wildlife numbers in most of Africa, Kenya included (EAWLS 5: 2004; 
Barnett, 2002).  Wildlife sector observers argue that this phenomenon of bush meat trade 
could be arrested if communities had a stake in wildlife.  In the absence of such a stake, as is 
the case under absolute state ownership of wildlife, communities lack the incentive to check 
the bush meat menace. 
There is also another respect in which communities’ lack of interest in wildlife is seen 
as contributing to the decline in wildlife numbers.  This is in the destruction of wildlife 
habitat.  Although the state claims, and has instituted, a legal regime that empowers it to 
dictate land-use activities even on private land (see, for example, RoK, 1986; RoK, 1999), 
apparently it has been unable to implement land-use planning that would not be fatal to 
wildlife production.  Consequently, communities owning land that is also crucial as wildlife 
habitat continue to practice land-use strategies that destroy wildlife habitat.  Studies on 
wildlife decline suggest that such decline is proportional to the reduction of wildlife habitat 
as measured in terms of land being put under cultivation and thereby ceasing to support 
wildlife production (see, for example, Reid et al, 2002; DRSRS, 2004).   
                                                 
114 This happened, for example, in the 1989 amendment of the Wildlife (Conservation and 
Management) Act that removed compensation for farmers for damages from wildlife (RoK, 1989: 
sec. 11).   
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Thus, a combination of poaching and habitat loss came to be identified as responsible 
for wildlife decline, thereby leading the state and other conservation actors to think in terms 
of how communities can be brought in to help stem the tide of decline.  The result was a 
series of initiatives geared towards incorporating communities living with wildlife into the 
project of wildlife conservation.  These initiatives, discussed below, nevertheless failed to 
satisfy communities, and this led to their clamor for a more structured devolution strategy 
(i.e. devolution of a wildlife property rights regime that is embedded in law). 
 
VIII Initiatives in Devolution of Wildlife Property Rights by the Postcolonial State 
The initiatives that the state (and its conservation partners) took to accommodate 
communities in wildlife conservation assumed several forms.  These forms included quotas 
for wildlife harvesting (cropping and sports-hunting), revenue-sharing, leasing land to 
wildlife utilization (easements), and assistance in setting up wildlife enterprises.  Some of 
these initiatives, such as sports-hunting, were a continuation of what the independent state 
inherited from the colonial state.  This was perhaps the only fool-proof case of attempted 
devolution.  The other initiatives concern non-consumptive utilization, and because they take 
part in private land, to refer to them as instances of devolution of wildlife property rights to 
local communities would seem to present some difficulties.  Proprietors of either private or 
communal lands just take advantage of the presence of wildlife in their lands.  To do this, 
they do not need the signature of KWS because the sight of animals is not copyrighted.  
Seeing them, therefore, does not constitute a violation of any patent law.115  If anything, it 
                                                 
115There may be a problem in the argument, given the experience of Tanzania where appropriation of 
wildlife in private or communal lands is prohibited by the Wildlife Division.  The cross-referencing 
of the Kenyan situation with that of Tanzania is, however, erroneous.  In Tanzania, prohibition is 
embedded in law (albeit a contentious legislation) (MNRT, 2002a).  The Wildlife Division first 
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would appear that it is the landowners who are devolving land property rights to KWS; 
landowners are allowing KWS to come into their lands by making their lands habitable for 
wildlife.  Otherwise, if landowners are not to be conceived as devolving land property rights 
to the state for its wildlife, then the presence of wildlife in private land would constitute 
trespass, to the extent that the state claims ownership of wildlife.   
With respect to consumptive utilization, prior to the ban on hunting in 1977 (RoK, 
1977b) the state allowed landowners to run hunting blocks on their lands.  Sports-hunting 
outfitters were supposed to conduct hunting on private land only after producing written 
consent from such owners.  This was devolution of wildlife property rights to local 
communities at its best.  It was supported both by wildlife policy and wildlife law.  The 1975 
Wildlife Policy provided that  
At the option of the landowner the Wildlife Service will undertake to 
handle bookings for the parcel, subject to conditions specified by the 
landowner, to manage behavior of hunters on the land in accordance 
with those conditions,…and to collect and remit fees accruing to the 
landowner.  In case where the landowner elects to handle his own 
bookings, or to make other arrangements (e.g. concessions) the 
Wildlife Service must approve the bookings procedures…and the 
landowner must undertake to keep…relevant information required by 
the Service (RoK, 1975, par 71). 
Thus the Policy envisaged a situation whereby landowners would have full rights over 
wildlife assigned to them.  This right was given effect by the 1976 Wildlife Act (RoK, 
1977a).  The Act protected landowners from invasion by either the sports-hunters or the 
wildlife authorities.  The Act provided that a license officer could not endorse a hunting 
license unless, 
                                                                                                                                                       
declares private or communal lands to be Game Controlled Areas, prior to prohibiting the owners 
from wildlife use without the permission of the Wildlife Division.  Thus, there is an attempt to attack 
the ownership rights of such lands, making the situation in Tanzania different from Kenya’s.  In the 
latter, the law does not give KWS such powers (although land use may be regulated or alienated for 
wildlife conservation.  But the owners vacate the land and are compensated).   
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(a) the holder of the license is the owner of the land concerned; or 
(b) the person applying for endorsement produces to the licensing officer the 
written consent of the owner of the land thereto (RoK, 1977a, sec 29(1));  
 
It is clear then that the landowners even reserved the right to decide who hunts on their lands.  
In the event a landowner decided to register her land as a facility for hunting, such land could 
be registered by the Wildlife Service 
subject to such conditions as to the giving of notice to the 
landowner…or as to the types of animals which may be hunted, as the 
owner may specify (RoK, 1977a, sec 29(2 b)).   
 
In this case, the rights of the landowner included not just determining access to her land by 
the hunters, but also the type of animals to be hunted.  The landowners were also paid fees 
for the hunted animals in a proportion that was to be prescribed by the Service.   In case of 
lands under local authorities, fees were paid to the Council.  Both Narok and Kajiado County 
Councils were beneficiaries of this devolution of wildlife property rights.  In Kajiado, the 
Maasai already had a hunting association and they leased out hunting concessions (Western, 
1994).   
Apart from sports-hunting, the state also endeavored to expand the scope of wildlife 
utilization (that would presumably benefit landowners).  Between 1971 and 1977, the 
government together with donor agencies introduced a Wildlife Management Project in 
Kajiado district.  The project sought to explore the possibilities of starting game meat 
production in Kenya’s arid lands.  The evaluation of the project, after a pilot phase, 
concluded that game meat production was not viable; the project was, therefore, abandoned 
(Parkipuny and Berger, 1993; Western, 1994; Coffman, 2000; Kameri-Mbote, 2002).  Thus, 
by the time of the ban on hunting, communities were benefiting from devolution of wildlife 
property rights.  With the ban on hunting, they lost these rights already entrenched in law.  
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Since 1977 then, any wildlife property rights they have enjoyed have been at the pleasure of 
the bureaucrats at the Wildlife Service department; they have not been codified in statute.  
Two such wildlife property rights have been operational, namely, the wildlife utilization fee 
in Amboseli, and a pilot wildlife cropping project that was in force between 1992-2003.  
Narok was effectively edged out because Maasai Mara remained a reserve under the Narok 
County Council.  There was no pilot cropping scheme in Narok. 
Prior to 1974, the Maasai of Amboseli had wildlife property rights both in the 
Amboseli game reserve, and in wildlife outside the reserve.  When the government took over 
Amboseli in 1974 from Kajiado county council, the Maasai lost the former rights.  The latter 
right was lost with the ban on sports-hunting in 1977.  This latter loss was never mitigated, 
but the 1974 alienation of Amboseli basin had been mitigated through a bargain between the 
Maasai and the state.  The bargain covered the loss of use of Amboseli basin (the dry season 
grazing refuge for the Maasai), and the access of Maasai Group Ranches by wildlife during 
the wet season.  (Wildlife access to Group Ranch pasture was not an issue when the Maasai 
run Amboseli reserve because it was assumed that it was in their interests to maintain the 
wildlife range if Amboseli was to remain viable as a tourist destination, and hence an asset to 
the Maasai.  After the state took over Amboseli, the access of Maasai Group Ranch pasture 
had to be contracted for.)   
The Amboseli bargain was negotiated between 1974 and 1977.  The bargain gave the 
Maasai certain concessions in lieu of the loss of Amboseli to the state (Lindsay, 1987; Talbot 
and Olindo, 1990; Western, 1994).  These concessions included, inter alia, provision of water 
supply (piping from swamp and boreholes) for Maasai cattle in lieu of using the swamps 
inside the Amboseli basin.  There was to be revenue-sharing whereby the National Parks 
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Trustees were to run the park and collect the gate fees but the Maasai were to receive a share 
of the gate fees (oral sources claim this share was to be 25% of the gate collection) and the 
trustees were to retain locally recruited staff such as rangers, scouts, and lodge employees.  
The government was also to develop infrastructure in form of wildlife viewing circuits.  
These infrastructural developments would enable communities to derive direct economic 
benefits from tourist camp sites and revenue from trophy hunting.  In addition, the 
government was to provide such social services as schools, dispensary, and community 
centre.  In order for the Maasai to grant wildlife access to Group Ranch land, the Group 
Ranches bordering Amboseli were to be paid an easement or wildlife utilization fee. 
In the 1974-1977 Amboseli bargain, therefore, there is evidence of attempts at 
devolution of wildlife property rights to the local communities because these communities 
claimed a share of wildlife largesse.  This dispensation, however, did not last for long.  It 
collapsed in stages.  First, the communities ceased getting any revenue from trophy hunting 
consequent to the ban on hunting.  Later on, the water system worked for some time, but then 
collapsed (and so the Maasai went back to the park).  Similarly, the wildlife utilization fee 
was distributed well up to about 1981, and then it became irregular and finally fizzled out 
(Talbot and Olindo, 1990; Western, 1994).  With the collapse of the Amboseli bargain, 
communities lost any claim to wildlife property rights and the state became the sole claimant 
to wildlife property rights.  The situation remained like this until the 1990s when KWS 
introduced pilot wildlife cropping and bird shooting schemes. 
The pilot wildlife cropping was implemented in certain districts, among them Kajiado 
District.  Private landholders were given quotas to harvest wildlife in close collaboration with 
KWS.  Before a quota could be given, both the private landholders and KWS could mount a 
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game count on which the wildlife cropping quota was based.  The cropping scheme, 
however, limited landowners on the uses to which they could put the wildlife property rights 
devolved to them.  Some commentators claim that it had no legal authority because it was 
contrary to the law banning hunting.  Thus, in a sense, landowners were beholden to the 
goodwill of KWS and government officials.  This meant that landowners could not invest in 
it because there was no security guarantee for their investments (Kameri-Mbote, 2002: 142).  
In terms of specific utilization, landowners could not practice sports-hunting, nor could they 
process the hides and skins.  The limitation on the processing of hides and skins was 
attributed to the ban on trade in wildlife products that accompanied the 1977 ban on sports-
hunting (RoK, 1978).  As a result, the hides and skins were being exported raw, thereby 
fetching much less than their actual value.  Further, in 2002, the government imposed a 
twenty percent export duty on all unprocessed hides and skins.  This reduced the viability of 
cropping even more.   
The overall evaluation of the value of cropping by landowners was that it was not a 
paying venture.  Some argued that sometimes the operational costs could not even be 
recovered.  One commentator of the wildlife sector claimed that landowners involved in the 
cropping scheme were merely scavenging; because it denied them the opportunity to add 
value to wildlife property rights, they were then merely eking out what they could without 
even re-investing in the resource (EAWLS 9, 2003).  During various KWWG meetings, 
wildlife entrepreneurial arguments were made about how things could have been different 
had landowners been allowed to practice sports-hunting.  It was claimed, for example, that a 
buffalo disposed of through cropping fetched about Ksh. 40,000, while it could fetch ten 
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times that through sports-hunting.116   As a result of such limitations, some members of 
KWWG initiated discussions with KWS in 2003 on the production of a policy on cropping 
(KWWG 5, 2003).  Thus, when KWS banned the pilot wildlife cropping scheme later in the 
year, it came as a surprise to the landowners.  Several district wildlife fora expressed their 
outrage at the ban, citing the inconvenience it would cause to wildlife-related ventures, 
including wildlife security provided by landowners because this security was funded from 
cropping revenue (KWWG 9, 2003). 
The ban was preceded by an evaluation of the pilot wildlife cropping project.  A 
consultancy group was engaged for this purpose, but conflicting reports surround the 
outcome of this consultancy, with both sides of the wildlife utilization divide siding with 
aspects of the reports that favored the outcome convenient to them.  What seems undeniable 
is the fact that the report generated controversy.  During a discussion on cropping by 
KWWG, one of the issues that was raised was that  
Since the past consultancy study on cropping could highly influence views of 
decision makers (Director of KWS), there was need for a review of the 
findings of the study by stakeholders (KWWG 5, 2003).   
 
Even before such views could be floated, it appears that KWS had formed the opinion that 
the report that found that the scheme was a failure was the one to be adopted.  In a 
commentary on the local media, the Director of KWS pointed to a correlation between 
wildlife cropping and an upsurge in poaching and bush-meat trade (E.Afri. March 31-April 6, 
2003).  A landowner challenged the Director on these views, and while the Director 
acknowledged the role of landowners as partners in conservation (KWWG 5, 2003), KWS 
                                                 
116An American hunter told me that he paid $US10,000 to hunt a cape buffalo in South Africa.  In 
Kenyan currency, this is Ksh720, 000.  In Tanzania, the trophy fee for a buffalo is $US 600 (the 
equivalent of Ksh 42,000). 
 187 
 
nevertheless terminated the pilot wildlife cropping scheme.  A similar fate befell the Game 
Birds shooting scheme.    
The Game Birds shooting program had been instituted as a result of “…prolonged 
and intense negotiations by diverse stakeholders” with KWS (KWWG 7, 2003).  A 
committee was formed to run the scheme, and KWS was a member of this committee.  In 
2003, KWS disbanded the committee, claiming that it was illegitimate.  What infuriated the 
landowners about this disbanding of the committee was that by the time of doing so, some 
landowners had already contracted with clients and done some bookings based on the 
authorizations granted to them by the Game Birds Committee.  Landowners, therefore, felt 
that the action by KWS was not only unfortunate but also irresponsible (KWWG 7, 2003).  
Moreover, there were also grievances of landowners over the fact that KWS had not been 
remitting booking fees to landowners (KWWG 9, 2003).  Landowners were, therefore, 
forming the opinion that “…by not honoring an agreement reached with landowners, KWS 
had proved an unfaithful partner, unfit for business” (KWWG 9, 2003). 
By terminating these two schemes, KWS extinguished any claim there was about 
devolution of wildlife property rights to local communities.  Taking place simultaneously 
with the evolving of an umbrella body of landowners living with wildlife in their lands, these 
developments fueled landholders’ clamor for a wildlife legal regime that would guarantee the 
rights of landholders to the wildlife estate free from KWS administrative fiat.  Landowners 
now wanted to be recognized in both wildlife policy and law as legitimate claimants to the 
wildlife largesse.  To do so, they felt that they needed to abandon the endeavors to secure 
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economic rights through KWS, but rather, struggle for the legal rights through a political 
process in order to secure their economic rights.117   
Nevertheless, the foregoing should not mask the fact that there are wildlife enterprises 
going on among various landowners living with wildlife in their lands.  Some of these 
ventures have even been supported by KWS in terms of actual financial inputs.  This was 
actually the case after 1992 when KWS established the Community Wildlife Service (CWS) 
department.  The objective of this department was to facilitate the flow of wildlife benefits to 
communities who interact with wildlife outside the protected areas.  It was hoped that this 
would create trust and dialogue between KWS and those communities and, therefore, 
motivate communities to participate in sustainable wildlife conservation and utilisation 
programmes for their own economic gains.  Through it, some of the financial benefits 
accruing from wildlife conservation were to be channelled to local communities in the form 
of social services such as schools, health facilities, water supply and cattle dips (see, e.g. 
KWS 1, 1990; KWS 1, 1994).   
Some of these ventures were funded through various donor-supported initiatives such 
as the Conservation of Biodiverse Resource Areas (COBRA) project that was funded by 
USAID.  Among the community-funded projects within Kajiado and Narok (respectively) 
were Kimana, Eselenkei, Olgulului; and Olchoro Oiroua (private), and Koiyaki Lamek 
community wildlife projects.  A review of these projects by the time the funding cycle ended 
claimed that the objectives of turning community attitude in favor of wildlife had been 
achieved, thereby suggesting that communities had started reaping benefits from wildlife 
(see, for example, COBRA 1, 1994; Little, n.d.; Hall, n.d.).  Hall, for example, claimed that  
                                                 
117I borrow the conceptualization of property rights in terms of, inter alia, economic and legal rights 
from Barzel (1997).  
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Benefits have been generated for communities residing in major 
dispersal areas for wildlife and adjacent to National Parks and 
Reserves, primarily through revenue sharing and to a more limited 
extent from enterprise development.  Perhaps more important, 
community attitudes toward KWS as the steward of the nation’s 
wildlife resources and toward that possibility of deriving meaningful 
economic and other benefits from community-based conservation and 
management have radically changed, especially in the focal areas of 
the COBRA project (Hall, n.d.:1).  
 
While Hall returned optimistic observations, his colleague in the evaluation team was more 
cautious.  Little observed that  
At this point there are still too few income-generating activities that 
have been implemented to assess whether or not COBRA’s main 
assumption—i.e., that providing local socioeconomic benefits from 
wildlife-based activities will enhance management and conservation 
outside of protected areas—is correct (Little, n.d.: 6-7). 
 
My own experience would tend to be more sympathetic with Little’s position.  While it is 
true that money has been expended on these areas, there still seems to be some disconnect 
between communities and the conservation project.  When I asked communities bordering 
Amboseli and Maasai Mara whether they know of any benefits that they have gained from 
living with wildlife, the popular opinion was in the negative.  This was in contradistinction to 
their eloquence in narrating the predicaments of living with wildlife.   
Whatever the verdict that could be passed about these landholder wildlife ventures, 
however, it would not undermine the claim that they do not constitute devolution of wildlife 
property rights to landholders in the sense that cropping and sports-hunting, for example, did 
involve devolution.  In these ventures, there are no rights over wildlife that KWS cedes to 
communities.  What KWS is involved in with these ventures is an act of charity.  This act of 
making a gesture, not devolution, is actually its stated public position; one of its public 
relations releases states that: 
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The Kenya Wildlife Service has recognized the need to reciprocate the 
commitment and sacrifice made by Kenyan communities to the 
conservation of wildlife in Kenya’s protected areas (KWS 1, 1994: 1). 
 
And, consistent with this thinking, implementers of the COBRA project found one of   
 “COBRA Constraints” to be the “Increased perceptions amongst some target groups that 
WDF/revenue-sharing is a “right” without concomitant “obligations” and responsibilities” 
(COBRA 1, 1994).  One would have imagined that by virtue of providing land and absorbing 
externalities from the wildlife, as landholders think they do, they have already had more than 
enough of their obligations and responsibilities.  Thus, for the COBRA project team to see a 
dichotomy in the relationship between “right” and “obligations” in community thinking 
suggests that the team was aware they were not in a devolution process but something akin to 
provision of charity services.  It is this attitude that provided KWWG with the impetus to 
negotiate its claim in the wildlife sector through the political process that culminated in the 
GG Kariuki parliamentary bill to amend the Wildlife Conservation and Management Act, 
1989.  The next chapter will examine the struggle for wildlife property rights at the political 
level within the context of the GG Kariuki Bill.  
 
IX Conclusion:  State Reluctance to Devolve Wildlife property Rights Evident 
The theme that emerges from the foregoing discussion is one of the struggles for devolution 
of wildlife property rights since the colonial period, and how the state has toyed with the idea 
while dealing with local communities in a manner that skews the bulk of authority to itself, 
rather than to local communities.  Thus, while recognizing communities as claimants to the 
largesse of the wildlife sector, the distributional gains of the sector have made it difficult for 
the state to withdraw its pervasive presence.  The result has been a see-saw of the devolution 
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of wildlife property rights projects to the local communities.  Any endeavors that were 
initiated towards devolving these rights to the locals were geared towards persuading the 
communities to accommodate wildlife in their lands.  These initiatives did not assume the 
pattern of creating a private property rights consciousness, because the state’s presence in the 
sector remained paramount.  It was this failure to confer on communities a predictable 
private ownership of wildlife property rights that triggered the clamor for a legal recognition 
of the community stake in the wildlife property rights.  As we will demonstrate in the next 
chapter, an attempt by communities to secure the legal ownership of these gains has so far 
been a failure, thereby indicating that the state is either unwilling or incapable of 
relinquishing wildlife property rights to local communities.   
  
 
 
 
 
Chapter V 
The Political Struggle for Devolution of Wildlife Property Rights in Kenya: 
An Attempt to Amend the Wildlife Conservation Act 
 
I  Abstract 
The preceding chapter examined the failure by the state to guarantee the devolution of 
wildlife property rights to local communities through the bureaucratic process.  Faced by this 
predicament, and against a background of state sluggishness and dilly-dallying in reviewing 
wildlife legislation, landowners hosting wildlife in their lands sought a political solution that 
could confer on them the legal right to wildlife largesse.  Consequently, they initiated 
amendments to the wildlife legislation to accommodate their interests.  This move assumed 
the form of a private members parliamentary bill to amend the Wildlife Act.  The Member of 
Parliament sponsoring the bill worked in concert with the Kenya Wildlife Working Group 
(KWWG).  The move triggered a series of lobbying efforts for and against the Bill.  The Bill 
was finally passed by Parliament, but it failed to secure Presidential assent in order to 
become law.  Thus the state failed at the political level to accede to the devolution of wildlife 
property rights to local communities.   
This chapter examines the failed attempt by landowners to secure wildlife property 
rights through the political process.  It is argued here that the state inability or unwillingness 
to devolve wildlife property rights to local communities could be a result of interaction of 
two factors, one, economic self-interest as per the claim of the previous chapter, and two, 
convergence of the interests of the state with those of Green NGOs who are alleged to hold it 
hostage through KWS. 
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II Introduction 
The Wildlife (Conservation and Management) Amendment Bill, 2004 (also known as the GG 
Bill118) provides ample terrain of examining the question of whether the state in Africa can 
devolve wildlife property rights to local communities so as to engender in them a private 
property rights consciousness in wildlife as envisioned by the proponents of CBC.  The GG 
Bill was a watershed in the politics of the wildlife policy-making in Kenya because of the 
nature of public involvement in the events leading up to the adoption of the bill by 
Parliament and its subsequent rejection by the President.  Previous turning points in the 
wildlife policy-making in Kenya were basically bureaucratic shows.  Even when these 
landmarks in wildlife policy were processed through Parliament, such as the 1989 
Amendment to the Wildlife Act, the public was simply treated to a legal by-product that was 
conceived in the image of the state.  This was because community representation was 
through a prostrate Parliament (Widner, 1992; Barkan, 1992).119  The GG Bill was, however, 
different.  For the first time, community interests became a defining issue in the drafting and 
debating the wildlife conservation regime.      
It can be argued that it was the activities of KWWG that gave the GG Bill the 
limelight it may not otherwise have generated.  Prior to the GG Bill, communities hosting 
wildlife in their lands and who considered themselves wildlife producers, were not organized 
as a producer community, unlike other communities with agrarian interests such as coffee, 
tea and sugar.  Consequently, during the development of government programs on wildlife, if 
                                                 
118It is so-called because GG Kariuki, the MP for Laikipia West, sponsored it. 
 
119Some people even hold that the Sixth Parliament was unconstitutional because some Members of 
Parliament did not go through the formal electoral process.  They won the ruling party nominations 
and were declared sole candidates as per party regulations, but these were not statutory electoral 
regulations. 
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these communities acted, they did so as individuals or amorphous groupings without 
presenting any concerted community front on the wildlife issue(s) of the day.  Nevertheless, 
this scenario was reversed during the GG Bill.  The GG Bill generated a lot of attention 
among the conservation protagonists to an extent that the politics of devolution of wildlife 
property rights to local communities was more protracted among these protagonists than 
between the local communities and the state.  The state was targeted by the belligerents on 
both sides of the conservation divide to either accede to or reject the GG Bill.  From the point 
of view of the Bill’s proponents, the fact that the communities living with wildlife failed to 
secure their preferred outcomes only goes to show the extent to which the state is enamored 
against devolving wildlife property rights to these communities in ways other than those it 
deems fit (see, for example, Scott, 1998).  This conclusion, however, need to be tempered 
with the observation that the state failure was sanitized by the opponents of the Bill who also 
laid claims to community interests.  The state associated its action with this group, thereby 
suggesting it was acting in the interests of the communities. 
 
 
III Context of the Rise of GG Bill 
Costs to Communities Living with Wildlife 
Kenya’s wildlife conservation is bifurcated between protected and non-protected areas.  The 
protected areas harbor wildlife estimated at ten to thirty percent while the non-protected areas 
absorb the rest, estimated at seventy to ninety percent.120  It can be claimed that the demand 
                                                 
120Some commentators in the Kenyan conservation scene dispute the claim.  Leakey, for instance, 
argues that the claim no longer holds because population growth has displaced wildlife from the open 
range habitat, forcing game to retreat into the Protected Areas (Leakey, 2001). 
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on non-protected areas could even be absolute since the wildlife in the other areas 
occasionally require the former as migratory corridors and dispersal areas.  Non-protected 
areas are private lands and, therefore, wildlife in these areas occupies private property.  This 
does not make them private property, though.  They still remain public property 
(controversial, though, as the question of ownership of wildlife remains), bringing in a 
situation where public property is on private land.121  Thus there is a tragedy of the commons 
on private land.122  It is against this background that the private cost of producing a public 
good (in this case, wildlife) should be conceptualized.  Perhaps to dramatize the full 
implications of this “privateness” in the production of Kenya’s wildlife as a public good, one 
can consider the interface between protected and non-protected areas and note the clear 
distinction, lopsided as it is, between the two.  While private lands are expected to host 
wildlife, landowners’ livestock is excluded, and with reprisals for infraction, from venturing 
into protected areas.  
Although wildlife can roam from the parks into the private lands, landowners and 
their livestock have no right of access to the parks.  This is the law; and the protected area 
managers implement it with zeal.  It is then clear that the private cost of maintaining a 
national wildlife constituency in Kenya is borne by the private landowners.  Ali Kaka 
captures this landowner, who incurs private cost thus, 
 
                                                 
121Okoth-Ogendo (1991) has alluded to this question as a problem of the nature of public interest in 
private property.  
 
122This can be referred to as the tragedy of the commons in reverse.  Unlike the classical Tragedy of 
the Commons in Garret Hardins (1968) where private interests wreak havoc on common property, 
common interests in Kenyan wildlife are wreaking havoc on private property.  (David Hopecraft’s 
remarks during an EAWLS monthly seminar in Nairobi drew my attention to the paradox.) 
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That small-scale farmer who stays up all night, then has his family take the 
day shift to keep his one crop safe, that school child who has to stay home and 
go to school late and leave school early, that fisherman who cannot fish 
anymore, that woman who has lost her husband or child…people who go 
hungry and become destitute beggars (sic) because of the wildlife that we 
enjoy and protect (Kaka, n.d.). 
 
This raises the question whether the cost borne by landowners is against certain benefits. 
Landowners answer this question in the negative (KWWG, 2003-04). 
While wildlife at the national level is an asset, this should not mask the fact that to the 
landowners it has been a liability.  Although landowners have virtually no benefits to show 
from wildlife, they count losses not only in terms of opportunity costs of hosting wildlife, but 
also direct costs imposed by wildlife damage [see Table 4] (KWS, 2003-2004).     
 Table 4.  Cost imposed on communities (Kajiado district) by wildlife: 2003- 2004 (May)123 
Cost/damage No. of incidences  Extent of damage 
Threat  17  
Predation 79 -sheep and goats injured/killed: 208 
- cows injured/killed: 18 
Crops 179 In most cases: extensive 
Disease 3 Enormous death of livestock 
Property  1  
 Source:  KWS (Community Wildlife Service dept.) field returns 2003-2004 (May). 
 
Even a casual glance at the media pages in Kenya would throw undisputable light on the 
predicaments besetting communities living with wildlife.  Media headlines tell of the agony 
of communities grieving from human attacks or deaths caused by wildlife, curfew on 
movement imposed on villagers by marauding wildlife, livestock lost to predators and acres 
of cultivated land reduced to bare ground by browsers, and then there is the stress imposed 
                                                 
123The figures are largely underreported.   Most community members do not bother reporting the costs 
they incur since there is no compensation. To visit wildlife authorities in order to report wildlife 
damages is considered a waste of time and resources. 
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on grazing and watering resources and hence the consequent competition over these 
resources between livestock and wildlife (see, for example, figure 2). 
 
Figure 2: Sample of media headings announcing wildlife havoc on communities. 
(Ref.  Daily Nation Group of Newspapers & The Standard newspaper.) 
7/9/2004 
 
Lions invade 
Village hit by famine 
12/11/2004 
 
Jumbos destroy 
school property 
30/10/2004 
 
Stray Lion kills 
50 animals 
14/10/2004 
 
Two are in 
hospital after 
buffalo 
attack 
15/7/2004 
 
Woman 
trampled to 
death by 
stray jumbo 
10/10/2004 
 
Jumbos injure 
school girl 
13/11/2003 
Farmer Killed by 
rogue elephant 
 
2/5/2002 
Brave moran hospitalized 
after killing lion  
  
6/6/2002 
Lions Kill 54 
sheep in a 
night attack   
1/13/2001 
 
Farmers to 
tackle 
wildlife 
menace   
 
10/10/2000  
Buffaloes damage crops   
 
5/7/2000 
Government     
       gets 
ultimatum 
over Jumbos    
  
3/13/1999 
Elephants wreak 
havoc in Nyeri 
farms    
24/1/1999 
Residents told to 
shoot rampaging 
elephants    
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   As a result of these experiences, politicians have complained and condemned this 
lopsided relationship between their constituents and the wildlife sector.  Nevertheless, these 
presentations never yielded much positive response from the authorities.  It was against this 
background that the Member of Parliament spearheading the 2004 Wildlife Amendment Act 
situated his efforts.   
 
GG Kariuki’s Arguments:  the Commoners as Free-riders 
In a meeting with the KWWG (KWWG 4, 2004) Honorable GG Kariuki, argued that in 
undertaking this project, he was motivated by the need to redress the gross injustices caused 
to communities by game animals.  He averred that this is the issue of major concern to 
parliamentarians who are familiar with the damages caused by wildlife to their constituents 
albeit they may not be conversant with the management of wildlife.  He posited that his 
concern was how the wildlife will not eat the maize of his mother, and that he does not 
understand any other language.  It follows, therefore, he argued, that while many people 
speak about money that Kenya earns from wildlife, such claims are not important to people 
suffering from wildlife damage.  Hence, there was need for landowners to have a say on 
animals in their lands.  This necessity, he contented, needed to be understood in light of the 
fact that landowners have other alternatives to wildlife such as keeping goats, etc.  To this 
extent, he argued that if Kenyans want to retain wildlife as a national asset, then they must be 
prepared to pay for its upkeep.  This is contrary to the current dispensation whereby Kenyans 
want to conserve wildlife yet they are not willing to spend money on it.  It was this situation 
that his proposal set out to rectify.  Two issues emerge from this narrative; one, the 
governance of the wildlife sector, and two, the question of human-wildlife conflict.   
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Wildlife governance in Kenya is state-centric.  Landowners are excluded from the 
wildlife governance regime and yet they are the ones that bear the cost of sustaining a 
wildlife estate.  Past policy and legal initiatives led to this state of affairs because those 
initiatives that provided for a redress failed to be effected by the government, even as it 
undertook initiatives that undercut communities’ clout in the wildlife sector.  The former 
include the 1977 legal notice that banned hunting (RoK, 1977b), the 1978 Act No. 5 that 
banned trade in wildlife and wildlife products (RoK, 1978), the 1984 Presidential directive 
prohibiting all hunting and capture of wildlife (KWS, 1996: 6), and more notoriously, the 
1989 Wildlife (Conservation and Management) Amendment Act (RoK, 1989).  Positive 
initiatives that were dispensed with included the 1965 Sessional Paper No. 10 (RoK, 1965), 
the 1975 Statement on Wildlife Policy (RoK, 1975), aspects of the 1976 Wildlife Act (RoK, 
1977a), the 1994 KWS 5-Person Review Group report (KWS, 1996), and the 1996 Draft 
Wildlife Bill (Wanjala and Kibwana, 1996).  
As pointed out in the previous chapter, the 1965 Sessional Paper No. 10 ruled out the 
possibility of giving landowners the kind of property rights in wildlife that would make the 
criticism of the sector as leveled by Hon. GG Kariuki unnecessary.  By privileging the 
interests of the state, it set the stage for the problems that the GG Bill proposed to reverse: 
the state’s desires to retain wildlife largesse, while unwilling to spend money on it.  Although 
the 1975 state’s policy on wildlife somehow remedied this predisposition, it was subverted 
by the law enacted to implement the policy.  The Wildlife Act of 1976 (RoK, 1977a) 
downplayed the economic approach to wildlife conservation and held that economic 
utilization of wildlife would be “incidental”, otherwise, preservation (and, therefore, not 
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conservation124) was to be the norm.  Nevertheless, the 1976 Wildlife Act was sensitive to 
the politics of wildlife conservation in two ways.  It provided for landowners to benefit from 
wildlife, and secondly, it upheld the right for compensation for wildlife damage.  
Nevertheless, these novel provisions were soon subverted by subsequent policies and legal 
actions of the state.   
In 1977, the state banned sports hunting as a land-use strategy (RoK, 1977b).  By 
banning sports hunting, the state stultified a glorious initial attempt at devolving wildlife 
control to local communities.  In the following year, trade in wildlife products was also 
outlawed, and in 1979, dealers’ licenses were banned (RoK, 1978).  These actions rendered 
wildlife utilization to become a full-blown issue in Kenya.  Henceforth, the politics of 
wildlife conservation became bifurcated between those for consumptive utilization 
(specifically sports hunting) and those against.  Among the latter were animal rights NGOs 
and organized lobbies of tour operators and hoteliers who were averse to consumptive 
utilization.125  While the Green NGOs cast their argument in terms of the decimation of 
species, the latter argued that it was inimical to the photo-tourism enterprises they were 
involved in.  Without an organization, the landowners could not counter the interests of the 
organized lobbies.   
This community inertia came out starkly in 1989 when Parliament passed an 
amendment to the Wildlife Act that abrogated the legal right for compensation of property 
damaged by wildlife (RoK, 1989).  One would have assumed that while the civil bureaucracy 
in charge of wildlife can countenance such an act, at least the people’s representatives could 
                                                 
124Critics of the non-consumptive use of wildlife pejoratively refer to preservation as leaving a 
resource undisturbed, while conservation is used favorably to refer to wise use. 
 
125
 Wildlife entrepreneurs are organized around the Kenya Association of Tour Operators (KATO), 
Hotel and Caterers Association and Kenya Tourists Federation (KTF). 
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not.  Yet, Parliament enacted into law such an attack on private property.  Although it can be 
argued that this abolition was insignificant to the landowners because compensation existed 
merely on paper,   abolishing it meant that even if the state was able and willing to pay in 
future, that could not be done unless the Wildlife Act was amended again.  This implied 
increased transaction costs to the landowners.   
Ironically, this attack on private property took place at a time when in the parent 
Wildlife Act and in the amendments being introduced, the name of the organization was 
branded as a “Wildlife Service” (RoK, 1989).  The rendition of ‘service’ was presumably 
meant to signify that the entity should make the interests of the people interacting with 
wildlife uppermost (see, for example, Kameri-Mbote (2002)).126  The bureaucrats in charge 
of the wildlife body apparently did not take note of such expectations.   With respect to the 
1989 amendment, for example, they were seemingly interested in the abolition of 
compensation more than in the mandate conferred on them to render “service” to the 
landowners.  When they were confronted, for example, with claims of compensation by 
farmers who had suffered damage from wildlife after the 1989 amendment, they took cover 
under the Act and claimed that they were not legally bound to accept liability for wildlife 
damage (see, for example, HCCC, 1998; KWS, 1996).  Thus with the enactment of the 1989 
Wildlife Amendment Act, the interests of the landowners remained marginalized until 1994 
and 1996 when, through bureaucratic- sponsored examinations of the wildlife sector, they 
                                                 
126 Kameri-Mbote (2002: 105), referencing Western, says the term ‘service’ was introduced 
deliberately in the 1989 amendment to the parent Wildlife Act to convey the message that the new 
organisation was expected to contribute to the welfare of communities.  In 1989, however, the term 
was not new to the Wildlife Act.  Even the parent Act referred to the wildlife body as a “service”, and 
not a department, even though in popular use, people used department (Wildlife Conservation and 
Management Department).  In the parent Act, it is actually defined as a “Wildlife Conservation and 
Management Service”, not department (RoK, 1977a: sec 2, 3 (1).  Its officers are referred to as 
officers of the “service”, even as it refers to other organizations such as Fisheries as departments 
(RoK, 1977a: sec 3(4), 5(1)b, c). 
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raised issues of interests to themselves.127  These attempts did not, however, materialize into 
anything valuable to them.                     
Initiatives that sought to give landowners some lifeline but which were arrested 
before they materialized include the 1994 Kenya Wildlife Review on wildlife-human 
conflicts (KWS, 1996), and the 1996 draft of the Wildlife Act (Wanjala and Kibwana, 1996).  
An attempt to chart the way forward for wildlife utilization initiated by KWS through a 
workshop with wildlife stakeholders in 2004 did not yield any substantive result in terms of 
adoption of policy.  The 1994 KWS review solicited and reported on landowners’ views 
regarding problems and solutions on wildlife-human conflicts.  In its two specific 
recommendations, the review group called for a new legislation on wildlife utilization so as 
to ensure that landowners receive benefits from hosting wildlife (KWS, 1996: ix).128 These 
attempts received stiff opposition from interested parties in the conservation sector such that 
even a decade down the line, KWS was still holding discussions about wildlife utilization 
(Coffman, 2000; KWS Conf. 2004).  Moreover, even the less handsome form of utilization, 
wildlife cropping, was being discontinued (KWWG, 2003).  One of the most interesting 
cases of these aborted initiatives was the 1996 attempted review of the Wildlife Act. 
The 1996 proposal to review the wildlife Act was sponsored by KWS through a grant 
from USAID.  KWS engaged consultants who solicited views and drafted a wildlife bill for 
legislation by the state.  The draft bill recognized landowners as having user rights over 
                                                 
127An exception to this could be the Court of Appeal ruling that held that to the extent that  KWS has 
a responsibility to landowners, then it can be held liable for wildlife damage and landowners can seek 
remedy in the courts in case of wildlife damage (HCCC, 1998). 
 
128The issue whether the review group recommended re-introduction of sport-hunting is controversial.  
Some commentators claimed that some members of the review group disowned the recommendations 
and averred that it had been smuggled into the review group’s report after they submitted it to KWS 
(see, for example, Opanga, 1997). 
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wildlife in their lands.  Within this context, it is significant to note that the draft Bill re-
introduced sports hunting and gave landowners a preponderant say in determining who hunts 
and the animals to be hunted in their lands.  Landowners were also to be paid a fee by the 
hunters operating in their lands.  The draft also sought to formalize the institution of 
Community Wildlife Association such that they would become recognized under the law.  
Such Associations could have wildlife user rights devolved to them, and these rights could 
include both consumptive and non-consumptive utilization.  These provisions of the draft 
Bill with respect to the landowners is precisely what landowners had been calling for.  To 
this extent, had the draft legislation been enacted into law, it would have gone a long way in 
mitigating the grievances of the landowners in so far as benefiting from wildlife in their lands 
is concerned.  Unfortunately, the draft Bill withered somewhere within the administrative 
hierarchy and, so far, there is no clear-cut statement as to where it stalled.  Even within 
KWS, some officials publicly claim that they do not know what became of it (EAWLS 9, 
2003) while others claim it was returned because it was not consultative enough (EAWLS 
kcb, 2004).  Other sources aver that it went up to the cabinet level but then it was withdrawn 
mysteriously (KWWG 7, 2004; EAWLS 12, 2004 KCB).129 
Thus prior to the GG Bill, there were notable attempts to achieve what it aspired for.  
These initiatives failed to go as far as the GG Bill did.  Apparently, only those initiatives 
limiting the interests of the landowners were being effected.  To this extent, the GG Bill was 
a watershed in the politics of communities and wildlife conservation in Kenya.  It is claimed 
in this study that it was the degree of landowners involvement in the GG Bill that accounts 
for the mileage it covered.  While the Members of Parliament debating the GG Bill had more 
                                                 
129 This sounds similar to what is reported in Tanzania with respect to the structure of the 
Environmental agencies (see, Leat, 1999 (ch. 5 n. 12)). 
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leeway (as a multi-party Parliament) to go against the state interests than those of the 1989 
Parliament, it was still possible for the GG Bill to be defeated on the floor of Parliament.  
The forces opposed to the outcomes that landowners pursued could have lobbied and 
combined forces with the state to sway the vote against the Bill.  This possibility was 
undermined, however, by the presence of a strong overt lobbying by the landowners 
(organized around KWWG), a phenomenon that was new in the wildlife conservation politics 
in Kenya.  As we demonstrate below, KWWG was thus the power behind the passage of the 
GG Bill.       
 
IV The Kenya Wildlife Working Group (KWWG) 
As pointed out earlier, landowners hosting wildlife in their lands did not have a formidable 
national institution prior to the rise of KWWG in 2003.  Moreover, it was not until 1991 
when KWS asked landowners to organize themselves into wildlife forums.  The rationale for 
this initiative was that KWS had come to realize that it could not manage wildlife on its own 
and, therefore, it sought to incorporate landowners in a structured way, hence the need to 
have them organized (EAWLS 11, 2003; KWS Conf. 2004).   KWS arrived at this conclusion 
in its “Policy Framework and Development Programme” that it produced in 1990 (KWS 1, 
1990).  The policy framework recommended, among others, that “Landowners should 
organise themselves to obtain better deals from the tourism industry and to offer a better 
wildlife ‘product’ by improving management of the wildlife and the tourism environment 
(KWS 1, 1990: Annex 6: 12; Hall, n.d.).  According to one respondent who was an official of 
the original wildlife forum, it was the KWS Director who in 1994 facilitated the formation 
and secured funding for the first National Wildlife Forum.  The Director also arranged for the 
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forum to be accommodated at the KWS headquarters as it organized itself so that it could 
stand on its own.  As a result of this recognition of the significance of landowners, KWS set 
up a new department called “Community Wildlife Service.”   
Thus, in spite of the current tensions between KWWG (the successor of the first 
National Wildlife Forum) and KWS, it would appear that KWS initially did not see an 
organized landowners’ lobby as a threat.  Indeed, protagonists in the formation of the first 
wildlife forum observe that initially, it was actually the politicians who were alarmed at the 
idea of organizing landowners into a national forum.  Politicians are said to have been 
suspicious of these wildlife associations; “They wonder, why are these groups forming?” 
(San Diego Union-Tribune, 1995).  One respondent actually confirmed that this apprehension 
existed among senior state officials.  In one meeting of the forum that was attended by the 
registrar of societies, the registrar reportedly told the landowners that the government was 
reluctant to register such organizations because it was not clear what role they would play in 
the wildlife policy framework as wildlife was under state management.   
 
Constraints in Initial Forum Formation 
This first attempt to form a national wildlife forum, however, did not succeed.  None of those 
who talked about it seemed to be clear what had happened, but it does seem it had problems 
with its donors who stopped funding it.  Others claim that the donor was pressurized by 
interested parties to discontinue funding it in order to stifle its growth.  Yet, others claim that 
it collapsed after it lost the support of KWS consequent to a change of guard there.  
Nevertheless, regional wildlife fora survived.  The work of these fora included coordinating 
wildlife utilization, organizing income-generating enterprises and liaising with wildlife 
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authorities (KWS, 1996:16).  It was these district wildlife fora that re-grouped in 2003 to 
form a national umbrella body, KWWG.   
 
Formation of KWWG: Composition, Objectives and Mandate 
KWWG operates as a sub-committee of the EAWLS, though it is now registered as a Trust.  
It is run by a Board of Trustees; the trustees are drawn from each district forum.  So far, there 
are over 12 district wildlife fora that form KWWG.  Although it started as a grouping of 
landowners hosting wildlife, it now accommodates other parties with an interest in wildlife 
conservation such as the Kenya Tourist Federation (KTF) (KWWG, 2003j).  Other interested 
parties such as individual researchers (like this researcher) are allowed to attend meetings but 
have no voting power.  The KWWG Trust Deed defines a wildlife forum as  
any group or body of people the majority of whom are landowners or 
members of land owning communities or people professionally or 
economically involved in either or both the sustained consumptive and/or non-
consumptive uses of wild animals on agricultural or pastoral land.  In the 
event of doubt over whether a particular group or body qualifies as a Wildlife 
Forum the decision of a two thirds majority of the Trustees shall prevail 
(KWWG Trust, 2004).   
 
At the forum level, the members include individual owners of small, medium and large 
holdings, communal owners of Group Ranches, shareholders in land companies and land 
users of trust lands (KWWG, 2003a). 
In forming the national umbrella body, the fora benefited from the intervention of 
international environmental actors.  USAID provided the initial financial base that enabled 
KWWG to stamp its mark on Kenya’s conservation arena.  USAID had initiated a program 
known as CORE (Conservation of Resources through Enterprise) whose broad mandate was 
to enhance conservation and management of natural resources through increased benefits to 
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landowners living adjacent to wildlife parks and reserves (CORE-net 1, 2001).  Among the 
objectives of CORE was to increase capacity to conserve and manage natural resources 
outside protected areas and it was within this context that the CORE program sought to 
develop the district wildlife fora through EAWLS.  Through this support, trustees from 
district wildlife fora were facilitated in holding monthly and lobbying meetings mostly in 
Nairobi, or any other place that they deemed strategic.  Among the objectives of the Trust 
that guided their activities was that of  
giving land owners and land owning communities an effective voice in 
making policies that relate to them, their land and the wild animals that live on 
that land…  (and) 
facilitating and encouraging continuous dialogue between landowners and 
land owning communities and Kenya’s legislators, administrators, 
Government, the commercial sector of the economy and any other interested 
parties (KWWG Trust, 2004). 
 
It is in this context that KWWG was able to liaise with Hon. GG Kariuki and other Members 
of Parliament in a sequel that culminated in the passage of the Wildlife (Conservation and 
Management) Amendment Bill, 2004 by Parliament.  USAID was thus a central actor in the 
activities surrounding KWWG and the GG Bill. 
 
KWWG and the GG Bill 
Given KWWG’s understanding of its mandate as seen above, it diagnosed the predicament 
besetting its members as being rooted in the existing wildlife legislation. Consequently, its 
first task was to secure amendments to the Wildlife Act in order to incorporate the interests 
of the landowners.  At the same time, Hon. GG Kariuki was working on a Bill to amend the 
Wildlife Act.  KWWG sought to throw its weight behind his initiative.  Once KWWG 
managed to link up with Hon. GG Kariuki, the next phase was to lobby parliamentarians to 
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support the GG Bill.  It was in the process of lobbying parliamentarians that KWWG 
attracted the attention of other actors in the conservation sector who espoused values 
different from those KWWG sought to achieve through the GG Bill.  The two camps 
engaged in a protracted struggle that was played out in several fora. 
 
KWWG’s Two-pronged Strategic Approach 
In its lobbying strategy, KWWG pursued a two-pronged approach.  It sought to work within 
the establishment and hence pursued dialogue with KWS and the Minister in charge of 
wildlife.  At this point, it was hoped that they could influence the wildlife policy from within.  
With this mindset, they were banking on the fact that a new government had been instituted 
in Kenya and that it was more receptive to public participation in the management of public 
affairs.  In this setting, the popular opinion on the ground in Kenya was that policy makers 
and policy implementers could now make decisions without having to wait for directives 
from the powerbrokers in State House as was the case in the previous regimes. 
 
KWWG’s Bumpy Ride with the Ministry 
While it was relatively clear that cabinet ministers and state corporation executives now 
enjoyed more leverage in making decisions than previously, this was not the same as saying 
that they had become more socially responsive to public intervention in the running of public 
affairs.  The political leadership and the bureaucrats working under them merely appropriated 
to themselves the new liberty to make decisions within their dockets to assert their power and 
run new centers of power brokerage outside of State House. 130   Thus when KWWG 
                                                 
130It was a classic re-enactment of Mamdani’s notion of decentralized despotism (Mamdani, 1996).  
Cases include (KWS Director) Wamithi’s dissolution of the cropping project without consulting the 
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approached both the minister for wildlife and the Director of KWS to sue for a cooperative 
approach between the wildlife bureaucrats and the landowners, they found that other parties 
with interests diametrically opposed to theirs had actually been there earlier.  Nevertheless, 
they still hoped that they could make their case with a favorable hearing from these wildlife 
authorities.  As shown below, this approach proved bumpy.   
During KWWG’s first call on the minister, both the top ministry bureaucrats and 
KWS director were present.  Thus, it was a fairly well constituted meeting.  The KWWG   
reported that the visit was a big success.  The petition was well received and 
issues raised noted with the seriousness they deserve.  The presence of the 
Director of KWS (Michael Wamithi), the PS, and an Assistant Minister 
(Professor Wangare Mathai) on the ministers team attested to the importance 
of the meeting (KWWG 3, 2003). 
 
KWWG made it clear to the minister that their objectives could be achieved under the current 
Act if only KWS would cooperate with landowners.  Specifically, they wanted to be 
consulted by KWS and to be represented in KWS.  They seem to have gotten this petition 
through (albeit for a short while).  In their report, they observed that  
An assurance was made that Landowners would be consulted to ensure their 
views and interests are adequate (sic) represented on the KWS Board of 
Trustees….The Minister registered enthusiasm for further dialogue and 
willingness to visit individual wildlife fora.  The Director of KWS positively 
responded to the petition and expressed willingness to work with wildlife fora 
(KWWG 3, 2003). 
 
The KWWG delegation, although satisfied that the meeting went on well, at the same time 
sensed that the task ahead was likely to be rough.  This feeling emanated from their 
assessment of some of the comments that came out of the meeting.  During the meeting, both 
                                                                                                                                                       
Board of Trustees (KWWG 11, 2003), the stand off between Maseno University and the Ministry of 
Education over re-admission of students who had been dismissed for various (alleged political) 
crimes; and the minister in charge of wildlife dismissing the Director of KWS, yet according to the 
regulations the President issued as part of the State Corporation Act, the oversight of state corporation 
CEOs is the responsibility of the corporation’s board, who were supposed to operate autonomously 
(RoK, 2004a).   
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the minister and the assistant minister said that they had over-flown Tsavo national park and 
they saw no wildlife.  According to them, there was a decline in wildlife and they seemed to 
attribute this to the pilot wildlife cropping program.  KWWG nursed the fears that the 
ministry could have been captured by opponents of consumptive utilization.131  These fears 
were soon to be confirmed when KWWG’s letters to the minister soon began to go 
unanswered.  For example in the July monthly meeting,  
The Secretariat confirmed having sent a letter to the Minister of Environment, 
Natural Resources and Wildlife, seeking an appointment for him to meet a 
delegation of KWWG of which no feedback had been received….The 
Secretariat reported having sent a letter to the Chairman of KWS seeking to 
have a meeting between him and KWWG members of which there has been 
no feedback (KWWG 7, 2003).  
 
KWWG began to feel that the minister, perhaps under the influence of KWS director, may be 
holding the view that KWWG is a non-entity that is not even registered.  By the end of the 
year, even the director of EAWLS confirmed to KWWG that they need not bother going to 
the minister because he appeared to have shut doors even to EAWLS.132  Indeed, there had 
been an exchange between the director of EAWLS and his counterpart at KWS because the 
latter had written to the former complaining that EAWLS was being derogatory by 
supporting KWWG (KWWG 10, 2003).   
                                                 
131Before the meeting with the minister, KWWG drafted briefs on bush meat trade and the economics 
and sustainability of wildlife use and how these impact on conservation (KWWG 3, 2003).  The 
briefs were drafted and sent to the Minister, including an invitation for him to attend the monthly 
meeting for April, 2003.  By the next monthly meeting, no feedback had been received (KWWG 4, 
2003). 
 
132As mentioned earlier, it was a sub-committee of EAWLS.  EAWLS had a bone to pick with the 
ministry over a court case they had filed during the previous regime and they were not agreed with 
the new regime how the case could be treated.  This could have precipitated sour relations between 
them and the minister (KWWG 2, 2004). 
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The failure to strike a rapport with the ministry’s top-brass does not seem to have had 
anything to do with the personalities there.  Between the beginning of the GG Bill’s initiative 
and its enactment into law by Parliament, KWWG dealt with three different ministers in 
charge of wildlife.133  KWWG again made attempts to work with the second minister.  There 
was actually more enthusiasm about a better rapport with him because he and the chair of 
KWWG came from the same region, thereby signaling the possibilities of informal 
networking, at least, in terms of booking appointments with him.  Moreover, the new 
assistant minister was also from the same region as the chair, and furthermore, his 
constituency is a hot-bed of wildlife menace.134  He could thus be conceptualized as a natural 
ally.  Thus, in terms of the personalities at the ministry headquarters, the fortunes of KWWG 
looked bright.  When KWWG delegation visited the minister, he was described as having 
been very friendly.  In its written report, KWWG delegation referred to its presentation to the 
minister as having been made “…to an alert and jovial minister” (KWWG, 2004c).  Although 
during the informal evaluations of the meeting some delegates noted that the minister went 
out of his way to be friendly,135 they were also quick to point out that “but then he is a 
politician” (KWWG 8, 2004).  This meant that he could be double-faced, a view reinforced 
by his position on the GG. Bill.  The delegation concluded that he did not like the idea of GG 
Bill because he claimed that the initiative would rather be taken over by the ministry.  
                                                 
133The second minister came following a cabinet reshuffle, while the third was acting after the death 
of the substantive minister. 
 
134The assistant minister for Tourism and Wildlife, Boniface Mganga, is from Taita, the district that 
hosts the expansive Tsavo East and West National Parks. 
 
135The minister, for example, told KWWG that in his second day in office, he received presentations 
on how bad KWWG was (KWWG 8, 2004).  He said it was a smear campaign to discredit KWWG.  
Certainly, KWWG members must have felt relived on hearing that the minister did not buy the 
allegations. 
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Unfortunately, the minister passed away before there were follow-up meetings.  How their 
relationship could have unfolded is now a matter of speculation, but one thing that may be 
predicted is that KWWG was still going to be encountering rough terrain.  Two indices point 
to this direction.   
In one respect, there was the minister’s reservation about the GG Bill; yet KWWG 
could not afford to give in to this as will be shown below.  Secondly, KWWG chairman 
reported in the subsequent KWWG meeting that the KWS director had been quoted as saying 
that when KWWG met the minister, they were thrown out through the window and that now 
the whole thing about the GG Bill was in the hands of the government (KWWG 8, 2004).136 
While KWWG could not tell whether the director was privy to the minister’s mind, the need 
to be alert was underscored just incase the director was vindicated.  The tenure of the third 
(acting) minister began after the Bill had made advances in Parliament. As such, it was 
largely uneventful in terms of KWWG lobbying for his support.   
 
KWWG’S Recourse to the National Assembly; the Ground Work and Focus 
Following these actual and anticipated frustrations with wildlife authorities KWWG found it 
necessary to take their cause before the legislators.  The idea was to lobby the ministry, but to 
do so simultaneously with the lobbying of parliamentarians just in case the struggle reached 
the floor of the National Assembly.  KWWG first moved into Parliament through the 
window presented by the Pastoralists Parliamentary Forum.  This is an informal grouping of 
MPs from pastoral areas that is used to rally support for pastoralist interests in and outside 
                                                 
136KWWG chair was so serious about the allegation that he stated he wanted to be quoted though he 
knew a KWS representative was in attendance.   At a certain point, KWS, which experienced a 
succession of directors between the initiation of the GG Bill and debate in Parliament, used to attend 
KWWG’s monthly meetings.  This was after KWWG started making in-roads at the ministry 
headquarters and Parliament.   
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Parliament.  Almost all pastoral areas are endowed with wildlife and thus most of these MPs 
were perceived as sympathetic to wildlife-based issues.  KWWG also had the advantage of 
access to the Speaker of the National Assembly by virtue of him being one of their own as a 
landowner in the wildlife and pastoralist areas.  The linkage with the Speaker proved a good 
anchor to their contact with Members of Parliament and even the minister in charge of 
wildlife (KWWG 4, 2003).  Occasionally, KWWG, and especially its chair, would make 
forays into Parliament to lobby MPs and discuss with them aspects of the proposed Bill.  The 
sequel of this approach was the formation of an informal parliamentary committee on 
wildlife.137  Its aim was to sensitize MPs on law reform within the wildlife sector (KWWG 3, 
2004).   
KWWG began holding meetings with parliamentarians where they conversed for 
things like the need to have a formal wildlife policy, and the need to amend certain sections 
of the current wildlife Act to accommodate the interests of landowners.  The meetings were 
facilitated by a grant to KWWG from USAID.  These meetings took the form of brief 
luncheons or retreat where KWWG got resource persons to take the parliamentarians through 
the key issues that needed to be undertaken.  After one luncheon that was held in Nairobi, 
KWWG came out exuding confidence on the progress they were making in their lobbying 
activities.  During a review of the luncheon in the subsequent monthly meeting,  
Members noted that the luncheon was a big success as pertains sensitizing 
MP’s on the proposed wildlife policy and drawing their input into the 
document, as well as winning their support to lobby for speedy revival of the 
national wildlife policy review process.  It was noted that due to effective 
media coverage of the event, and the on-going human wildlife conflicts…MPs 
and other stakeholders’ interest and support for KWWG activities had been 
aroused (KWWG 7, 2003). 
 
                                                 
137Parliamentarians from tea, coffee and sugar-growing areas have similar informal outfits. 
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In another retreat held in Malindi, various papers were presented on aspects of wildlife 
conservation in Kenya (KWWG 11, 2003).  The idea was to have the parliamentarians 
develop a common front on the wildlife sector.  It was actually at this meeting that the 
parliamentarians’ wildlife caucus was launched (EAWLS, 12 kcb 2004). 
 
KWWG’S Local and Global Successes 
As the momentum on the GG Bill gained ground, KWWG also began to extend its public 
relations initiatives to include other actors outside the country who are interested in aspects 
of wildlife conservation such as consumptive utilization that KWWG sought to have re-
introduced in Kenya.  Such actors included Safari Club International (SCI).  SCI offered to 
aid KWWG lobbying by paying for a trip to Southern African countries practicing 
consumptive utilization so that the legislators can have an empirical view of what the 
industry entails.  KWWG also got funding for this tour from USAID through EAWLS.  The 
tour included ministry officials, KWS, MPs, and KWWG Trustees.  The tour worked well for 
KWWG because MPs in it largely agreed with the idea of consumptive utilization.  During a 
seminar organized to receive a report of this tour, one MP claimed that when the GG. Bill 
comes up for debate he will argue that people have to benefit from wildlife through sports 
hunting, although it should be controlled (EAWLS 11, 2004).  Thus KWWG’s lobbying 
efforts were paying dividends.   
KWWG also made its presentations, like other stakeholders, before formal 
parliamentary institutions such as the public hearing that was held in the Old Chambers of 
Parliament and the parliamentary committee on Finance, Trade, Tourism and Planning.  The 
latter is a formal committee of Parliament that scrutinizes parliamentary bills after the First 
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Reading and makes reports and recommendation to Parliament (Parliament¸ 2004).  During 
the public hearing all attendees were free to express their views, but the formal parliamentary 
committee only received views from invited parties.  These parties were referred in the 
committee’s report to Parliament as “…stakeholders involved in the management of 
wildlife…”(Parliament, 2004).  The “stakeholders” who consulted with the committee were 
KWS, Kenya Human Wildlife Conflict Management Network (KHWCMN), EAWLS, 
Laikipia Wildlife Forum, KWWG, and AWF (Parliament, 2004).  USAID was also involved 
in this consultative meeting, and a consultant group that it had commissioned to review the 
wildlife sector in Kenya made a presentation to the committee.   
Thus this cluster represents both the camps involved in the struggle for and against 
the GG Bill.  While KWWG and EAWLS were supportive of the amendment, both KWS and 
KHWCMN were opposed to the initiative.  The opposition cast the GG Bill as an initiative of 
KWWG, which was portrayed as a grouping of big ranchers out to take advantage of Kenya’s 
wildlife and local communities living with wildlife.  The opposition to the GG Bill was thus 
presented as a critique of the KWWG agenda. 
 
V TAKING SIDES  
The Anti-KWWG Coalition 
The opposition to the GG Bill was presented by a consortium of NGOs that, arguably, was 
fronted by the KHWCMN and Youth for Conservation, who also produced its chairman and 
secretary, respectively (KCWCM 2, 2004; KCWCM 3, 2004; KCWCM 4, 2004; KCWCM 5, 
2004).  This anti-KWWG coalition was not a factor in Kenya’s conservation circles prior to 
the rise of the GG Bill.  As an entity, its creation was a reaction to the GG Bill.  They 
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adopted the name Kenya Coalition for Wildlife Conservation and Management (KCWCM), 
although in some of their documents, there are variations in how they use this phrase.138 
In terms of their self-identification, however, they described themselves as “We, the 
farmers, pastoralists, business people and professionals” from various districts of Kenya that 
they list in their documents (KCWCM 4, 2004, KCWCM 5, 2004; KCWCM 6, 2004).  In the 
majority of the documents they issued during this period, the member organizations of the 
coalition were about fourteen, among them Kenya Human Wildlife Conflict Management 
Network, Youth for Conservation, Kenya Wildlife Coalition, NARC Youth Congress, Action 
Aid International-Kenya, Center for Minority Rights and Development and the Pastoralists 
Information Bureau (KCWCM 4, 2004, KCWCM 5, 2004). 139    While many of these 
organizations existed as individual entities, the Kenya Wildlife Coalition was itself an 
amalgam of other individual NGOs (and also persons) such as Born Free Foundation-Kenya, 
International Fund for Animal Welfare (IFAW-Kenya), Youth for Conservation, Bill 
Woodley Mount Kenya Trust, Friends of Conservation, Pan-African Conservation Network 
(and, perhaps, many others?).140  Critical in this consortium, however, was a group of animal 
rights NGOs that are opposed to consumptive utilization of wildlife and are mostly organized 
                                                 
138Shifting reference of their title betrays the fluidity of their identity, which perhaps suggests that 
they merely adopted a name to keep going.  In other documents, they refer to themselves as “The 
Coalition for Wildlife Conservation Group or the Kenya Coalition for Conservation and 
Management” (papers on file with the author). 
 
139The membership of Narc Youth Congress and Action-Aid is, if it were formal, quite intriguing.  
One would expect them to be non-partisan in such ‘wars’ because their members cut across the 
divide.   For Narc Youth Congress, it is most likely that the leadership made personal decisions to 
join, and then dragged their organizations because having an organization behind one’s membership 
confers clout to an individual’s standing in the movement.  As for Action-Aid International-Kenya, it 
is difficult to comprehend its membership. 
 
140While I did not ask many organizations whether they were members of the Kenya Wildlife 
Coalition, the majority share values on animal welfare and I had no reason to doubt that they would 
hang out together.  
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around the Kenya Wildlife Coalition (KWC).  The composition of KWC is significant in that 
given their values (as animal rightists), it throws some light as to why their opposition to the 
GG Bill was dominated by an anti-hunting accent.   
 
Anti-KWWG Coalition’s Opposition to the GG Bill 
In their opposition to the GG Bill, the anti-KWWG coalition, employed several strategies.  
These included lobbying the parliamentarians, countering the proposals of the proponents of 
the GG Bill during the various wildlife discussion fora in which the issue was discussed, 
using the press and street demonstrations.  Unlike KWWG that began lobbying 
parliamentarians early enough when the GG Bill was still at its infancy, the anti-KWWG 
coalition stepped into the precincts of Parliament after the bill started being processed in 
Parliament.  For instance, it targeted parliamentarians holding meetings outside Parliament.  
Their approach was to show the parliamentarians why the bill was not appropriate, without 
necessarily appearing to be opposed to the amendment of the Wildlife Act given that no MP 
would dare claim that the current Act suffices.  Hence, as shown below, their story line was 
plotted to show that the Bill does not deliver what is required to rectify the current situation, 
and if anything, it could be worse.  The coalition, through one of its scion, the KHWCMN, 
was invited by the parliamentary committee reviewing the bill to submit their views on the 
bill.  Thus, the anti-KWWG coalition had both formal and informal access to Parliament and, 
hence, the opportunity to shape the bill as it was processed by Parliament (contrary to what 
they will claim latter).   
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With respect to the wider constituency of parliamentarians, the coalition organized a 
consultative meeting with them in Nairobi in the run up to the debate of the bill in 
Parliament.  The letter of invitation made to the individual MPs read thus, 
The Coalition of Wildlife Conservation Group…has now organized a 
consultative meeting with members of parliament to facilitate dialogue and 
deepen MPs understanding of the impact of the current Amendment Bill so as 
to realize a more community and human rights responsive legal regime… 
The meeting will be attended by other members of parliament from affected 
areas, policy experts and community representatives … (KCWCM 3, 2004). 
 
The inclusion of community representatives here may be seen as a tactic to undermine the 
claim by the proponents of the GG Bill that it represents the interests of communities.  
Moreover, the idea of deepening MPs’ understanding of the GG Bill was founded on the 
notion propagated by the coalition that the GG Bill did not have community interests as its 
main force, but rather was a sub-text for private interests cloaked in community garb.  In a 
seminar organized to discuss the bill, the acting minister for Tourism and Wildlife asked a 
follow-up question to a participant whose self-identification was member of Youth for 
Conservation: “Are you reducing the bill to the question of hunting?”   The participant 
responded that “there are things hidden in the bill which points towards hunting which we are 
not prepared for.”  As will be shown below, among these issues, for example, will be that of 
compensation and unregulated sports hunting. 
It is also evident, at least from the testimony of some MPs, that the coalition lobbied 
individual MPs against supporting the bill, or associating with KWWG-organized activities 
that had a bearing on facilitating the adoption of the bill.  In the run up to the KWWG-
organized tour of MPs to the southern African countries, some of the MPs in the delegation 
claimed that they were being persuaded by some members of the coalition not to go on the 
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tour.  One of the MPs while giving a report on their experiences and lessons learned from this 
tour stated that,  
A chilling experience during the preparation of the tour was attempts by anti-
utilization lobbies to persuade Members of Parliament and Government not to 
go on this trip.  Why should comparing what others do with what we do in 
Kenya be so frightening? (Hon. Lesirma, 2004). 
 
What this approach suggests then is that both camps had access to the MPs and that they 
lobbied for their preferred positions on this Bill.  If it is true that there were attempts to 
persuade the MPs from participating in the tour, this raises some difficulty in understanding 
the coalition’s objective position because, as will be cited below, one of their grievances 
against the GG Bill was based on the clause on sport-hunting.  The argument of the coalition 
was, in part, that sports hunting had failed in other areas such as the southern African 
countries.  If this was their case then, the more reason one would expect them to be happy 
that the MPs were touring southern Africa to get a first-hand experience of how sport-hunting 
had failed there.  Thus it is the coalition, more than the proponents of hunting, who would 
have wanted the tour to be undertaken because the tour would have made their lobbying even 
easier. 
The coalition also lobbied for the dismissal of the GG Bill in other fora such as the 
EAWLS monthly seminars.  During these monthly meetings, especially those related to 
consumptive utilization, it was clear that there was a sharp and hostile divide between those 
for and against.  Perhaps the one single forum where this emerged clearly was the one 
devoted specifically to debating the way forward on wildlife legislation.  This was organized 
by the EAWLS on December 2nd to 3rd, 2004 in Nairobi and coincided with the week the GG 
Bill was being debated in Parliament.  It was attended by several NGOs, KWS and the acting 
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minister for Tourism and Wildlife.  During the session in which the acting minister was given 
the floor, he engaged the audience in a discussion about the bill.  The speakers from the floor 
who were opposed to the bill spoke while making it clear who they were and that they were 
opposed to the bill for reasons that are explained here below.    
The other strategies the coalition used to indicate their displeasure with the GG Bill 
included press releases and demonstrations.  These strategies were mostly employed after 
Parliament passed the GG Bill.  There was also an attempt to stage a demonstration during 
the meeting of December 2nd referred to above, but it was not clear that the coalition could 
explicitly be linked to this demonstration.  Nevertheless, the coalition’s antagonists were left 
with little doubt that the coalition was behind the demonstrations.  Certain members of the 
coalition were implicated in the demonstration in the sense that one banner was inscribed 
with the words of “NARC YOUTH CONGRESS” which, as pointed below, appears in the 
list of member organizations forming the coalition.  But again, one cannot tell whether this 
was the initiative of an individual member of a member organization, or whether it had the 
blessings of the member organization and then the coalition.  What was clear, however, was 
that the demonstrators were on the side of the protagonists opposed to the GG Bill.  Some of 
their placards read thus (see figure 3): 
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(Figure 3: demonstration placards by opponents of the GG Bill) 
          
            
 The demonstration was composed mostly of youth, accompanied by a few elderly people 
clad in Maasai attire, perhaps a staging device to impress on the community-origins of the 
demonstrators.  Other than for the placards, the demonstration was uneventful, unlike the one 
that was staged consequent to the passing of the bill by Parliament. 
The coalition overtly staged a demonstration against the GG Bill once it was passed 
by Parliament, but before it had received presidential assent in order to become law.  The 
demonstration was aimed at appealing to the President not to assent to the bill.  The coalition 
publicized the demonstration through the press that was invited to cover the  
procession that will present our petition to the President of the Republic of 
Kenya His Excellency Emillio Mwai Kibaki at his Harambee House office 
and later one to the Attorney General, Amos Wako, the Minister for 
Constitutional Affairs Hon Kiraitu Murungi and Ag Minister for Tourism and 
Wildlife Hon Raphael Tuju at their respective offices.  We will converge at 
Uhuru Park at 11 am and proceed to Harambee House at 11.30 am on 
Thursday 16th December 2004 (KCWCM 4, 2004). 
 
MPs are for 
Hire 
Wildlife is 
For 
Posterity 
Hunting 
is 
colonial 
No to  
GG Bill 
 
NARC YOUTH CONGRESS 
Vijana Tosha 
(Youth suffices) 
MPs travel for 
accommodation 
and fun 
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During the demonstration, the coalition issued a press release in which they appealed to the 
President for his intervention in the GG Bill initiative by not assenting to the bill.  They cited 
reasons for their opposition and the fact that  
the local communities will be the major losers if this bill is enacted; …we 
hereby appeal to His Excellency the President to refer this Bill back to 
parliament to allow due constitutional process and appropriate all inclusive 
amendments thereof (KCWCM 5, 2004). 
 
The press release was copied to the above cabinet ministers “…to advise the president 
appropriately” (KCWCM 5, 2004).  The procession participants are then identified as “For 
and on behalf of the Kenya Coalition for Wildlife and Management (Member 
Organisations below) and local communities representatives:” (KCWCM 5, 2004) 
(emphasis in original); below the statement were listed the fourteen organizations. 
Thus here was an attempt to appeal to political support by presenting the opposition 
to the Bill in terms of a popular front.  Perhaps this was meant to counteract the image of 
KWWG as a non-community entity.  In the press release, they dismissed KWWG as  
the so-called District Wildlife Forums, whose constitution and mandate is not 
representative of the local communities.  They are in essence private members 
club of a few elite purportedly representing the local communities.  We, the 
local communities, do not recognize them and their entrenchment in law is a 
disenfranchisement of our involvement in wildlife conservation and 
management (KCWCM 5, 2004). 
 
This observation, coming at the tail end of the drama for the amendment of the Wildlife Act, 
confirms that opposition to the bill had a lot to do with turf wars and hence, why one group 
of representative of communities is dismissed by another as a party of pretenders.  There is 
no evidence, beyond mere claims, that is adduced to show why some are less community 
representatives than the others.  What is undeniable, however, is that while KWWG was 
gaining ground among MPs, the anti-KWWG coalition was inflicting pressure on KWWG.  
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KWWG was making little headway beyond the parliamentarians who, as the denouement 
demonstrated, did not have the last card.141 
 
KWWG and the Pressures of the Opposition to the GG Bill 
Even though Parliament would finally pass the GG Bill, the activities of the anti-KWWG 
coalition put a heavy strain on KWWG.  These pressures were felt by KWWG at several 
levels, including its interaction with the ministry in charge of wildlife and KWS, those 
facilitating its activities such as USAID, and within its ranks where the struggle for the 
review of the Wildlife Act threatened to split KWWG.  As KWWG made headway in 
Parliament, the ministry seemed to have realized that KWWG cannot just be ignored, 
whatever its critics were saying about it not being representative.  So, to take the thunder 
away from KWWG, the minister in charge of wildlife started making overtures to the mover 
of the bill.  During the public hearing on the GG Bill that was held in the Old Chambers of 
Parliament, one MP claimed that the minister is asking them not to move too fast.  The MP 
said that their response to that is that their horses have been held for too long and they cannot 
wait any longer.  Moreover, that it was clear the bill will pass with an overwhelming majority 
and “not a single MP will oppose it.”  He then observed that it was only the World Bank that 
could now stop the passing of the bill if it threatened to stop aid.142 
When the ministry failed to slow down the process, it then suggested that it should 
take over the bill and move it as a ministry’s project.  The minister approached the mover 
                                                 
141In strict parliamentary practice, they have the last card because they could still overrule presidential 
objection.  This, however, would require a two-thirds majority of the House, which is impractical in 
the current Parliament.  
 
142This was an allusion to the tendency of the World Bank to attach conditionality to aid.  The 
government would be unable to adopt the Bill if the World Bank confronted it. 
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who, however, refused to hand over the initiative, leading the minister to seek the 
intervention of the convener of the MPs wildlife caucus.  Nevertheless, there was a cabinet 
reshuffle before the minister succeeded in taking over the bill.  The next minister and even 
KWS continued with the same approach.  KWS trustees were also trying to impress the 
sponsor of the bill to give them time, but they did not succeed.  Part of the explanations for 
this failure by KWS was that there may have been a communication breakdown (EAWLS 8, 
2004).  The second minister also expressed his interest to take over the bill.  When KWWG 
visited the minister, he raised the issue of the GG Bill and  
noted that the best way forward was to work with the government (his 
ministry taking charge of the review process), since, he averred, the 
reasons for taking the Hon. GG route no longer abounds (KWWG, 
2004c). 
 
This trend to take over the bill continued with the third minister but apparently Parliament 
was debating the bill by the time the minister was telling a meeting of stakeholders that he is 
holding talks with the sponsor of the bill (EAWLS, kcb).  Thus, even as the bill went into its 
final stage, the ministry still had reservations about it.   
The pressures on KWWG to accommodate the establishment also came from its 
“allies” such as USAID.  As pointed out earlier, USAID was a critical actor in the life of 
KWWG because it was literally funding single-handedly the activities of KWWG—
especially in the first two years.  Thus USAID’s intervention could not be taken lightly.  To 
KWWG, this intervention showed the extent the anti-KWWG lobbies could go to halt its 
advance.  At one time, it was reported in a KWWG meeting that there has been an 
orchestrated campaign for KWWG to lose funding from USAID (KWWG 3, 2004).143  Later, 
                                                 
143The idea would be to demobilize the trustees because without donor funding, they were not going 
to meet frequently in the capital city.  Without such meetings to lobby and show some semblance of 
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an attempt was made by USAID to prevail over KWWG to halt their push for the GG Bill, 
but the chairman of KWWG said they could only wait for two weeks (KWWG 7, 2004).  At 
one time, USAID even indicated that it was willing to mediate between KWWG and KWS to 
see if the two could agree on a way forward.  USAID asked the director of KWS to come up 
with a plan to that effect.  The chairman of KWWG tried unsuccessfully to pursue this 
suggestion with the director of KWS (KWWG 8, 2004).  Then, KWWG began hearing 
individual USAID staff (i.e. not official USAID position) express opinion that suggested that 
USAID was raising issues on the bill similar to those raised by the anti-KWWG coalition.  
Some of these views included claims such as the lack of education and capacity by district 
wildlife forums to run a wildlife industry as would obtain if the GG Bill was passed.  And 
then, during a KWWG meeting, “It was learnt that USAID was pushing for comprehensive 
review as opposed to the Hon. GG’s hot parch/piece meal approach.” (KWWG 9, 2004).  
This view was popular with the opponents of the bill.  It featured prominently, for example, 
in the stakeholders’ meeting organized by EAWLS to review the bill after the acting minister 
had asked the participants whether they were all in support of the bill (EAWLS kcb, 2004).  
The pressures on KWWG also came from within its ranks.   
 
VI TOLL OF PARTISANHIP ON KWWG 
Imminent Split of KWWG 
KWWG’s push for the GG Bill threatened to split KWWG.  Laikipia Wildlife Forum at one 
time almost pulled out of KWWG, claiming that KWWG’s style was abrasive and not 
accommodative to other stakeholders in the wildlife sector (such as the Greens).  Laikipia 
                                                                                                                                                       
institutionalisation, KWWG would be a spent force.  Its story would then have been similar to the 
first National Wildlife Forum. 
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Wildlife Forum argued that KWWG was taking an overtly pro-hunting stand that created 
wrong perceptions of KWWG.  These wrong perceptions were in turn negating Laikipia 
Wildlife Forum’s initiatives and undermining its partnership with donors, NGOs and 
communities (KWWG 3, 2004).  According to KWWG, the problem was the intrigues by the 
Greens.  They were thought to be putting pressure on Laikipia Wildlife Forum to pull out of 
KWWG.  The pull- out would have weakened the image of KWWG because Laikipia 
Wildlife Forum is among the three well-organized fora.   
Given all these pressures, the question may then be asked why KWWG was not quick 
to let the ministry take over the legislative review process.  Several reasons may account for 
this.  In one respect, KWWG was suspecting some foul play given the way state organs were 
handling the GG. Bill.  Secondly, they were concerned that the takeover bid could be a 
delaying tactic, and third, there was the dilemma presented by NARC144 politics. 
 
KWWG’S Reluctance to Work Within the Establishment 
KWWG was concerned that when the GG Bill was handed over to the technocrats who fine 
tunes parliamentary bills before they are debated, it had been tempered with beyond 
acceptable technical inputs (KWWG 7, 2004). 145   When they consulted those 
parliamentarians who are also lawyers, the latter argued that the only way out was to 
introduce amendments from the floor of the House (KWWG 8, 2004).  A document that was 
                                                 
144Politicians who came together on the eve of the 2002 General Election formed Narc to contest 
aganst the then ruling party (National Rainbow Coalition) instead of contesting through individual 
political parties.  Some politicians, however, retained allegiance to their parties, even when they were 
elected on a Narc ticket. 
 
145If this happened, it may have taken place between the office of the Clerk to the National Assembly 
and the Attorney-General’s Chambers. 
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produced towards this end throws some light on what KWWG considered extraneous 
introduction.  In one case, after proposing to “Delete in toto” (KWWG, 2004e) the clause on 
definitions, the memo concluded that “The proposed definitions are ill-thought out, badly 
worded and unnecessary.  They have no relevance to amending the GG amendment” 
(KWWG, 2004e).   Another disputed clause (RoK, 2004b: 10 (b)), sought to give the 
Director of KWS powers to regulate utilization of land in which wildlife is to be found.  The 
memo stated that it was “unacceptable” because it amounts to giving the Director power to 
determine utilization of private land contrary to the provisions of the Agricultural Act (Cap 
318), and that in any case the Director’s powers are provided elsewhere in both the parent 
Act and the GG Bill (RoK, 1977a: 47 (2)(c)(d); RoK, 2004b: 47A).  The memo observed that 
“Whoever drafted it was profoundly ignorant of the existing law” (KWWG, 2004E).  This 
and other clauses (such as 11, 12, of which the memo recommended “Pointless: delete 
completely” (KWWG, 2004e))146 suggest that there were things that appeared in the Bill 
tabled in Parliament that fundamentally changed it from the one KWWG had crafted with the 
mover.        
Moreover, KWWG could not feel comfortable entrusting a project they had banked 
on so much to an institution that they felt was hostage to the Green lobby (see, for example, 
Kabiri, 2006).  As observed above, the minister had approached the convener of the MPs 
Wildlife Caucus to intervene with the sponsor of the motion, yet this particular MP had no 
reservation in expressing his distaste for the adverse influence of the Green lobby in Kenya’s 
wildlife policy.  During the KWS-organized stakeholders’ conference, he confessed, while 
giving a vote of thanks to the ministry, that as a result of the conference, he had formed a 
different view about the minister after the latter attended the conference throughout to listen 
                                                 
146The two clauses amended sections in the principal Act that deals with hunting. 
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to the landowners.  Otherwise, he averred, he previously had always looked upon the 
minister as one who was captured by the Greens (KWS Conf. 2004).  KWWG members also 
shared this view (Powys, 2002).  Thus, given this KWWG attitude to the establishment, 
handing over the bill to the ministry would have amounted, in KWWG’s view, to contracting 
the Green lobby to author it in their own image, if at all it would be authored.  Furthermore, 
the ministry had a legacy of stalling wildlife legislative review initiatives.     
KWWG feared that, if the history of legislative review was anything to go by, the 
ministry’s desire to intervene could be a delaying tactic to drag the review for ever.  One 
KWWG member narrated that when he was trying to start the first wildlife ranching in 
Kenya in 1977, he communicated with the wildlife service and they told him that they were 
reviewing the policy and will get back to him.  He had not heard from them by 2004 when he 
was making these remarks (EAWLS kcb, 2004).  In addition, the ministry was giving 
conflicting signals regarding their intention to review the wildlife legislation.  For one, when 
KWWG visited the ministry for the first time, they were advised to pursue selective 
amendments since a comprehensive review of the wildlife Act was not a priority because 
attention was on the mining and forestry sectors (KWWG, 2003).  Even a KWS official 
claimed the same advice had been given to them in the past: that if they have problems with 
some aspects of work, they could review those rather than thinking of reviewing the entire 
Act (EAWLS kcb, 2004).  As the temple for the GG Bill gained ground, opponents began 
saying that what was required in the wildlife sector is not piece-meal reforms but a 
comprehensive review of the Act.  As pointed above, even USAID was considered to share 
this opinion (KWWG 9, 2004).  This shift in gears could thus be seen as an attempt to deflate 
a process that was already headed to conclusion.  By the time such proposals favoring 
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comprehensive review appeared, KWWG was deep in rapport with the legislators, albeit they 
still had the schism in the national party politics to take care of. 
 
KWWG and the NARC Politics 
The division in the NARC politics represented yet another dilemma for KWWG, and 
particularly in terms of handing over the review initiative to the ministry.  With one section 
of NARC having denounced their partners in the ruling party, the fear was that if the 
initiative goes to the floor of the House as a government agenda, the rebelling wing could 
side with the opposition to shoot it down.  This problem was not hypothetical.  Previously, 
the Forest Bill that was tabled in Parliament as a government bill was rejected.  Some MPs 
who voted against it claimed that there was nothing wrong with the bill but they shot it down 
in order to teach the government a lesson (Nation 3, 2004).  When the KWWG chairman held 
consultations with some MPs, a few thought that the bill should perhaps be withheld so that 
the anti-government heat could cool down and hence avoid a replay of the Forest Bill.  The 
rest, however, were of the opinion that the GG Bill was not a government bill and could thus 
not suffer the fate of the Forest Bill (KWWG 7, 2004).  The fears of a backlash in Parliament 
became more pronounced, however, when an acting minister took charge of the ministry.  
The minister had broken ranks with his colleagues in the NARC-affiliate party that had 
rebelled against the government (even though they were still serving in government).  
Rumors were then in air that if the minister were to move the bill instead of the original 
sponsor, then the MPs in the rebelling wing of the coalition (the Liberal Democrat Party) 
would oppose it.   
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The rumors seem to have been so real to those close to the lobbyists of the bill that an 
article appeared in the daily press urging the MPs to put aside sectarian differences to avoid 
killing a policy that they, as individuals, subscribe to (Forster, 2004).  Thus KWWG had 
grounds to fear that the GG Bill could meet the fate of the Forest Bill.  Consequently, they 
argued that the ministerial overtures to take over the bill should be rejected.  It was thus 
presented to Parliament as a private member’s bill. 
 
VII The Wildlife Amendment Bill, 2004 in Parliament 
The bill was debated in Parliament and, remarkably, the heat it generated outside Parliament 
was not reflected inside Parliament.  This suggests that there were forces outside Parliament 
who seemed to draw their inspiration from elsewhere other than from the communities.  Had 
this inspiration been drawn from the communities, then the people’s representatives in a 
Parliament that is arguably very free to air its views (vide its assault on the Forest Bill), could 
have echoed these sentiments inside Parliament.147  The reason behind the inside/outside 
Parliament dichotomy is that the center of conflict lay in the sensationalized politics of 
sport/recreational hunting.  This is a question that seems to have been inspired by ethical 
considerations on the side of those fronting for it, the animal rights or Green lobby.   
Nevertheless, because they operate in a secular state, it was not possible to advance 
overtly the argument that their opposition is founded on moral grounds.  So, it would appear 
that their strategy was to argue in empirical terms in which they averred that sports hunting is 
not tenable because one, there are no structures to regulate it, and two, it does not guarantee 
any benefits to the local communities but will only benefit the rich ranchers.  In the latter 
                                                 
147Of course, critics of the bill can claim MPs are compromised, as one of the placards cited earlier 
posited. 
 231 
 
case, they may be understood as playing the race card because most of the big ranchers 
involved in the wildlife industry are Kenyans of European ancestry.  The provision for 
consumptive utilization in the GG Bill was, perhaps more than any other of its provisions, 
responsible for the acrimony it generated.   
 
VIII Center of Conflict: the Greens and the Politics of Sports Hunting 
The GG Bill sought to re-introduce non-consumptive utilization of wildlife (RoK, 2004b: sec 
10 (b) (3).  This was the most contentious issue.  As stated earlier, hunting was banned in 
1977, but elements of it were re-introduced in 1990 as wildlife cropping.  Nevertheless, 
Sport-/recreational hunting was not re-introduced, in spite of several KWS administrative 
initiatives to review the wildlife sector favoring its re-introduction (KWS 1, 1990; KWS, 
1996; Wanjala and Kibwana, 1996).  In the 1990 KWS policy review, for example, KWS 
noted that it may have to concede wildlife consumptive utilization in land use (1990: 42, 
46ff, 53).  The re-introduction of sport- hunting nevertheless remained elusive up to the time 
of the GG Bill when its implementation seemed imminent.  Various forces were associated 
with the drive to either re-introduce or oppose its re-introduction.  Certain observers of the 
wildlife sector pointed at the big land owners as the ones behind the push for the re-
introduction of sport-hunting (see, for example, Opanga, 1997; COBRA 1, 1994), while the 
hoteliers and the Green lobby are, on the other hand, associated with the opposition to its re-
introduction (KWS, 1996: 6).  The anti-hunting lobby is somehow able to sell its case to the 
government.   
As far back as 1975, for example, the government had issued a policy paper on 
wildlife in which it argued in a way similar to that of the hoteliers and tour operators, as an 
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appeal to the west’s sympathy to the country’s pursuit of sports hunting. The statement 
observed,  
Overseas public education activities are extremely important, from the 
standpoint of the future economic value of wildlife.  Potential donors 
must be informed of the difference between simple preservation and 
conservation, so that donations do not dry up due to 
misunderstandings.  Even more important, we must ensure that the 
potentially large and secure export market, for the products of 
consumptive wildlife utilization (sports hunting, sales of meat, skins 
and other trophies), are not foreclosed through ignorant 
“preservationist” pressure on overseas Governments and firms.  
Already there is some evidence to suggest that prices of some skins 
have fallen due to such pressure.  If wildlife are to “pay their way” 
over large parts of Kenya, such development as this must be 
reversed—and quickly (RoK, 1975, 35).   
 
The government was thus sensitive to two issues related to sport-hunting, one, the enterprises 
that are based on the wildlife sector, and two, the donations to the wildlife sector.  Tourism is 
a critical player in the economy not only because of earning direct foreign exchange but also 
because of its contribution to the economy through the spin-off benefits that are associated 
with the hotel industry that tourism supports.  To this extent, the hoteliers and tour operators 
who, unlike landowners, have for a long time been organized in powerful lobbies such as 
KATO, are always eager to voice their concern to the possible image dent that a resumption 
of sport-hunting could effect on the country’s tourism industry.148   
The government is also alert to the voice of the donors because, while it values the 
wildlife sector as an engine of economic growth, it is unable to allocate a sufficient budget to 
it due to other pressing demands and thus relies on donors to fill the void (see, for example, 
                                                 
148Since the demise of apartheid in South Africa, some proponents of sport-hunting have argued that 
the argument that tourists were being lost because they find sport-hunting morally repulsive has been 
discredited because Kenya is now operating under the fear of loosing its traditional clientele to South 
Africa, yet the latter pursues consumptive and non-consumptive use of wildlife (Mathenge, 2002; see 
also Loefler, 2004b).  
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Kabiri, 2006).149 It is in this light that the NGOs, and especially the Green lobby, have 
become an active player in the formulation and direction of the wildlife policy in Kenya 
(whether formally or informally).  As argued in Kabiri (2006), landowners who are the 
proponents of sport-hunting, hold the Greens as entirely responsible for the failure by the 
government to legalize consumptive utilization of wildlife.  The Greens on the other hand, do 
not make secret their opposition to sport-hunting, though they may not own up to the implicit 
accusations of compromising state wildlife officials (KWWG, 2003c; Powys, 2002).   
In their opposition to sport-hunting, the Greens portray it as not being in the best 
interests of the wildlife conservation project.  They argue that if the latest experiment in 
wildlife cropping is anything to go by, consumptive utilization would only benefit a tiny 
segment of society, yet wildlife is a national heritage.  The latest cropping project, they 
argue, was confined to a small class of rich large landowners that has made consumptive 
wildlife utilization an elitist phenomenon.  This argument is then slanted to impress on the 
fact that these large landowners are whites, thereby giving the clamor for the re-introduction 
of sport-hunting a racial accent.  In a presentation prepared for the KWS Board of Trustees, 
KWWG in asserting its legitimacy, was forced to address this racial slant that threatened to 
cloud their identity.  They averred that  
We are a genuinely participatory and democratic organization 
representing solely the interests of private and communal Kenyan 
landowners and landusers… 
We feel it is important to reiterate this, to redress the inaccurate 
perception that the KWWG is some sort of elitist club of rich, mainly 
European, landowners interested only in game cropping and trophy 
hunting (KWWG, 2003a).  
                                                 
149Donors heavily subsidize the KWS budget and if they withdrew funding, its activities could 
severely be compromised (see, for example, KWS/USAID, 2004). 
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The perception referred to emanated from the cropping legacy where large landowners, who 
were also whites, were said to have been favored in the allocation of quotas for cropping 
(EAWLS 8, 2003; KWS, 1996:12; People, 2004a and 2004b).   
This story line has been rehearsed so well that it has almost become popular opinion.  
Indeed, even when KWWG initially made forays into Parliament, most parliamentarians 
were concerned about what stake was in the project for the people or whether the venture was 
simply for European ranchers (KWWG 7, 2004).  This echo of big ranchers was formally 
heard when the parliamentary committee reviewing the GG Bill recommended the rejection 
of a clause (RoK, 2004b: (15)) that sought to replace the minister with the KWS Board of 
Trustees as the agent overseeing recreational hunting.  In the current Act this role is assigned 
to the minister (RoK, 1977a: 37).  The committee recommended that the powers must remain 
with the government because “The Board may easily succumb to external influence more so 
in areas where the big Ranch farmers’ interest are (sic) concerned” (Parliament, 2004).  In 
taking this position, the parliamentary committee could take recourse to public debate to 
claim that they were not simply entertaining wild imaginations.  An opinion article in print 
media had asserted, for example, that  
For the record, when Njonjo was the chairman of the Board and 
Leakey the vice-chairman, KWS danced to the whims of game 
ranchers and to the detriment of Kenya’s conservation goals (Mbaria, 
2003). 
 
This can then be seen as a hint that in popular opinion, there is a feeling that the big ranchers 
may not be trusted with the wildlife sector. 
The specter of white big ranchers as being the ones who will be the single 
beneficiaries of a sports hunting project had become so dominant that in a workshop on 
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wildlife utilization, the Speaker of the National Assembly150 had to counter, while reacting to 
an opponent of sport-hunting who had argued along the racial lines, that such opponents had 
to be disabused of the notion that a landowner means a white rancher (KWS conf, 2004).  A 
parliamentarian added that proponents of wildlife utilization have been depicted as acting at 
the behest of the white ranchers, but in any case, these ranchers are also Kenyans (KWS 
conf, 2004).  The KWWG chair also took up the issue and argued that while he had been 
accused of fronting for the white ranchers, it should be made clear that there were only 71 of 
them, majority in Laikipia district, while in Tana River district where he comes from, there 
are no white ranchers (EAWLS kcb, 2004).  The Greens, therefore, had managed to make the 
issue of class and race a factor in the way the debate on consumptive utilization was handled.  
This served them well because the two issues are emotive, given the level of deprivation 
among most communities that suffer damage from wildlife.  It was, therefore, easy to whip 
up emotions against recreational hunting through the twin issues of disproportionate benefit-
sharing and, as shown below, resource degradation.               
The anti-hunting lobby further argued that consumptive utilization, as was carried out 
under wildlife cropping between 1990 and 2003, proved that it can be a disastrous wildlife 
management technique.  In several fora where wildlife utilization was discussed, the Green 
lobby argued that it was used as a conduit for, or at least inspired, the bush meat trade that is 
blamed for the decline of wildlife in large numbers (EAWLS 8, 2003; EAWLS 10, 2003; 
EAWLS 11, 2003; KWS conf, 2004).  In addition, KWS was unable to supervise cropping 
                                                 
150Who is always quick to say he discusses wildlife issues in such fora in his private capacity as a 
landowner, not as the Speaker of the National Assembly (KWS conf., 2004). 
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quotas with the result that animal census were inflated leading to over-harvesting.151  To this 
extent, it was argued that if KWS was unable to control a pilot cropping project, how can it 
run a sport- hunting industry?  The favored conclusion then is that if sport-hunting were 
introduced it would be unmanageable and thus spell doom to the wildlife sector.   
Nevertheless, KWWG and the proponents of consumptive utilization saw the Greens’ 
position in a different way.  They argued that the opposition to hunting is based on 
                                                 
151Studies commissioned to review the wildlife cropping scheme were not unanimous on whether it 
was a success.  They polarized the protagonists just as before, with each camp supporting studies 
deemed to verify their position.  While the Greens supported the report that argued that cropping was 
abused because it was KWS’ own review (a convoluted logic though, given that the consultants are 
free to report as they wish), landowners said in several fora that the census that informed cropping 
quotas was done annually and approved by KWS representatives. Another study (Barnett, 20002) that 
showed that animal numbers had increased where cropping was practiced was rejected by the Greens.  
They said it had not factored the ranchers’ manipulation of animal movement.  They claim ranchers 
enclose wildlife in the ranches during census, giving the wrong impression regarding wildlife in the 
ranches.  This line of reasoning was actually pursued through a question to the principal investigator 
in the study during a wildlife seminar for stakeholders to review the GG Bill (EAWLS kcb, 2004).  
Similarly, a wildlife study KWS/USAID funded through the COBRA project that recommended 
wildlife consumptive utilization, came under criticism from one evaluator of the project.  The 
criticism posited that the  
Composition of team commissioned to undertake study undermines its credibility.   Even 
though the conclusions reached by the utilization study, that consumptive wildlife-use rights 
can and should be devolved to landowners is reasonable, the composition of the team 
undermines its credibility.  Some team members are closely connected with large private land 
holders and managers, the group that stands to benefit most from an easing of regulation 
controlling consumptive use of wildlife.  The input from communities was minimal.  This 
was reflected in an unbalanced analysis of the issues.  
On cropping, the criticism argued that  
….the technical component of the utilization study understated what appears to be some  
serious problems with the pilot utilization program now in place.  For example, it is claimed 
in the report that wildlife numbers in Machakos are stable in spite of cropping.  Close 
scrutiny of the data tells a different story.  The statement that overall wildlife numbers 
remained the same between 1991 and 1995 is correct.  However, of the 8 ranches that had 
utilization quotas between 1991 and 1995, five registered a decline in wildlife numbers that 
ranged up to 42%.  One ranch, however, claimed an increase in wildlife numbers of 256%.  
The remarkable biological performance of this one ranch made up for the loss in the other 
five ranches where wildlife numbers were reduced.  Unfortunately, it is difficult to believe 
wildlife count figures, especially when quotas are calculated as a percentage of wildlife 
numbers as determined by the user.  Therefore, while agreeing with most of the 
recommendations reached by the utilization study, we feel it lacked balance.  This we 
attribute to the composition of the team that undertook the study.  A different team probably 
would have come up with different recommendations (AWF commissioned the team of 
consultants (Queiroz, n.d.: 10-11)).  
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preservationist ideologies that oppose killing of wildlife for sports.  In executing their 
desires, KWWG contend, the Greens have an advantage over landowners because they are 
able to capture policy makers (by doling out donations to KWS) and hence impose their 
ideology on Kenyans (see Kabiri, 2006, for a further exposition on how this argument was 
propounded).  This clout of the conservationists was not a new phenomenon.  As we saw in 
the last chapter, they were active in trying to impose their view of conservation on the state 
right from the colonial era.  Even bigger actors such as the World Bank could not ignore 
them.  As Western has observed, conservation actors trying to bring in community interests 
in conservation projects had difficulties looping in the bank because it was sensitive to what 
the environmentalist would do.  Western writes that,      
The World Bank, though warming to the idea of balancing conservation and 
development, fretted about the response of conservation groups.  The last 
thing the Bank wanted was a roasting from the environmentalists for letting 
the Maasai get a foot back in Amboseli after Kenyatta had annexed the land 
for wildlife.  The Bank only accepted when the New York Zoological Society 
supported the project (Western, 1997: 130-1).   
 
Thus, while proponents of the Bill never made secret the fact that they want to make capital 
out of wildlife, their interlocutors’ position was not merely what was played out in public.  It 
may have had nothing to do with the reasons advanced in public; rather, it was about a 
certain ideological adherence, but one that was sponsored in public through the language of 
ecology.  It was a project aimed at preserving certain areas as pristine as possible, devoid of 
human activity.  This desire has to do with what one commentator of these struggles has 
called a pseudo-ideology, emotional conservationism or religious environmentalism that 
perceives human activity on nature as immoral (Loefler, 2004a, 2004b; Bonner, 1993).  
Sport-hunting certainly offends this desire more than anything else, thereby making it a 
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highly emotive and politicized issue (USAID/Kenya, 2004; Leakey, 2001; Pearce, 1998; 
Western, 1997; Bonner, 1993) hence, the protracted opposition to the GG Bill.   
The question for analysis here is whether the opposition was informed by a desire to 
see a well fashioned wildlife sector or it was ignited by a sentimental view of wildlife as the 
bill’s proponents felt.  As discussed above, many proponents of the bill had no doubt that this 
sentimental aversion to hunting was the central thread informing the opponents of the bill.  
There are compelling grounds to support this view.  The claims of the opponents were too 
frail to stand on their own.  The anti-bill lobby argued that it is inappropriate to introduce 
hunting yet there is no infrastructure to regulate the industry.  They also averred that 
managing the hunting enterprise would not be possible given the corruption levels in the 
country and, therefore, hunting should not be introduced until corruption was completely 
wiped out first (EAWLS 11, 2003; Mbaria, 2002).  The problem of re-introducing hunting 
was also portrayed in terms of the proposed structure of the board of KWS.  It was argued 
that given that landowners will dominate the board (not really, as will be shown latter), and 
the board will have a hand in hiring the director, then it would mean that sport-hunting would 
be regulated by the ranchers through their proxies and thus there would be a conflict of 
interests (KCWCM 5, 2004).  Examples were also cited from Tanzania where it was said that 
the sport-hunting project is in disarray, with the slaughter of wildlife having reached 
uncontrollable proportions (EAWLS 11, 2003; MERC, 2002).152  In light of these, opponents 
held that sport-hunting would only benefit hunters, not the communities.   
                                                 
152Critics of the hunting industry in Tanzania were brought to give their view on the game carnage 
and agony of communities in areas where hunting was taking place (EAWLS 11, 2003; See also, 
MERC, (2002) for a report on the Loliondo hunting scandals — as its critics call it.  On whether 
consumptive wildlife utilization in Tanzania should inform Kenya’s policies on whether to hunt or 
not, see, for example, Kabiri, 2005a). 
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Their opposition, however, failed to disclose discernible reasons for the stand they 
took.  To argue, for example, that there was no infrastructure to support sport-hunting 
without specifying what kind of infrastructure they were referring to was tantamount to 
asking the proponents of sport-hunting to purusue a mirage.  What would have been expected 
of the opponents was to tabulate sequentially what should be put in place for their standards 
of infrastructure to be satisfied.  Similarly, the claim on corruption sounded almost hilarious.  
While it is true that this is an issue, to claim that it needed to be wiped out completely before 
sport-hunting was introduced was to set standards for one sector that were not prescribed for 
other sectors; why in sport-hunting?  Corruption pervades various facets of a body politic and 
the only way out to deal with it is vigilance by those members of society with an interest in a 
particular sector.  In this way, they would help to police and regulate the industry.  
Otherwise, it is presumptuous to pose the proposition that life should stop because there is 
corruption in society; and no known society has in any case wiped out corruption, in 
whatever ways one may define it.  Hence, the claim by the opponents fails to muster 
credibility in the way it was executed.  
In addition, the opposition, as outlined, failed to give other dimensions of the hunting 
enterprise which could, if animal sentimentalism was not the issue, lead to a different 
conclusion.  In one respect, hunting in Kenya has been going on, only that it is illegal.  
Opponents of re-introduction of legal hunting did not say how this should be stopped.  They 
operate on a very strange proposition: that legalizing sport-hunting will provide a cover for 
the bush meat trade.  The untenable implication is that if you curtail legal sports hunting, 
bush meat trade will wither away.  Yet, poaching also serves local dietary concerns and other 
interests first and foremost.   
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On the other hand, the proponents of sport-hunting contend that one way out is to 
give communities some incentives to control illegal hunting by giving them  a stake in 
wildlife, hence the need to give them quotas in sport-hunting.  This seems to be a more 
resourceful way of controlling the problem than merely slapping a ban, which has not 
worked anyway.  Moreover, the Tanzanian experience was quoted disingenuously.  
Communities in Tanzania are not calling for the abolition of the hunting industry, but rather, 
for a stake in its control so that they can stem the malpractices going on in the industry (see 
previous chapters on Tanzania here).  Thus, both communities in Tanzania and the GG Bill 
share the same platform.  The argument against the bill was being crafted selectively in so far 
as it could undermine the sports hunting project, the actual cause for the opposition to the 
bill; other issues were merely diversionary.  A look at the issues that were debated in the GG 
Bill throws more light on the significance of the unstated claims in the opposition to the bill.   
 
IX Issues in the GG Bill Debate 
Two of these issues included, one, who the stakeholders in the wildlife sector are, and a 
concomitant question being who owns wildlife in Kenya.  The other issue touched on who 
would drive the process of legislative and policy formulation, with the attendant question 
being whether the GG Bill addressed the interests of the majority of Kenyans.  
 
On the Question of the Share Holders and Ownership of Wildlife 
In a debate as heated as the one dealing with how to utilize a resource, the question of who 
are the stakeholders is not merely academic.  It is a practical question because underlying its 
resolution is the confirmation of, or exclusion from, locus standi to participate in the 
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deliberations at stake.  The disputants in the wildlife sector in Kenya are very alive to this 
fact and their conception of stakeholders has to do with either eliminating nuisance 
contenders from the sector, or giving one a foothold in the sector.  While some people argued 
that the stakeholders are the landowners, the state and the NGOs, majority of the landowners 
hold that the government and the landowners are the stakeholders in the wildlife sector with 
the rest only being interested parties (KWWG 3, 2004).  The question of interested parties 
was heavily debated during the KWS-sponsored wildlife utilization conference.  Opponents 
of community ownership of wildlife argued that wildlife cannot just be conceptualized as 
belonging to those living with it because if a river starts from somebody’s farm, even others 
down stream have a right to it.  This was an attempt to conceptualize wildlife as national 
property. 
While one camp applauded the definition of wildlife as a state property just as 
titanium or gold, and as a national resource, the distinction of stakeholders and interested 
parties was eloquently articulated by the Speaker of the National Assembly.  He contended 
that the proposition that wildlife belong to the state is one of a century ago.153  He posed the 
question, to thunderous applause from the floor, “Who says that wildlife belongs to the 
government and who is government anyway?”  He contended that in any case, people are the 
government and the government exists to ensure the wishes of the people are met and not the 
other way round.  In addressing the question of ownership, he posited that there are various 
groups in conservation.   
                                                 
153Nevertheless, this proposition is repeated in several quarters.  Kameri-Mbote (2002: 158, 171), for 
example, observes that in Kenya, the state owns wildlife.  She, however, favors joint ownership 
among individuals, communities, local government and the state because their land provide wildlife 
habitat (Kameri-Mbote: 2002:184).  In this respect, she shares Kaparo’s opinion. However, a 
proposed Wildlife Bill, 1996, that was never implemented had defined wildlife ownership as being 
vested in the state whether it was in private, trust or public land (Wanjala and Kibwana,, 1996:18). 
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These groups included those who have never seen any wildlife except in books, or 
websites or zoo, yet they are the ones who seem to love wildlife more, even more than those 
who live with the wildlife; then there are those who live with the wildlife and bear the cost of 
wildlife production; there are those who make money out of wildlife, but put in nothing into 
the sector; then there are those who pretend they know policy, yet they know nothing, and 
then there is the government that presumes it owns wildlife, yet fear codifying its ownership 
into law (for fear of incurring liability).  From this, he concluded that wildlife belongs to 
those living with it and advised the animal lovers that the earlier that is recognized, the better 
for their enterprise otherwise they will soon have nothing to be sentimental about because 
wildlife will disappear (because communities will eliminate it).  A number of 
parliamentarians who addressed the same issue in other wildlife seminar fora shared this 
opinion and insisted that the people own the wildlife; another parliamentarian claimed that in 
areas such as southern Africa where the government has devolved wildlife to local 
communities, wildlife is part of livestock,154 while another stated that it is him (meaning as a 
citizen) who owns the wildlife while the government only owns it in a political sense 
(EAWLS 11, 2004; EAWLS kcb, 2004).155 
The argument on stakeholders versus interested parties as advanced by Kaparo is 
supported by others on the ground that the issue at stake is that of agricultural land.  To this 
extent, for people other than the government to claim a right over resources in private land is 
                                                 
154Child (1990:164) observes that in Namibia, the 1967 wildlife legislation gave full ownership rights 
to landowners.  Namibia is one of the countries the Kenyan delegation on the Southern African 
wildlife tour visited. 
 
155It was not clear what he meant by state ownership in a political sense after claiming that he owns it.  
But this claim was perhaps along the same lines of land ownership.   While individuals have titles 
giving them private ownership to land, the government retains ownership of all land through the 
doctrine of eminent domain (see, for example, URT, 1977 (2000); RoK (1998) sec. 75, 118-119). 
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to imply invading private property and would constitute a taking.  These other people have 
rights over wildlife in national parks and, therefore, the question of who owns what wildlife 
should be seen within the context of the migratory nature of wildlife.  When wildlife is 
outside the parks, it belongs to the landowners on whose land it is and when it is back to the 
park, it belongs to the state and hence the public.  Proponents of that thinking contend that 
those unwilling to buy that kind of arrangement should simply ensure that wildlife does not 
migrate into private property and it will remain in the arks and hence remain under 
state/public ownership.  Thus when the parliamentary committee reviewing the GG Bill 
stated that it received “comments by stakeholders involved in wildlife management” 
(Parliament, 2004), according to the opinion of landowners, it should be understood to mean 
interested parties.  This is because among those it calls stakeholders are USAID and AWF.  
Nevertheless, KWS seems to have emerged out of the conference it sponsored with 
the notion of the multiple ownership of wildlife.  In a seminar where KWS presented the 
conference report, it stated that the local communities ought to recognize that wildlife in their 
lands also belong to other people and hence, they should not deny the people and other range 
states the benefit of wildlife (EAWLS 7, 2004).  This position of KWS was subtly reiterated 
by the acting minister in charge of wildlife when he addressed a seminar on the GG Bill a 
few days before it was passed by Parliament.  While claiming that he was not giving policy 
pronouncements but he was just sharing his thoughts, he raised the issue of stakeholders and 
drew an analogy from the tea industry.  He averred that if the tea industry collapsed, it was 
not only the people in tea-growing districts who would be affected, but the entire country 
because tea is a strategic industry.  From this, he observed that while there are primary 
stakeholders such as tea pickers, the industry also involves other Kenyans.  Consequently, he 
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argued that the whole country is a stakeholder and, therefore, as people look at the question 
of stakeholders, they ought to understand that there is a bigger picture to which to concede 
(EAWLS, kcb, 2004).  My reading of the mood of the Green lobby in the hall was that they 
were evidently elated because the minister, oblivious of, or ignoring, the nuanced 
differentiation between stakeholders and interested parties, had indicated that those claiming 
a stake in the wildlife even when they are not landowners have allies within the corridors of 
power.156   
This apparent convergence of thought between the Green lobby and the decision-
makers was, however, out of step with the general view on the ground among communities 
living with wildlife.  What community representatives were voicing in seminars dovetailed 
with what one would get from the field.  During field interviews, villagers were almost 
unanimous that albeit the government claims the ownership of wildlife, landowners are 
actually the ones who should own it.  Villagers aver that they live with the wildlife, protect it 
and incur costs from it; these are expenses that the government refuses to foot. At the 
minimum, the communities expect to be involved in wildlife management.  These are the 
same sentiments that KWWG expressed to the KWS Board of Trustees.  On the question of 
the conservation and management of natural resources on private land, they stated that, 
Together, the members of the Forums of the KWWG are the custodians of all 
these natural resources, including wildlife, that lie outside the formally 
Protected Areas.  These resources are on our land; we are responsible for 
them; we look after them even when they present a financial burden to us.  
The State may claim ownership, but we are the custodians (KWWG, 2003a).  
 
                                                 
156This line of thinking did not, however, go down well with community representatives.  During the 
plenary, an assistant minister argued that if wildlife belongs to Kenyans, then his people are not the 
herdsmen and, therefore, the owners of wildlife should go to his area and take it away (EAWLS kcb, 
2004).. 
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Thus here, we can see a convergence of thought between local villagers, their representatives 
in the struggles over the wildlife sector, and the Members of Parliament.  Thus the KWS 
review group did not get it right when they observed that “Neither KWS nor the people have 
clear ideas about who the stakeholders are…”(KWS, 1996:6).  As the discussion above 
showed, both are clear who the stakeholders are; but they have differences of opinion, or at 
least each could accuse the other of feigning ignorance of who the stakeholders are.   These 
differences in turn affect the question of who should drive the process of legislative review. 
 
Who should drive the process? 
While many people acknowledge the need for a conservation policy, 
should this really be drafted by KWWG?  Would it be prudent for the 
country to embrace a wildlife policy driven by the interests of one 
group---landowners (Mbaria, 2003). 
 
The challenge we have in reforming our wildlife sector is freeing the 
policy and decision-making process from the influence of foreign-
based extremist animal welfare lobby groups whose agenda is contrary 
to progressive development (Hon. Lesirma, 2004).  
 
These observations reveal one thing: that the government is not considered a prime mover of 
the wildlife policy in Kenya.  The two forces that are in the picture are the landowners157 and 
the NGOs.158  Thus when in policy fora the question is raised as to whether the policy should 
                                                 
157As the discussion above indicated, those referring to landowners do not simply mean anybody 
claiming a parcel of land; they have in mind big ranchers, mostly Kenyans of European origins.  
Nevertheless, when challenged that there are only 71 white landowners and not in every part of the 
country, one seminar participant on the GG Bill murmured that there are also Kenyan (i.e. black) 
“wazungus” (whites). 
 
158Commentators on the woes bedeviling the wildlife sector and KWS, the state agent charged with 
overseeing wildlife matters, claim that KWS is hostage to NGOs and big ranchers.  But the charge 
sheet reads differently depending on who drafts it.  Those on the ranchers’ side accuse NGOs of 
holding KWS hostage, while NGOs accuse ranchers of holding KWS hostage, especially when the 
issue is consumptive utilization (Muga, 2003, 2004; Loefler, 2004b; Mbaria, 2003; Njaga, 2003, 
2004). 
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be driven by the ministry or KWS, support for or against any of these is premised on how 
one camp views its proximity to the two, as if knowing that these two are merely pawns in a 
chessboard.  While some people think it is KWS, others object on the basis that KWS is 
central to the entire issue and is thus likely to pursue the politics of self-preservation.  In one 
seminar, a participant argued that the policy should not be led by KWS, but by a reform body 
appointed by the ministry and where KWS will just be a member.  To this participant, a 
situation where KWS hires and even pays a consultant to drive the process is unacceptable 
because such a consultant could end up writing what KWS wants to hear (EAWLS 7, 2004).  
This view seemed to be shared by many, including the landowners and even KWS donors 
such as USAID.  In responding to the claim that KWS should not lead the process, a KWS 
officer stated that during discussions with USAID who are funding the review process, the 
latter insisted that it was the ministry and not KWS who should drive the process.   
Whether KWS conceded to this ruling in principle or because, as its critics say, it is 
hostage to external forces is difficult to observe.  What is undeniable is that the views of 
those who felt that wildlife governance in Kenya, unlike the southern African countries 
where parliamentarians had toured, are not free of external influence seemed to be verified.  
In particular, landowners, as represented by KWWG, contend that KWS is captured by 
vested interests, specifically Green NGOs.  They posit that, 
organizations such as IFAW, Youth for Conservation or the Born Free 
Foundation who are so critical of us and who seem to be able to command so 
much attention.  … are largely funded from overseas, do not necessarily 
represent the interests of Kenyans.  Solely by virtue of their financial 
strengthen they can impose their hidden agendas and policies on KWS and 
Kenya—with impunity and without any accountability (KWWG, 2003a).       
 
The discounting of KWS by the landowners or KWS critics does not imply a vote for the 
ministry as the driver of the policy process.   
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The argument can be made that if KWS is not a legitimate vehicle of making wildlife 
policy, so is the ministry in charge of wildlife.  This is because, KWS is the ministry’s expert 
on wildlife matters and, therefore, when the ministry wants anything on wildlife, it performs, 
has to call KWS.  Thus, this line of thought, expounded mostly by the landowners, hold that 
it is naïve to think that a demarcation can be made between the ministry and KWS.  This 
group, therefore, holds that the policy process is the prerogative of the people and their 
representatives in government.  The role of government agencies such as KWS, they contend, 
is to implement policy.  This line of thought catapults landowners into the forefront of the 
policy process, but again, this is what the Green lobby objects to. 
Landowners, as stated above, are portrayed as an exclusive club, that isolate other 
interested parties from the wildlife sector and, according to their interlocutors, they should 
not be entrusted with the policy process.  Consequently, a particular refrain was popularized 
that the GG Bill was driven by partisan interests and, therefore, it did not represent the 
interests of the majority of Kenyans.  This view was shared thus even at the ministerial level.  
When KWWG visited the minister, they reported him as stating that while the amendment 
bill was good, “…it needs to be reviewed, as it doesn’t address the concerns of the majority 
of Kenyans” (KWWG, 2004c).  This line of attack was pursued vigorously in the run-up to 
the debate on the bill in Parliament and during the clamor for it to be rejected by the 
President.  The attack was in spite of the fact that KWWG, on its part, defines itself as the 
voice of land owners, from small scale ones to the big ranchers. 
 It is then clear that there was a problem of recognizing the legitimate drivers of the 
policy process.  This in turn generated a secondary problem in that irrespective of whatever 
efforts were expended by what camp, there would be no consensus as to whether the process 
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has been consultative.  The GG Bill was to be a victim of this requirement.  While its 
proponents held that they had consulted widely, the opponents popularized the view that the 
process leading to the GG Bill had not been consultative. 
 
The Question of Consultation 
This country is suffering from a severe bout of what may be described 
as “interest group hysteria” characterised by the mushrooming of 
institutions which describe themselves as “stakeholders”.   The term 
“stakeholders” is almost becoming a meaningless cliché.  We have a 
situation where even one-man consultancies are demanding 
“stakeholder” status, saying their voices must be heard (Kisero. 2004). 
 
In a radical departure from the 1980s, when a bill abolishing compensation for wildlife 
damage could easily pass in Parliament, the initiatives of the 1990s have been marred by the 
specter of consultation.  Wildlife review initiatives since the 1990s have been derailed on the 
grounds that not all stakeholders were consulted.  The protagonists, however, are again 
divided over whether this clamor for consultation is legitimate or merely a ruse to derail the 
process by those who may think they are loosing out in the new dispensation that might result 
from the review.  This reservation seems to be the case both in the 1996 and the GG Bill 
initiatives.  The 1996 draft bill is said to have been referred back by the cabinet apparently 
because it was not consultative.   This claim is disputed by some, and even KWS officers 
concede that it is a claim that some people may have an issue with (EAWLS kcb, 2004).  
Whatever the case, the 1996 initiative once returned from cabinet ended on that note.  The 
next thing to appear on stage was the GG Bill, 2004.  It also inherited the same consultation 
test, with the same consequences albeit taking different manifestations.   
 The charge that the GG Bill was not consultative was spearheaded by the KCWC and 
the KWS.  While it was all along clear to KWWG that KWS did not support the bill, KWS 
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officers confirmed this position openly in a wildlife seminar.  A question was posed to KWS 
officers as to what was the position of KWS on the GG Bill.  KWS representative replied that 
they did not support it because they had met many stakeholders who claimed that they had 
not been consulted (EAWLS 7, 2004).  KCWC also held the same view.  Its members159 who 
spoke in a wildlife forum debating the GG Bill with the minister in attendance told him that 
they are opposed to it because it has not been consultative.  They told him that the wildlife 
fora that are behind it do not represent the people because they are for big ranchers who have 
been managing wildlife in their own way (EAWLS kcb, 2004).  Although the chairman of 
KWWG argued against these views and cited the various times the issues have been debated 
including the seminars organized by the EAWLS, the KWS-sponsored wildlife utilization 
conference and the southern African tour by Members of Parliament, the minister seemed to 
have been swayed by the opponents of the bill.  The minister, while giving what he called his 
thoughts (other than policy statements) on the issue, posited that participation is fine but it 
should be devoid of vested interests otherwise less endowed Kenyans would be unable to 
participate.  With the benefit of hindsight, given the position that the executive finally took, 
this was a loaded ‘thought’.  It turned out to be the policy. 
The GG Bill, as the previous discussion indicated, was, contrary to the claims by its 
critics, not a solo performance.  Both the antagonists and the protagonists invested in 
influencing the legislators to either vote for it or reject it.  Moreover, the parliamentary 
committee reviewing the bill for Parliament made recommendations which literary read like 
                                                 
159During seminars, participants introduce themselves and mention the organizations they are from.  
The names of the organizations opponents of the Bill identified with appear in the documents they 
released to the public.  I knew some through my fieldwork.  There is a problem making sense of some 
of the groups and their claims that they are not represented.  A person, for example, speaking as a 
member of the ruling party’s Youth Congress cannot make a legitimate claim of not being represented 
when the youth straddle across the divide of the conservation debate — unless his view of 
consultation is that of dealing with the leaders of the youth, hence the elitism they were criticizing.  
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the wish list of the critics of the bill (Parliament, 2004).  This means that the issues that the 
critics of the bill had with it were formally submitted to Parliament, but Parliament 
nevertheless voted for the bill.  Also, earlier in the year, most of those agitating against the 
GG Bill were party to the KWS-sponsored conference on wildlife utilization where most of 
the issues of contention in the GG Bill were discussed.  Even though one can say that the 
KWS conference was marked by controversy, controversy does not negate the fact that the 
body politic had an opportunity to air their views on the various issues.  The fact that they did 
not agree is precisely why in a democracy individuals have a right to lobby their legislators 
as the issues are submitted to the lawmakers for a vote.  Thus a critique that it was not 
consultative is largely unsustainable, though it is the one that the Presidential rejection of the 
bill will be premised on.  There were, however, other issues that beset the bill as well. 
 
Other Issues that confronted the GG Bill 
Two other issues that were raised by the opponents of the GG Bill included the proposed 
balance of power in KWS, and compensation for wildlife damage. 
 
Balance of Power in KWS 
The GG Bill proposed to have communities represented in the Board of Trustees by people 
whom they had democratically elected.  They thus sought to depart from the current practice 
whereby the minister chooses the members of the board.  In the current practice, 
communities are not even entitled to a representative appointed by the minister.  The 
composition of the board is from government ministries, plus other trustees whom the 
minister appoints, with the only qualification being that they should be conversant with 
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nature preservation (RoK, 1977a (3B1)).  The GG Bill proposed to add five more trustees 
elected by communities (RoK, 2004b: 3(B)(1)(i)).  With respect to the appointment of the 
director that is currently done by the President, the bill proposed that the President appoints 
the director, but on the advice of the Board of Trustees (RoK, 2004b: (4)). 
Apart from the composition of the Board of Trustees, there was the question of 
exercising powers in running the wildlife agency.  Currently, the minister has overriding 
powers and the GG Bill sought to transfer these powers to the Board of Trustees.  The 
targeted areas included regulation of aircraft landing in national parks, declaration and 
regulation of national reserves, matters related to hunting and regulation of game trophies 
and meat (RoK, 2004b: sec. 5, 8, 9, 15, 16, 17).  It was this apparent displacement of the 
government from the agency that the critics of the bill assailed.  They charged that this is 
dangerous for the security of the state given that the wildlife service is a para-military 
organization which should not be removed from state over-sight (KCWCM 5, 2004; EAWLS 
kcb, 2004).  In a KWWG monthly meeting, USAID-donor liaison actually hinted at this 
when he told KWWG that the killer of the bill at the President’s desk will be the density of 
civil society involvement in the board yet it is a para-military organization (KWWG 11, 
2004).  Future events vindicated him, though it is not yet explicit what role the security factor 
played.   
The criticism of the bill in terms of dilution of state stranglehold by community 
involvement does not square off with the critics’ claim that the bill does not represent the 
aspirations of the people.  Local level experience suggests that the representation of the 
communities is a recurring theme among the communities view of wildlife management.  
This desire for communities to be involved in the running of wildlife matters had even been 
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recorded by the KWS review group.  It reported that communities from several districts 
believe that “Our district must be represented on the KWS Board of Trustees” (KWS, 1996: 
12, 15).   If each district was to be represented, then the picture of the Board of Trustees 
would become something far different from the one proposed by GG Bill.  In any case, the 
substantive claim that the state is displaced is invalid.  The proposed Board would have 
seventeen members, eight of them being state representatives, while four are from 
professional organizations and five elected by the communities.  This implies that even if one 
was to assume that community members will also vote against state interests, there are four 
professional members who could provide the swing vote, and in the event of abstention, the 
state would have majority vote because members seconded from other state departments are 
more than five.  The critique of state displacement is thus difficult to uphold, and could, 
therefore, have been generated just to stoke the controversy on the Bill, just as was the case 
with the other issue of compensation. 
 
Compensation for Property Damaged by Wildlife 
Compensation for property damaged by wildlife was provided for in the Wildlife Act of 1976 
(RoK, 1977a: sec 62), but it was repealed in the 1989 Amendment to the Act (RoK, 1989 
sec.11).  The only compensation that has been in force is that of human injury or death.  
Nevertheless, even this has been the subject of severe complaints by communities because, 
the amount of compensation for death occasioned by wildlife has been thirty-thousand 
shillings (KSh 30,000) which most people feel is not adequate.  Moreover, even getting this 
compensation, inadequate as it is, was a difficult experience.  The GG Bill sought to both re-
instate compensation for wildlife damage and increase the amount to be compensated.   
 253 
 
 With respect to the latter, the bill sought to specify the amount of compensation, 
unlike in the previous legislations whereby this amount was not specified but the decision for 
the amount was left to administrative determination.  With respect to injury and death, the 
Bill proposed paying amounts ranging from Ksh 300, 000 to 10 million, with the latter being 
the payment for death caused by wildlife.  The bill also proposed that compensation for loss 
to property be pegged to market rates.  Nevertheless, it introduced a rider here, which was 
not in the principal Act, and which was to prove the Achilles heels of this otherwise very 
community-friendly clause.  It proposed that owners of property would have to take 
reasonable measures to protect their crops, livestock or property from game animals (RoK, 
2004b: sec. 62B (4-5)).  The critics of the bill exploited this clause to portray the bill as 
having a sectarian character. 
Opponents of the bill argued that the proposed Ksh. 10 million was a ploy to seek 
community sympathy for the bill, yet the government cannot afford to pay that amount.  
Moreover, its opponents interpreted the requirements for communities to take due protection 
of their property in order to merit compensation in the event of wildlife damage to mean that 
even injury and death would be subjected to the same requirement.  In this case, they 
propounded the impression that people would even be required to take insurance in order to 
merit being compensated.  When they argued about the problem of insurance, they either 
conveniently avoided, or did not bother, to make a distinction that precaution was only 
required in case of property, not human life.  Hence, they advanced the view that because 
communities cannot be able to take insurance, if the bill is passed, the only beneficiaries will 
be the big ranchers as they are the only ones capable of taking insurance coverage.  After the 
bill was passed its opponents appealed to the President to reject it. They claimed that;  
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If consented to, compensation as proposed by the Bill, will cost the 
government billions of shillings but still leave out a significant 
proportion of the local community uncompensated.  This is because 
only when injury, loss or death is inflicted 5 kms from a property 
hosting wildlife is liable for compensation!  The impoverished 
communities will also be required to pay insurance premiums, which 
they may not afford (KCWCM 5, 2004). 
 
The content of this appeal is problematic.   
For one, issues of distance from property do not appear in the proposed bill, nor is 
insurance premiums mandatory because the requirement for due care could be effected 
through other means such as erecting physical barriers as suggested in the bill (RoK, 2004b: 
sec.62 B (5).  Insurance was only being made mandatory for those intending to engage in 
wildlife enterprises (RoK, 2004b: sec. 20 (2).  Secondly, while one may use this clause to 
show that communities will be excluded from wildlife enterprises, it does not support the 
claim of exclusion from compensation for wildlife damage.  While it may not be easy to 
discern the logic behind these misstatements, an element of turf wars seems to be the one in 
play here, and not necessarily the search for a viable wildlife governance regime.  In addition 
to the misrepresentation of facts, there are other pointers to suggest that the bill was being 
opposed for reasons other than the ones overtly cited in public.  The issue of Ksh. 10 million, 
for example, was not new to KWS, and hence, the state.   The 1994 KWS review group had 
reported that 
respondents propose rates of compensation for human life ranging 
from forty-nine head of cattle or Ksh 500,000 to Ksh 10 million, with 
Ksh 1 million a frequently suggested figure.  The compensation 
suggested for injuries range from Ksh 150,000 to 300,000, plus 
payment of hospital bills (KWS, 1996:7).  
  
In addition to this, KWWG held the view that the figure of Ksh. 10 million is not outrageous 
because parliamentarians had already set the stage by voting for themselves a similar amount.  
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It was thus the opinion of many that there was no way overt opposition in Parliament could 
be raised on the basis of that amount.  On his part, the sponsor of the bill told a public 
hearing gathering on the bill held in Old Chambers of Parliament that the amount is meant to 
tell the government and the conservationists that they cannot have their cake and eat it. 
 
X  Parliamentary Approval, the Presidential Rejection of the Bill and the Emergence of 
More Issues 
 
In spite of the spirited campaign to oppose the bill outside the House, parliamentarians 
nevertheless passed the bill.  The opponents, however, mobilized for the last campaign 
against the bill.  They staged street demonstrations urging the President not to assent to the 
bill, citing reasons as discussed above.  At this stage, however, more issues were included.  
The story line now was that the bill was unprocedural and unconstitutional.  Among these 
was that the President’s approval was not sought yet the bill has financial implications to the 
government.  The opponents argued that this should have been done through consultation 
between the minister for Finance and the sponsor of the bill, and then the minister advising 
the President to consent to the bill’s introduction to Parliament.  The question of how they 
knew that these otherwise official communications did not take place is not made clear.  It is, 
however, telling that they were advising the President that the bill was unconstitutional 
because, among other thing, he was not consulted.  The opponents also claimed that the bill 
was rushed through Parliament and, therefore, it was unprocedural.   
In spite of the seemingly hilarious nature of these claims, the President failed to give 
assent to the bill and returned it to the Speaker.  While the specific reasons were not made 
public, the general reference to the importance of Kenyans to have a say in wildlife 
management “since it is a national heritage” (Nation 2, 2005) seems to suggest that the 
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opponents could have managed to give the impression that there was grassroots opposition to 
the bill.  Alternatively, the state could still have had no intention to give out its clout on the 
sector, and the public opposition only happened to be a God-send opportunity.  The 
contending civil society actors helped the state retain its preferred outcomes without 
appearing to be dictatorial as was the case in 1989 amendment to the Wildlife Act.  The civil 
society had, therefore, sorted out itself, thereby shielding the state from a confrontation with 
communities/society over wildlife property rights.   
 
XI Conclusion 
The passage of the GG Bill by Parliament would have effected the devolution of wildlife 
property rights to local communities.  Had it done so, this would have been in a way 
communities thought was relevant and acceptable to them—having literary authored the GG 
Bill.  Its vetoing and, therefore, failure of the communities to get what they wanted raises a 
fundamental question as to the state’s willingness and ability to devolve wildlife property 
rights to local communities.  This conclusion is, however, problematic. 
The state was confronted by two groups, speaking from the vantage point of 
community interests, but seeking diametrically opposed rights: right to exploit and right to 
preserve the resource.  Even after the veto, supporters of the veto hailed it from the point of 
view of the people’s interests (Nation 4, 2005 and Nation 5, 2005).  Thus, while the GG Bill 
supplies evidence of the incapability of the state to devolve wildlife property rights to local 
communities, it is at the same time a problematic case study to cite as evidence of that thesis.  
It is problematic because the identity of community in GG Bill was compromised by the 
intervention of groups such as KHWCMN, Y4C, (KCWCM) that laid claim to the mantle of 
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community.  This is unlike the case in Tanzania where the community speaks with one voice, 
even when there are variations in the response strategies adopted by its members.  In Kenya 
then, the state can claim that it refused to yield to vested interests (not to the community); in 
deed it posed as if it did so in order to defend community interests—if the President’s 
remarks, and those of people who supported him (Nation 4, 2005 and Nation 5, 2005), are 
anything to go by.  
 The question can, of course, be raised as to whether the state has instrumental 
capacity to identify its subjects, the people/community in order to know who the community 
is and who are rented crowds.  Certainly yes, but doing so would not have been in its 
interests---at least if the preceding chapter holds.  So, it was satisfied with those community 
voices that were consistent with its objectives or those of its benefactors, the Green lobby. 
While what emerges from this scenario, therefore, is a story that casts aspersions as to 
whether the state can devolve wildlife property rights to communities local to wildlife, the 
question that obtains is that of whether we hold that the state’s objection was due to its self-
interests, or because of the grip the Greens have on the state (vide, RoK, 1975—the appeal to 
the West to understand sports hunting), or an interaction of the two.  The overall idea is, 
however, that it is difficult to see the state acting in ways that would deliver what 
communities want: it is fettered by forces either internal or from without. 
 
  
 
 
Chapter VI 
Conclusion: Devolution in Comparative Perspectives 
 
 
I Summary 
At the beginning of this study, it was argued that executing a successful community-based 
conservation (CBC) model would be difficult given the character of the state in Africa.  It 
was hypothesized that the state is unlikely to devolve wildlife property rights to local 
communities in a way that engenders a private property right consciousness.  Two case 
studies were examined to throw light on this contention.  With respect to Tanzania, I have 
argued that while at the national level a wildlife policy conducive to community-based 
conservation has been adopted, its implementation has, however, stalled.  The study 
explained why this has been the case in terms of the interaction of several factors, including 
state and bureaucratic interests, and the imperatives of party politics that rob communities of 
the power that could be brought to bear on an intransigent bureaucracy.  
While the contentious implementation of devolution would lead to the conclusion that 
communities have no incentives to sign up for WMA, the findings yielded mixed responses.  
Some communities acted consistently with our hypothesis, while others conceded to the 
WMA project.  The study accounted for this variance in responses to the WMA project and 
raised the question whether the transformation of property rights in these WMA could deliver 
the outcomes envisioned by the proponents of the CBC model.  
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Two significant findings emerge from the Tanzanian case study. First, state 
structures,160 and not necessarily state policies and laws, account for the predicament facing 
the wildlife sector.  This is because state structures can be manipulated to impede 
implementation.  Second, contrary to what was suggested in the property right theory that 
informed this study, the state may not devolve wildlife property rights in a way that meets the 
expectations of communities, but the latter can still sign up, under circumstances that need 
not necessarily lead to a predator resource regime.   
 With respect to Kenya, the study examined similar contestations over wildlife 
property rights between the state and local communities that host wildlife.  It was shown that 
the state presents the impression that it can cede wildlife property rights to local 
communities.  Nevertheless, the findings indicate that it is, in practice, unwilling to devolve 
the rights to local communities except in its own terms.  Such terms are apparently not 
consistent with the expectations of the communities.  The state’s unwillingness, it was 
shown, has grown proportionately with the growth of the formal state.  The findings 
disclosed that the initiatives in devolving wildlife property rights failed to secure community 
allegiance to wildlife conservation according to the wishes of the state.  Because of this 
failure, communities attempted to entrench in law their version of what a wildlife 
conservation regime should be like. 
The communities’ effort to institute their own regime failed.  The state also failed at 
the political level to accede to devolution of wildlife property rights.  I have argued that the 
state’s inability or unwillingness to devolve wildlife property rights could be a result of two 
factors: one, economic self-interest, and two, convergence of the interests of the state with 
                                                 
160 A bureaucracy devoid of proper accountability mechanisms, and a legal regime not always 
accessible by those with limited resources (both human and non-human). 
 
 260 
 
those of Green NGOs alleged to hold it hostage through KWS.  Whatever the case, the failure 
to accede to community interests raised a fundamental question of the state’s willingness and 
ability to devolve wildlife property rights to local communities.   
However, I found this conclusion to be problematic because of the nature in which 
community interests were (re)presented.  Two groups confronted the state, speaking from the 
vantage point of community interests, but seeking diametrically opposed rights.  While one 
lobby group sought the right to exploit wildlife, the other lobbied for the right to preserve the 
resource.  Hence, while the GG Bill supposedly supplied evidence of the inability of the state 
to devolve wildlife property rights to local communities, it is a problematic case study to cite 
as evidence of that thesis.  Consequently, the validation of my central thesis (whether the 
state can devolve property rights in wildlife in a way that meets the expectations of local 
communities) cannot be stated without qualification.  Apologists of the state can, for 
example, contend that it can devolve wildlife property rights to local communities but only if 
communities were unanimous on the kind of devolution they want.  Thus, unlike in Tanzania 
where it can be said that the state is willing (Wildlife Policy of Tanzania, 1998), but 
incapable (bureaucratic intransigence), in Kenya, the division among interested actors 
tempers a clear-cut scrutiny of the state.  This social dynamic insulates the state from bearing 
the brunt of responsibility for failure to devolve wildlife property rights.   
Thus, there is variation in the response of the two countries to devolution pressures.  
In one case (Kenya), the state cannot even make a credible commitment to devolve (vide, 
Sessional Paper No. 10 as contradicted by Wildlife Conservation Act, 1976; and the GG 
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Bill).  In the other case (Tanzania), the state can make a credible commitment161 (Wildlife 
Policy of Tanzania, 1998), but it cannot deliver (WMA Regulations, 2002).  In both cases, 
however, the dynamics are informed by the same logic: The political economy of under-
development.  Both states are developmental states, but yet cash-strapped.  Consequently, 
natural resources are closely guarded as state largesse that can bail it out of fiscal doldrums 
without much investment energy.  Wildlife, because of its role in tourism, is, therefore, a 
prime target.162  In this context, the segments of society able to demonstrate to the state that 
they are the most able to guarantee its interests assume a hegemonic status in the eyes of the 
state.   
At this point, the two states differ.  In Tanzania, wildlife bureaucrats enjoy a 
hegemonic status by virtue of what wildlife brings to the Treasury.  Consequently, the state 
can defer to them in matters related to wildlife.  For Kenya, the wildlife bureaucracy, unlike 
its Tanzanian counterpart, is cash-strapped and relies on donors and NGOs to shepherd the 
wildlife sector.  It is thus the latter who are hegemonic, and their agenda holds sway.  
 In both cases, the hegemonies are uncomfortable with the inclusion of communities 
in governance of wildlife conservation.  In Tanzania, the inclusion of communities would 
render the management of the sector more accountable, thus interfering with the non-
                                                 
161Going by what was referred to in this study as bureaucratic benevolence, it would follow that a 
change of guard in the Wildlife Division, as one respondent told me, can easily lead to the 
implementation of devolution in the way articulated in the Wildlife Policy of Tanzania, 1998.   
 
162Over the years, the nexus between wildlife and tourism in the imagination of the two states has 
been betrayed by how Cabinet structures have always twinned the two.  This was the case long before 
the two states set up the Ministry of Environment, and even thereafter.  On several occasions wildlife 
has been removed from the Ministry of Environment and placed under that of tourism.  As of now, 
this is the case in both countries.   
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competitive rents163 that accrue to the bureaucrats.  In Kenya, most NGOs are of the animal 
rights persuasion and it is feared that they dread the introduction of sport-hunting, a possible 
scenario if communities were given the right to decide what to do with wildlife resources 
devolved to them.  Consequently, they oppose a devolution strategy that could give 
unfettered rights to communities.  In both cases, therefore, the politics of devolution of 
wildlife property rights to local communities is trapped.  
 
II  What is Being Advanced 
The issue explored was why anticipated devolution of wildlife property rights to local 
communities would not materialize.  The hypothesis was that the interests of the state make it 
a major claimant to wildlife largesse, and at the same time the regulator of the wildlife estate.  
This characteristic, interacting with the nature of the balance of power in society (specifically 
civil society and bureaucracy), predisposes the state to rule in favor of those championing 
wildlife causes that seem to embody its interests.  In this sense, the state behaves along the 
lines of scholars who have argued that governments, even when they need not be 
conceptualized as unitary actors, have interests.  Krueger (1990: 21), for example, contends, 
“…political actors have objective functions and constraints that need not mirror the common 
good or even the preferences of the large majority of the public.”  Bates (1983:146), arguing 
along similar lines, states that “States have their own objectives.  They want taxes and 
revenue and intervene actively in their economic environment to secure them.”     
The fact that the state seemed to have interests in wildlife conservation should not 
mask the existence of private interests that used the state to achieve their own ends even as 
                                                 
163The phrase is Bates’ (1983:111). 
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the state pursued its interests.  As Bates (1983) and Gibson (1999) observed, public policies 
are not choices made to secure what is socially best, but decisions made in response to 
organized private interests.164  Scholarship on imperialism in Africa portrayed the state as a 
tool of capital (whether international or domestic) (see, for example, Leys, 1975 and Tandon, 
1982).  In this study, the state emerges as fettered by the imperatives of capital, albeit of a 
different variant from that of multi-national corporations discussed in the above studies.  In 
Kenya, for example, it is the NGOs, as wildlife sector donors, who were presented as using 
the power of their largesse to influence the state in favor of their version of administering the 
wildlife sector.  
  The perversity of this influence is evident not only from what came out from the 
communities’ protestations against the NGOs, but also from former senior wildlife managers.  
Leakey (2001:124ff), a two-time director at KWS and later head of Kenya’s Civil Service 
and Secretary to the Cabinet has, for example, claimed that when the NGOs provided the 
bulk of funding to KWS,  
their experts had played an active role in setting the agenda for conservation.  
The Wildlife Department was financially weak, so donor money could and did 
have considerable influence in some areas” (p.125)…. “I was determined to 
change the relationship between the Wildlife Service and the NGOs.  I wanted 
us to be telling them what needed to be done, rather than the other way round. 
(p. 127.) 
 
A similar theme of donor clout can be inferred from another former director of KWS, David 
Western (Western, 2001), among other commentators on the wildlife sector in Kenya.  
 Thus, what is encountered regarding the state fits in a pattern that has been observed 
in Africa, although it has not always been linked to the debate about the possibilities of 
                                                 
164For a variation of this position, see, for example, Kelman (1987) and Krueger (1990). 
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ceding its grip of the wildlife sector.  The contention by Ake (1996) is thus instructive.  Ake 
argues that: 
One cannot understand development policies and strategies, let alone the 
possibility of development, without referring constantly to the nature of the 
state and the dynamics of the social forces in which it is embedded (Ake, 
1996:42). 
 
Hyden (2006) has restated similar observations.  He argues that there is need to inquire into 
the formal and informal networks because they influence policy outcomes.  Hyden thus 
underscores the fact that the state in Africa is not an independent system of power that is 
predictable and an instrument of development charting new ways forward.  Rather, it 
responds to constraints the community imposes on it.  What, however, is not explained is 
what demand(s) the state responds to when confronted by communites with divergent 
preferences.   
In the past, Bates (1989:9) had argued that “Which group organizes politically and 
thereby seizes the power to define the system of property rights thus matters.”  Yet, while 
Bates’ contention has merit, in the current study, the explanation encounters some difficulty.  
This is because, while it could pass scrutiny with respect to Tanzania, the Kenya case 
suggests that political organization and lobbying were not enough.  The configuration of 
executive power at the particular time when the policy was formulated could override 
everything else with such vague pronouncements as “public interests” and “not consultative 
enough.”  It is in this context that the theme of informal networks and social forces becomes 
pertinent, with the implication that explaining why certain things happen(ed) has at times to 
be left to disciplined conjecture.   
Given the foregoing, the question remains as to the conditions under which one would 
expect the state in Africa to yield to devolution as the proponents of CBC envisage.  The 
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findings of this study suggest that such conditions are to be found prior to the time of 
devolution.  These conditions can be modeled as shown in the diagram below (Figure 4).  
Otherwise, in so far as the proponents of devolution focus their energies on the point at 
which the state is supposed to devolve authority to the locals, devolution will likely remain a 
mirage or a scandal.  As the account presented in this study testifies, in Kenya and Tanzania, 
it is the antecedent conditions that hold the key to the devolution that the proponents of CBC 
anticipate.  In the final analysis, dealing with the antecedent conditions (as depicted in Figure 
4) implies a restructuring of the postcolonial state in terms of bureaucratic accountability, 
state-donor relations and a working (multi-party) political dispensation that would be 
sensitive to the interests of those affected by societal issues that need adjudication.   
To this extent, communities must also be in a position to present effectively their 
preferred outcome to those who pronounce (not make) public policy.  Under such conditions, 
proponents of CBC can then proceed to elect devolution of wildlife property rights to local 
communities as a viable strategy of securing environmental sustainability.   
 
Figure 4. Specifying conditions under which viable devolution may occur. 
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III  Connecting to Larger Processes 
 
The findings in this study reflect processes taking place elsewhere in Africa.   In the Gambia, 
for example, Schroeder (1999) reveals similar experiences to those in Tanzania, where the 
devolution experiment ends up extending state control over community resources.  This 
study confirms Schroeder’s observation that in the devolution experiment, the question of 
how to devolve without loosing managerial control confronts those in charge of resources 
(Schroeder, 1999: 3).  As was the case with Tanzania’s wildlife bureaucracy, the forestry 
department in Gambia sought to regulate marketing of community forestry reserve products 
and community management of finances.  Similar attempts to micro-manage communities in 
Botswana in what is otherwise supposed to be an experiment in self-governance has been 
reported by Dzingirai (2003: 254).  Community members imprisoned for wildlife-related 
infractions agonized over the question of who then were free, people or elephants?  In the 
final analysis, what obtains is a phenomenon Ribot (1999: 29) aptly captured thus: “Many 
apparent decentralization efforts recentralize with one law what they have devolved with 
another.”165  This study argues that to understand why this happens, one has to focus on the 
nature of the state in Africa in terms of the interests, structures and the social forces it is 
embedded in.   
                                                 
165The variation to this story would be the case of Namibia.  Some observations I have heard from 
observers of CBC in Africa sugggest that in Namibia communities enjoy a relatively free rein over 
wildlife resources once these are devolved to them.  Similarly, at one time in Zimbabwe, communities 
had the right to deal with devolved wildlife resources in whatever way they deemed fit.  This was, 
however, reversed once there was a change of guard at the wildlife conservation agency (Child, n.d ).  
Similarly, in Kenya, the fortunes and misfortunes of community access to wildlife largesse fluctuate 
with the holder of office at the Kenya Wildlife Service.  When communities get what they prefer, 
such variations are an exception other than the rule in the sense that they seem to be a study in 
bureaucratic benevolence other than predictable management of public affairs that would be expected 
in a bureaucracy of Weberian persuasion.   
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In a similar vein, there are parallels between the Gambia and communities in 
Tanzania who signed up for WMA under conditions which they would have been expected 
not to.  In the Gambia, Schroeder’s account, like the one given for Tanzania, would have led 
an observer operating in the confines of a private property framework to expect the 
communities to reject the project.  Yet, dozens of communities agreed to participate in the 
project.  As in the case of Enduimet villagers, Schroeder alludes to expediency being the 
causal force in the communities’ participation.  Schroeder problematizes community 
acceptance in a way that also emerges from our study of Enduimet villagers.  He states,  
Does it signal that rural Gambians have wholeheartedly endorsed the CFMA    
concept, or does it simply reflect their desperation to (re)gain control over  
forests in search of expanded economic opportunities? (Schroeder, 1999: 17) 
 
The cases studied here also reflect the theme of transformation of property rights.  As 
Libecap (1989) and North (1990) argued, those who have an advantage in the existing 
framework, as they seek to perpetuate the system, may block the transformation of the 
institutional framework.  Wildlife bureaucrats in Kenya and Tanzania, as elsewhere in 
Africa, exemplify this tendency.  The history of the struggle for devolution of wildlife 
property rights bore this contention out.  In Kenya, for example, this was evident in the way 
non-state actors with interests in a certain conception of conservation (non-sport-hunting) 
marshaled support to frustrate the entry of communities as decision makers in wildlife use.  
In turn, bureaucrats who feared that they stood to lose if the wildlife agency was restructured 
to give communities more power in management of the wildlife sector found cause with the 
coalition opposed to wildlife utilization.  
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The wildlife bureaucrats in Tanzania displayed similar tendencies and have been able 
to block for more than a decade a process that can easily be resolved in a single statement.166  
Mwangi (2003) has reported similar trends for the transformation of property rights in 
communally owned lands in Maasailand, as does Murphree (1993) for wildlife in Zimbabwe.  
Murphree has shown that the transformation of wildlife property rights in Zimbabwe was as 
protracted as in Tanzania.  In Zimbabwe, the Parks and Wildlife Act 1975 devolved property 
rights to owners of wildlife-occupied lands.  In spite of the legal provision, there was nothing 
in any communal-land district council to reflect it by mid 1988 (Murphree, 1993:135).  Thus, 
the Kenya and Tanzania cases fit in a pattern discernible in other parts of the continent.   
 
IV   Future research 
Garrett Hardin’s statement on the tragedy of the commons (Hardin, 1968), especially with 
respect to natural resources, has largely influenced scholarship on property rights.  Elinor 
Ostrom (1990) took up Hardin’s challenge in a seminal work that demonstrated that ruin and 
degradation are not logical consequences of communal ownership of property.  Ostrom’s 
work was to be institutionalized in the rise of a professional organization called International 
Association for the Study of Common Property (IASCP), recently renamed International 
Association of the Study of the Commons (IASC).   
While the bulk of the scholarship in this tradition is rich on how to manage the 
commons, and more so the question of private interests in common property, there is less 
emphasis on the converse of Hardin’s thesis, namely, the tragedy of the commons in private 
                                                 
166 In Zimbabwe and Namibia, for example, devolution of wildlife property rights to local 
communities was effected by less than two lines of statute.  In Zimbabwe, the 1975 Parks and 
Wildlife Act simply provides that landowners will be the appropriate authority with respect to 
wildlife on their land (USAID/Kenya, 2004). 
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land.  The story in this study shows how private actors conceptualize the commons as 
wreaking havoc on private property.  The conversation between the private actors and those 
articulating common interests raises a question that Okoth-Ogendo (1991: 38 n.1) designated 
to the level of a footnote.  This is the question of the nature of public interest in private 
property.  In the findings of this study, private actors’ attempts to internalize public 
externalities in the wildlife sector have not been well received by the guardians of public 
interests.  While there are constitutional safeguards in dealing with these issues, when it 
comes to wildlife, constitutional remedies providing for compensation do not seem to be 
operational.  This seems to be the case from Yellowstone to Serengeti National Parks.167  
There, therefore, need to examine more closely the question of public interest in private 
property, particularly with respect to wildlife conservation.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
167
 With respect to Yellowstone National Park, for example, an NGO (Defenders of Wildlife) has 
taken it upon itself to raise funds to compensate private actors bordering the park who suffer damage 
from wildlife, especially the wolf.  Yet, when I asked one of the leaders of the NGO who owns 
wildlife in the US, he was clear that it is the property of the US.  One would have expected that the 
US, as the bastion of private capital, should have set the pace on how to deal with such a problem of 
public interest.  It has not, and my respondent in the case of the wolf in Yellowstone did not have an 
answer as to why the state should abandon private property owners such that they have to rely on 
assistance from non-state actors.   
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